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Agree that OWASP's crypto advice is generally garbage, but is there a better salt policy than what they have? [protected form] = [salt] + protect([protecti
by pc86 10y ago
Agree that OWASP's crypto advice is generally garbage, but is there a better salt policy than what they have?
[protected form] = [salt] + protect([protection func], [salt] + [credential]);
- schoen 10y agoI assume tptacek's objection is that salts need to be unique (at most, unpredictable enough to discourage precomputation), and don't need to be produced by a CSPRNG. Edit: or maybe something else from the editorial history of the document?
- tptacek 10y agoThere's that, but more generally and importantly, application developers who take special measures to generate salts tend not to be using secure password hashing algorithms --- the libraries for things like bcrypt tend to handle this for you.
- schoen 10y agoMaybe akin to the "typing the letters A-E-S" in https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blog/2009/july/if-youre-typing-the-letters-a-e-s-into-your-code-youre-doing-it-wrong/ https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/b...?
- astockwell 10y ago"Just use bcrypt" (or scrypt). Salting is baked in.