6 ms·

This is a great essay, and I would highly recommend this as a counterpoint to Nagel in terms of explaining consciousness ("qualia") if you want to get the most

This is a great essay, and I would highly recommend this as a counterpoint to Nagel in terms of explaining consciousness ("qualia") if you want to get the most out of Nagel's argument: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/27/daniel-dennetts-science-of-the-soul http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/27/daniel-dennetts... If Nagel things materialists can't explain consciousness Dennett thinks they can. E.g. "The obvious answer to the question of whether animals have selves is that they sort of have them. [Dennett] loves the phrase 'sort of.' Picture the brain, he often says, as a collection of subsystems that 'sort of' know, think, decide, and feel. These layers build up, incrementally, to the real thing. Animals have fewer mental layers than people—in particular, they lack language, which Dennett believes endows human mental life with its complexity and texture—but this doesn’t make them zombies. It just means that they 'sort of' have consciousness, as measured by human standards." Joshua Rothman, New Yorker, MARCH 27, 2017 - http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/27/daniel-dennetts-science-of-the-soul http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/27/daniel-dennetts... More detailed counterargument by Dennett: https://www.amazon.com/DARWINS-DANGEROUS-IDEA-EVOLUTION-MEANINGS/dp/068482471X https://www.amazon.com/DARWINS-DANGEROUS-IDEA-EVOLUTION-MEAN...

danbruc 10y ago
If Nagel things materialists can't explain consciousness [...] I do not think he makes this statement. He seems perfectly open to the possibility of explaining subjective experiences in physical terms but he is convinced that we are at least very far away from being able to do it. In consequence he obviously considers all current attempts flawed and lacking.
- sahadeva 10y ago
  I appreciate the pushback. Here is what Nagel says in his essay (emphasis mine). I wonder if you still disagree? "It is impossible to exclude the phenomenological features of experience from a reduction in the same way that one excludes the phenomenal features of an ordinary substance from a physical or chemical reduction of it--namely, by explaining them as effects on the minds of human observers. If physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological features must themselves be given a physical account. But when we examine their subjective character it seems that such a result is impossible. The reason is that every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view."
  - danbruc 10y ago
    Let me counter with this quote. If we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the subjective character of experience, we must admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue how this could be done. The problem is unique. If mental processes are indeed physical processes, then there is something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo certain physical processes. What it is for such a thing to be the case remains a mystery. I think the critical point in your quote is the last sentence. The reason is that every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view. Sure, my experience of looking at a red object is fundamentally my experience, but there seems to be no obvious reason why we could not abstract me away and talk about the experience of an arbitrary human seeing a red object. This is also in line with the suggestions at the very end, trying to develop the tools to talk about experiences in an objective manner.
    - sahadeva 10y ago
      I don't think I fully understand what Nagel means by developing objective tools to describe experiences, I should re-read the full article a few more times. I think, though, that you're exactly right: We _do_ have a shared understanding and experience of what its like to see a red ball, and we can talk about it in the abstract. My reading of that is that because we do have a shared human experience there can and indeed must be a physical account (Nagel's term) of it. Nagel's argument brings in a wedge of doubt about whether that shared experience itself is real by saying, at least partially, that because we can't explain what it is like to be a bat (bat point of view) in human terms we won't be able explain what consciousness is for humans _or_ bats with a physical account (at all or at least right now). Dennett, I think, says that that is more or less backward, and that all the means is there are different kinds of consciousness. In the article I mention he says, "The big mistake we’re making,” [Dennett] said, “is taking our congenial, shared understanding of what it’s like to be us, which we learn from novels and plays and talking to each other, and then applying it back down the animal kingdom. Wittgenstein”—he deepened his voice—“famously wrote, ‘If a lion could talk, we couldn’t understand him.’ But no! If a lion could talk, we’d understand him just fine. He just wouldn’t help us understand anything about lions.” “Because he wouldn’t be a lion,” another researcher said. “Right,” Dennett replied. “He would be so different from regular lions that he wouldn’t tell us what it’s like to be a lion. I think we should just get used to the fact that the human concepts we apply so comfortably in our everyday lives apply only sort of to animals.” He concluded, “The notorious zombie problem is just a philosopher’s fantasy. It’s not anything that we have to take seriously.” I found that convincing, I'm curious if you do as well?
dilemma 10y ago
Dennett claims that he himself is unconscious. Not someone I'd look to for advice on anything, really.
- sahadeva 10y ago
  Really? That would be very surprising to me. Where did Dennett say this?
  - dilemma 10y ago
    He claims that consciousness is an illusion, ergo: He is unconscious.

