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What I like about Thomas Nagel is that he is one of the few atheists who steps up against darwinism and materialism as an explanation for almost everything. Qu

What I like about Thomas Nagel is that he is one of the few atheists who steps up against darwinism and materialism as an explanation for almost everything. Quoting from The Last Word (1997): "[...] I don't want here to be a God; I don't want the universe to be like that. My guess is that this cosmic authority problem is not a rare condition and that it is responsible for much of the scientism and reductionism of our time. One of the tendencies it supports in the ludicrous overuse of evolutionary biology to explain everything about life, including everything about the human mind." Of course his book Mind & Cosmos is the best example of this

ue_ 10y ago
I think it's rather refreshing to have someone speak out against scientism, thank you for the book.
amasad 10y ago
I agree that darwinism is overused to explain everything but materialism seems inescapable -- especially for atheists. I think even Nagel agrees with "Inference to the Best Explanation" and so far I've never seen a single case of anything better explained than the materialist explanation.
- goatlover 10y ago
  Materialism is not inescapable for atheists in philosophy at all. You can be anti-realist or an idealist sans God. You can also be a platonist. Or you could be a dualist like Chalmers. There's plenty of room for different views than materialism without committing to a belief in the supernatural.
  - ilugaslifg 10y ago
    How would you distinguish between "dualism" and "the supernatural"?
    - goatlover 10y ago
      Just say that the mind is part of the natural world, which means the world isn't simply material. It's both mental and material. Chalmers position is property dualism where certain informationally rich systems have conscious properties in addition to physical ones. Anyway, materialism is a monism, like Thales saying the world is made of water. There's nothing that necessitates the world be a monism. Maybe it is and maybe it isn't. Panpsychism is another dualistic view of the natural world than requires no supernatural component. Everything has a mental as well as material aspect.
      - ilugaslifg 10y ago
        So you distinguish between dualism and the supernatural by expanding your definition of "natural" to include a distinct realm of non-material "nature" with no definable rules. And, of all the phenomena that might be identifiable as emerging from the fabric of reality, the one that distinguishes you (and other systems you recognize as sufficiently like you) from everything else just happens to be the one you've decided must objectively be set apart. I'll ask again: in this framework, what remains "supernatural", and why can you reject it?
        goatlover 10y ago
        Who says the mental has no rules? Anyway, the question of what fundamentally exists is an ontological question. Materialism is one possible answer. All that fundamentally exists is material objects, and everything else, including mind, society, abstract concepts, etc emerge from that material substrate. Idealism would be the opposite answer. Everything is mental, and material objects are just ideas presented to the mind. Everything is mathematical would be another possibility. Or information, perhaps qubits (it from quantum bits). But maybe aspects of mind and matter are both fundamental to what exists. Or maybe it's some third neutral substance that's neither. But whatever the case, none of that need involve the supernatural. It can, if one is disposed to think that way. One can say that God created the material world (granted, that leaves God as the something else, but at least the world gets to be entirely material).
  - amasad 10y ago
    I guess I meant physicalism then. Or maybe naturalism? I didn't mean to make a claim on the philosophy of mind just that the world is simply the physical world. On the other hand dualism refitted for the physicalist world seems like a hack at best. Panpsychism fails the inference to the best explanation or Occam's razor etc.
    - goatlover 10y ago
      It depends on whether physicalism can account for all aspects of mind along with abstract concepts and the laws of nature (or causation). To be a successful monism, one has to be able to explain everything in terms of that monism.
      - amasad 10y ago
        Yes, and many have done so. Marvin Minsky, Steven Pinker, and Daniel Dennet come to mind. In philosophy lingo I think it all ends up being functional physicalism.
        goatlover 10y ago
        There's no consensus that Minsky, Pinker, Dennett have succeeded. Plenty of philosophers and scientists have disagreed with their arguments. Dennett's attempt rests on the controversial claim that we're actually p-zombies, and consciousness can be understood in only functional terms. This is prima facie absurd to many people.
        amasad 10y ago
        Dennet's argument is simply an inversion of the causal chain: i.e mind is not the causer but the cause. "P-zombies" is kind of a non-starter when you think about it. I think LessWrong's essays on it shows that, here is one passage: "you can form a propositional belief that "Consciousness is without effect", and not see any contradiction at first, if you don't realize that talking about consciousness is an effect of being conscious. But once you see the connection from the general rule that consciousness has no effect, to the specific implication that consciousness has no effect on how philosophers write papers about consciousness, zombie-ism stops being intuitive and starts requiring you to postulate strange things." http://lesswrong.com/lw/p7/zombies_zombies/ http://lesswrong.com/lw/p7/zombies_zombies/
- pdorje 10y ago
  Atheism may be defined as materialism, but more precisely it means the belief or knowledge of the non-existence of a creator god or at least a deity overlord. Most Buddhists are atheists but not materialists. And although materialism and atheism are commonly conflated, they are very different issues, particularly considering non-abrahamic religions or philosophy in the technical sense.
  - amasad 10y ago
    I don't like to argue about definitions so let me ask you this: Don't you agree that the majority of self-proclaimed athiests are non-religionists and also reject the supernatural?
- jchrisa 10y ago
  Donald Davidson's supervenience views occupy the in between space you describe https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/

ue_ 10y ago

I think it's rather refreshing to have someone speak out against scientism, thank you for the book.

