Another interesting nugget that I think is material to the conversation: "For the banks involved, taking on the risk of lending to an unprofitable private comp

Another interesting nugget that I think is material to the conversation: "For the banks involved, taking on the risk of lending to an unprofitable private company can help them win a role underwriting an eventual IPO." It's fascinating to watch how we're building the stack of cards this time. The bankers on SNAP made $85,000,000 in fees on the IPO - which is very high margin activity. The same bankers provided ~$1.2b in credit to SNAP as part of the courting process (1). I'm not going to wave the doom and gloom flag, but credit lending on unprofitable companies to secure speculative IPO rights is probably something that will show up in HBR case studies after the next downturn. (1) http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/03/snap-ipo-what-wall-street-banks-made.html http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/03/snap-ipo-what-wall-street-ban...