Isn't it a general principle that, if two provisions are contradictory, the more specific one counts? I also don't think it's quite fair to characterise anythi

Isn't it a general principle that, if two provisions are contradictory, the more specific one counts? I also don't think it's quite fair to characterise anything but textual originalism as "interpretation through the lens of policy decisions". In this case one could, for example, argue that that an interpretation which renders parts of the law completely useless (1391 in this case) is illegitimate, at least if the act that created the ambiguity could have also eliminated it. it would also seem proper to err on the side of the earlier legislation simply as a mechanism to encourage better legislation. I wouldn't even agree, but it's usually the conservative argument that judges shouldn't try to fix laws when they're poorly drafted (c.f. the last Obamacare case at SC).