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So, because some companies are good at fixing things in a timely manner, we should make the public wait for all vendors? What about problems that are more arch
by kbenson 10y ago
So, because some companies are good at fixing things in a timely manner, we should make the public wait for all vendors? What about problems that are more architectural or design specific that aren't easily fixed, or can't be fixed by the nature of the discovery (math proofs)? What about vulnerabilities that seem fairly benign, but when used in conjunction with other benign vulnerabilities result in something greater (e.g. the ability to influence timing attacks)?
What is a serious problem is subjective. The right amount of time to wait is subjective. In both cases, there will be people that are unhappy with how they were or weren't informed. Instead of some select group of people deciding how important the fix is and when it will be fixed, announcing immediately empowers the public.
- exergy 10y agoReally great discussion. To my complete layperson mind, perhaps a good middle ground is that if you are the person who discovers a big security bug, you first go to the company in private, but with the caveat that you insist on being informed, perhaps daily(?), of progress. If you feel that the vulnerability is big, and the company is taking it seriously enough, you give them an honest chance, otherwise if they slack or hum and haw, you go to the public. The nuance here is that we trust the person who discovered the hole to make subjective judgements about the severity of it and the company's response, and we force the company to be more transparent than usual to the person who discovered it about how they are working/nature of the code fix. But maybe that could be a good thing?
- godelski 10y ago>If you feel that the vulnerability is big, and the company is taking it seriously enough, you give them an honest chance, otherwise if they slack or hum and haw, you go to the public. This. I fully agree with this. Obscurity is a good form of security in a temporary sense. But vulnerabilities should ALWAYS be disclosed to the public, for a number of reasons. The question is when. Disclosing does a couple things: 1) We see a company fixes them in a timely manner, which gives us trust in services that we use (and the opposite if they fail to) 2) other companies don't make the same mistakes because now the vulnerability is googleable and quickly becoming public knowledge.
- godelski 10y ago>So, because some companies are good at fixing things in a timely manner, we should make the public wait for all vendors? Of course not. In our analogy here, if the lock maker isn't issuing even a statement then hell no you shouldn't trust them. But in this case the locksmith fixed the lock and reissued the lock within a week. > What is a serious problem is subjective. Yes an no. There is a gray area. But what isn't is: lives, A TREASUREBOX OF PASSWORDS, anything that can cause physical damage, and anything that can significantly compromise a user's safety. To be clear: in another post I said you should ALWAYS (read as "\Huge{ALWAYS}")publicly disclose. So that others don't make the same mistake. But obscurity can be useful in the short run. Announcing immediately DOES NOT empower the public. They are not rational and quick to fear. ALL (EVERY SINGLE ONE) companies have vulnerabilities. What is important is if they fix them in a timely manner or not. SEEING that a company does fix a problem quickly empowers the company AND the user, because they find they have a company they can trust. Immediate disclosure only empowers the adversary.
- tptacek 10y agoObviously, announcing immediately does indeed empower those parts of the public who will decide to simply stop using the vulnerable software. Vendors don't like to acknowledge this, and prefer instead a set of premises where the only recourse to a vulnerability is an officially-approved patch (and, by implication, the continued loyalty of their user base). But it is nevertheless true.
- godelski 10y agoI fully disagree. Your statement would be true IF it were possible for software to be invulnerable. Since ALL software (and hardware) is vulnerable it is perfectly reasonable to give the owner of said software/hardware a reasonable time to fix the issue before releasing to the public. I fully believe you should always release to the public, but obscurity is a good temporary measure.
- sillysaurus3 10y agoI think your stance is reasonable, but I disagree with it. Remotely turning off a pacemaker is the ultimate example of empowerment. If I had a pacemaker, I would want to be informed immediately of a vulnerability, along with everyone else. Assuming it's a proximity-based attack, I'd have the option of driving to a rural area and booking a motel until the vendor deploys a fix. This is obviously an extreme example, but addressing the most extreme example might be the best way to address all the rest. How would I hear about it? Because HN, Reddit, and Twitter would all blast the information to everyone, along with "warn anyone you know who has a pacemaker." Even if I weren't technologically literate, someone close to me would tell me. This is strictly preferable to the alternative: If the vulnerability is kept secret, my life would be in the hands of a select few who (a) know about the vulnerability and (b) may or may not use this information to their advantage. When an independent security researcher informs a company about a vulnerability, the researcher has almost no transparency into how the company is responding to the report or what the timeline is for a fix. (HackerOne has made this a bit better, but most companies still don't have public bug bounty programs.) In the case of a pacemaker, it's very likely that the only thing the security researcher will hear is "Thank you for informing us. We are working urgently to deploy a fix" followed by a month of silence. This leads to the researcher doing increasingly desperate things to bring attention to the issue, such as emailing other security researchers in private. But an independent security researcher has no way of knowing whether the person they're emailing is trustworthy, nor can it be guaranteed that their conversation isn't being spied on. The researcher is also likely to tell someone (their husband/wife, their colleagues, etc) who are all trusted to keep it secret. The responsibility for the pacemaker being able to kill me is squarely on the vendor, not the researcher. I would argue that the researcher has an ethical obligation to inform me, first and foremost, so that I can protect myself from the threat as quickly as possible. When my life is on the line, giving me a chance to save it is much better than leaving it up to someone else to secretly guard it. Some people might feel differently. For example, maybe they'd want to remain unaware that their pacemaker could kill them. But the point is that it's not a clear-cut issue. Honestly, in that situation I would probably do nothing, since the chance that anyone would maliciously target me with a proximity-based attack is so small that it's more productive to be worried about being struck by lightning. But what if it wasn't proximity-based? Let's ratchet up the severity: What if somehow the pacemaker was connected to wifi by design, and someone gained control over whatever central server it was connecting to? In that case, I would want to be informed so that I could disable my wifi rather than trust that the server remains secure while a fix is deployed. This all may seem unrealistic, but computing is still in its infancy. What about self-driving cars? I'd want to know immediately if someone could remotely gain control over my car so that I can not get in one. Ditto for planes. My mind is open on the topic, so I assure you that if you try to persuade me otherwise, it will be a productive conversation. But it's hard to imagine a scenario where I'd rather not know of a threat. Can you think of one? The only thing that comes close is if an entire city could somehow be destroyed remotely by any random troll on the internet. But in that case it might still be better to warn everyone immediately so that they can flee from the threat that was somehow constructed in their back yard, rather than keep them ignorant ostensibly for their protection and tell them later "By the way, you and your family were in serious danger."