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The Norden bombsight is a fascinating example of the way the promise of technology can run far ahead of the reality. It's not an exaggeration to say that the U
by smacktoward 10y ago
The Norden bombsight is a fascinating example of the way the promise of technology can run far ahead of the reality.
It's not an exaggeration to say that the U.S. military, when it entered World War 2, considered the Norden a war-winning weapon. The entire strategic bombing doctrine of the Army Air Forces was designed around it, emphasizing daylight raids on "pinpoint" targets to best capitalize on the Norden's accuracy.
The RAF advised against such a strategy, having tried the same type of raids themselves before American entry into the war; they found it impossible under combat conditions to achieve the degree of accuracy needed to knock such targets out. The British had switched to the doctrine of night area bombing, abandoning accuracy altogether to reduce their own casualties, and urged the Americans to do the same. But the AAF was confident that they would succeed where the British had failed, because American bombers were equipped with the Norden bombsight.
Which turned out to not make any difference whatsoever; in the stress of combat, buffeted by wind and flak and fighter attack, the bombardiers of the AAF ended up having just as hard a time hitting the target as the RAF's had. The Norden bombsight was a dud. And because it had led the AAF to organize its raids during the day, when its bombers were easy for German fighter pilots to find and shoot down, casualties in the bomber force during 1942 and 1943 were shockingly high; in one raid alone, the October 14, 1943 attack on the ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Raid_on_Schweinfurt https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Raid_on_Schweinfurt), 26% of the attacking bombers were shot down. Even worse, the casualties were taken to no practical purpose; the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (http://anesi.com/ussbs02.htm http://anesi.com/ussbs02.htm), a post-war review of the efficacy of the war's bombing campaigns, found that "there is no evidence that the attacks on the ball-bearing industry had any measurable effect on essential war production."
In the end the AAF's daylight raids did help win the war, but not in any way where the Norden bombsight contributed. As fighters were developed with the range to accompany the bombers all the way to the target, the AAF changed to a strategy of essentially using the bombers as bait, luring Luftwaffe fighters into the air where the AAF's could engage and destroy them. Here America's greater fighter production and better pilot training gave them the edge, with the result that by the time D-Day arrived in June 1944 the Allies had won uncontested command of the air, a dominant position they would never give up. But when the bombers were just bait, the accuracy of their bombing didn't matter at all; they could have gone up with any old bombsight, or no bombsight at all. Which is a sad verdict on the legendary Norden, which just three years before had been thought able to win the war all by itself.
- arjie 10y agoIn an interesting coincidence, I was just reading Kurt Vonnegut's Fates Worse Than Death. He fought in WW II and was taken as a POW to Dresden where he was promptly firebombed. He asks a close friend of his, Bernard O'Hare, what he learned (from the war). O'Hare (who eventually became a DA) replied "I will never again believe my Government." > The future DA O'Hare replied, "I will never again believe my Government." This had to do with our Government's tall tales of delicate surgery performed by bombers equipped with Sperry and Norden bombsights. These instruments were so precise, we had been told, that a bombardier could drop his billets-doux down the chimney of a factory if ordered to. There were solemn charades performed for newsreels in which military policemen with drawn .45 automatics escorted bombardiers carrying bombsights to their planes. That was how desperate the Germans and the Japanese were (so went the message) to learn and make use of the secret of our bombings' diabolical accuracy themselves. > Such a sop to civilian sensibilities nowadays would seem as unintentionally hilarious as a love scene between Gloria Swanson and Rudolph Valentino
- smacktoward 10y agoIt's true that the supposed accuracy of the Norden bombsight was made much of in propaganda; the Carl L. Norden company itself, for instance, bought a block of time in a 1943 Barnum & Bailey circus performance at Madison Square Garden to show a routine involving a clown using the sight to drop a bomb into a barrel. (Here's Life magazine's article on the performance: https://books.google.com/books?id=EU4EAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PA27&ots=NweZxvCOCQ&dq=norden%20bombsight%20circus&pg=PA27#v=onepage&q=norden%20bombsight%20circus&f=false https://books.google.com/books?id=EU4EAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PA27&ots=...) But it wasn't all propaganda; the government really did believe the Norden was critical technology, and required a range of extreme security measures to protect it, including having bombardiers check their bombsights out of their planes and into a secured facility after each mission. But it was all more or less for naught, as the Germans had a man inside the Norden company itself who passed them a range of confidential materials related to the sight's design before being caught in the roundup of the infamous "Duquesne spy ring" in 1941. (See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duquesne_Spy_Ring https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duquesne_Spy_Ring for more on the latter.)
- DanBC 10y ago