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I think your stance is reasonable, but I disagree with it. Remotely turning off a pacemaker is the ultimate example of empowerment. If I had a pacemaker, I wou
by sillysaurus3 10y ago
I think your stance is reasonable, but I disagree with it.
Remotely turning off a pacemaker is the ultimate example of empowerment. If I had a pacemaker, I would want to be informed immediately of a vulnerability, along with everyone else. Assuming it's a proximity-based attack, I'd have the option of driving to a rural area and booking a motel until the vendor deploys a fix.
This is obviously an extreme example, but addressing the most extreme example might be the best way to address all the rest.
How would I hear about it? Because HN, Reddit, and Twitter would all blast the information to everyone, along with "warn anyone you know who has a pacemaker." Even if I weren't technologically literate, someone close to me would tell me.
This is strictly preferable to the alternative: If the vulnerability is kept secret, my life would be in the hands of a select few who (a) know about the vulnerability and (b) may or may not use this information to their advantage.
When an independent security researcher informs a company about a vulnerability, the researcher has almost no transparency into how the company is responding to the report or what the timeline is for a fix. (HackerOne has made this a bit better, but most companies still don't have public bug bounty programs.) In the case of a pacemaker, it's very likely that the only thing the security researcher will hear is "Thank you for informing us. We are working urgently to deploy a fix" followed by a month of silence. This leads to the researcher doing increasingly desperate things to bring attention to the issue, such as emailing other security researchers in private. But an independent security researcher has no way of knowing whether the person they're emailing is trustworthy, nor can it be guaranteed that their conversation isn't being spied on. The researcher is also likely to tell someone (their husband/wife, their colleagues, etc) who are all trusted to keep it secret.
The responsibility for the pacemaker being able to kill me is squarely on the vendor, not the researcher. I would argue that the researcher has an ethical obligation to inform me, first and foremost, so that I can protect myself from the threat as quickly as possible.
When my life is on the line, giving me a chance to save it is much better than leaving it up to someone else to secretly guard it.
Some people might feel differently. For example, maybe they'd want to remain unaware that their pacemaker could kill them. But the point is that it's not a clear-cut issue.
Honestly, in that situation I would probably do nothing, since the chance that anyone would maliciously target me with a proximity-based attack is so small that it's more productive to be worried about being struck by lightning. But what if it wasn't proximity-based? Let's ratchet up the severity: What if somehow the pacemaker was connected to wifi by design, and someone gained control over whatever central server it was connecting to? In that case, I would want to be informed so that I could disable my wifi rather than trust that the server remains secure while a fix is deployed.
This all may seem unrealistic, but computing is still in its infancy. What about self-driving cars? I'd want to know immediately if someone could remotely gain control over my car so that I can not get in one. Ditto for planes.
My mind is open on the topic, so I assure you that if you try to persuade me otherwise, it will be a productive conversation. But it's hard to imagine a scenario where I'd rather not know of a threat. Can you think of one?
The only thing that comes close is if an entire city could somehow be destroyed remotely by any random troll on the internet. But in that case it might still be better to warn everyone immediately so that they can flee from the threat that was somehow constructed in their back yard, rather than keep them ignorant ostensibly for their protection and tell them later "By the way, you and your family were in serious danger."
- akoncius 10y agoanalogy with pacemaker would work better if disclosure would be just announcing that your life is at risk, please keep yourself isolated". it would warn public, but also it would lack specifics how to harm people. now if you announce wulnerability and disclose how it can be used then you increase number of people who could do damage and victims does not have anything to defend themselves. timing here is also very important.
- godelski 10y agoOk I'll present a scenario. Let's say you discover that there is an easy to reproduce hack that allows someone to remotely control a car of a specific, but popular, company, others aren't affected. All you need is an sdr and a computer. This hack was not so easy to find, which is why it was missed by the developers in the first place. It takes high technical skills to find, but is easy to execute. (BTW, this kind of hack would actually make it difficult to track down who executed the attack) Currently there have been no cases seen in the wild, how do you move forward? Do you give the company a chance to fix the problem before it is seen in the wild? I think so, and here is why. If you fully disclose you WILL see the hack in the wild because of its ease to execute and there are malicious people out there. What does the public do? Not go into work for a month? People can't do that. Buy a new car? People can't just buy new cars. They are too expensive and it isn't like a dealer will want to do a trade in for a dangerous car. Let's say you just tell the public that there is an easy to reproduce hack, and you fully disclose to the company. This can still be a dangerous thing because now that people know there is a powerful hack and they will be looking. Malicious actors will be quick to use it too, because they know it will be patched soon. It isn't unreasonable to think that the hack can be found before it can be fixed and a patch issued. Now let's say that you just disclose to the responsible party. There aren't many people looking for the hack. Malicious actors that might know about it (definitely few at this point), will be wary to use it because if it is used then the people will find out about it. In the mean time the company patches it, issues an OTA update, and we never see the attack in the wild (or maybe once or twice). We then tell the public so that no one makes the same mistake. By doing it this way you minimize the chance of the hack being used. This method IS protecting your life better than you could do on your own. We are presented with a problem if the responsible party brushes off the researcher. It is the responsibility of the researcher partially disclosing to the public. So now we're in the second case presented above. But now there is more power to the public. From a legal standpoint you can prove recklessness or malice by the responsible party and a lawsuit will be much easier. The company can be required to replace the vehicle, provide a temporary replacement, or buy it back. Whatever happens it will go much smoother in court than if one of the first two events happened. The key here is that we need trust. No system is invulnerable and it would be naive to think there is one. What the trust comes from is that the company producing the product you are using fixes the issue quickly. The trust is that they are doing what they can to ensure the safety of the users.