amasad 10y ago

I agree that darwinism is overused to explain everything but materialism seems inescapable -- especially for atheists. I think even Nagel agrees with "Inference to the Best Explanation" and so far I've never seen a single case of anything better explained than the materialist explanation.

goatlover 10y ago
Materialism is not inescapable for atheists in philosophy at all. You can be anti-realist or an idealist sans God. You can also be a platonist. Or you could be a dualist like Chalmers. There's plenty of room for different views than materialism without committing to a belief in the supernatural.
- ilugaslifg 10y ago
  How would you distinguish between "dualism" and "the supernatural"?
  - goatlover 10y ago
    Just say that the mind is part of the natural world, which means the world isn't simply material. It's both mental and material. Chalmers position is property dualism where certain informationally rich systems have conscious properties in addition to physical ones. Anyway, materialism is a monism, like Thales saying the world is made of water. There's nothing that necessitates the world be a monism. Maybe it is and maybe it isn't. Panpsychism is another dualistic view of the natural world than requires no supernatural component. Everything has a mental as well as material aspect.
    - ilugaslifg 10y ago
      So you distinguish between dualism and the supernatural by expanding your definition of "natural" to include a distinct realm of non-material "nature" with no definable rules. And, of all the phenomena that might be identifiable as emerging from the fabric of reality, the one that distinguishes you (and other systems you recognize as sufficiently like you) from everything else just happens to be the one you've decided must objectively be set apart. I'll ask again: in this framework, what remains "supernatural", and why can you reject it?
      - goatlover 10y ago
        Who says the mental has no rules? Anyway, the question of what fundamentally exists is an ontological question. Materialism is one possible answer. All that fundamentally exists is material objects, and everything else, including mind, society, abstract concepts, etc emerge from that material substrate. Idealism would be the opposite answer. Everything is mental, and material objects are just ideas presented to the mind. Everything is mathematical would be another possibility. Or information, perhaps qubits (it from quantum bits). But maybe aspects of mind and matter are both fundamental to what exists. Or maybe it's some third neutral substance that's neither. But whatever the case, none of that need involve the supernatural. It can, if one is disposed to think that way. One can say that God created the material world (granted, that leaves God as the something else, but at least the world gets to be entirely material).
- amasad 10y ago
  I guess I meant physicalism then. Or maybe naturalism? I didn't mean to make a claim on the philosophy of mind just that the world is simply the physical world. On the other hand dualism refitted for the physicalist world seems like a hack at best. Panpsychism fails the inference to the best explanation or Occam's razor etc.
  - goatlover 10y ago
    It depends on whether physicalism can account for all aspects of mind along with abstract concepts and the laws of nature (or causation). To be a successful monism, one has to be able to explain everything in terms of that monism.
    - amasad 10y ago
      Yes, and many have done so. Marvin Minsky, Steven Pinker, and Daniel Dennet come to mind. In philosophy lingo I think it all ends up being functional physicalism.
      - goatlover 10y ago
        There's no consensus that Minsky, Pinker, Dennett have succeeded. Plenty of philosophers and scientists have disagreed with their arguments. Dennett's attempt rests on the controversial claim that we're actually p-zombies, and consciousness can be understood in only functional terms. This is prima facie absurd to many people.
        amasad 10y ago
        Dennet's argument is simply an inversion of the causal chain: i.e mind is not the causer but the cause. "P-zombies" is kind of a non-starter when you think about it. I think LessWrong's essays on it shows that, here is one passage: "you can form a propositional belief that "Consciousness is without effect", and not see any contradiction at first, if you don't realize that talking about consciousness is an effect of being conscious. But once you see the connection from the general rule that consciousness has no effect, to the specific implication that consciousness has no effect on how philosophers write papers about consciousness, zombie-ism stops being intuitive and starts requiring you to postulate strange things." http://lesswrong.com/lw/p7/zombies_zombies/ http://lesswrong.com/lw/p7/zombies_zombies/
pdorje 10y ago
Atheism may be defined as materialism, but more precisely it means the belief or knowledge of the non-existence of a creator god or at least a deity overlord. Most Buddhists are atheists but not materialists. And although materialism and atheism are commonly conflated, they are very different issues, particularly considering non-abrahamic religions or philosophy in the technical sense.
- amasad 10y ago
  I don't like to argue about definitions so let me ask you this: Don't you agree that the majority of self-proclaimed athiests are non-religionists and also reject the supernatural?
jchrisa 10y ago
Donald Davidson's supervenience views occupy the in between space you describe https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/