danbruc 10y ago

If Nagel things materialists can't explain consciousness [...] I do not think he makes this statement. He seems perfectly open to the possibility of explaining subjective experiences in physical terms but he is convinced that we are at least very far away from being able to do it. In consequence he obviously considers all current attempts flawed and lacking.

sahadeva 10y ago
I appreciate the pushback. Here is what Nagel says in his essay (emphasis mine). I wonder if you still disagree? "It is impossible to exclude the phenomenological features of experience from a reduction in the same way that one excludes the phenomenal features of an ordinary substance from a physical or chemical reduction of it--namely, by explaining them as effects on the minds of human observers. If physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological features must themselves be given a physical account. But when we examine their subjective character it seems that such a result is impossible. The reason is that every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view."
- danbruc 10y ago
  Let me counter with this quote. If we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the subjective character of experience, we must admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue how this could be done. The problem is unique. If mental processes are indeed physical processes, then there is something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo certain physical processes. What it is for such a thing to be the case remains a mystery. I think the critical point in your quote is the last sentence. The reason is that every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view. Sure, my experience of looking at a red object is fundamentally my experience, but there seems to be no obvious reason why we could not abstract me away and talk about the experience of an arbitrary human seeing a red object. This is also in line with the suggestions at the very end, trying to develop the tools to talk about experiences in an objective manner.
  - sahadeva 10y ago
    I don't think I fully understand what Nagel means by developing objective tools to describe experiences, I should re-read the full article a few more times. I think, though, that you're exactly right: We _do_ have a shared understanding and experience of what its like to see a red ball, and we can talk about it in the abstract. My reading of that is that because we do have a shared human experience there can and indeed must be a physical account (Nagel's term) of it. Nagel's argument brings in a wedge of doubt about whether that shared experience itself is real by saying, at least partially, that because we can't explain what it is like to be a bat (bat point of view) in human terms we won't be able explain what consciousness is for humans _or_ bats with a physical account (at all or at least right now). Dennett, I think, says that that is more or less backward, and that all the means is there are different kinds of consciousness. In the article I mention he says, "The big mistake we’re making,” [Dennett] said, “is taking our congenial, shared understanding of what it’s like to be us, which we learn from novels and plays and talking to each other, and then applying it back down the animal kingdom. Wittgenstein”—he deepened his voice—“famously wrote, ‘If a lion could talk, we couldn’t understand him.’ But no! If a lion could talk, we’d understand him just fine. He just wouldn’t help us understand anything about lions.” “Because he wouldn’t be a lion,” another researcher said. “Right,” Dennett replied. “He would be so different from regular lions that he wouldn’t tell us what it’s like to be a lion. I think we should just get used to the fact that the human concepts we apply so comfortably in our everyday lives apply only sort of to animals.” He concluded, “The notorious zombie problem is just a philosopher’s fantasy. It’s not anything that we have to take seriously.” I found that convincing, I'm curious if you do as well?

dilemma 10y ago

Dennett claims that he himself is unconscious. Not someone I'd look to for advice on anything, really.

sahadeva 10y ago
Really? That would be very surprising to me. Where did Dennett say this?
- dilemma 10y ago
  He claims that consciousness is an illusion, ergo: He is unconscious.