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tptacek is also arguing against a straw-man. DANE with TLSA usages 0, 1, and 2 just supplies additional constraints on top of existing PKIX validation. It's o
by amluto 10y ago
tptacek is also arguing against a straw-man. DANE with TLSA usages 0, 1, and 2 just supplies additional constraints on top of existing PKIX validation. It's only TLSA usage 3 that has this issue at all. It would be entirely reasonable for browsers to get started with support for usages 0-2 but not 3.
I suspect the real issue is that the DNS protocol makes it extremely awkward for client machines to do full DNSSEC validation -- the normal approach is to see the AD bit and to blindly trust the upstream resolver, and this is obviously a complete non-starter for DANE.
- tptacek 10y agoFirst off, TLSA Certificate Usage 2 also effectively turns the DNS into a CA, so you're just factually off here. Second, why is this a compelling argument? The first 2 TLSA usages are essentially what we already have: HPKP, bootstrapped from the DNS. HPKP's competition, TACK, worked the same way and didn't require DNSSEC at all. Further: all the problems people have with pinning (certificate suicide) remain in place with TLSA 0 and 1. So basically this argument is: "that's a straw man because there's a way to deploy DANE where it doesn't accomplish anything and that's probably the only way DANE will ever be deployed so none of this matters". I am willing to stipulate that's the case.
- amluto 10y ago> First off, TLSA Certificate Usage 2 also effectively turns the DNS into a CA, so you're just factually off here. Whoops. Usages 0 and 1, then. > Second, why is this a compelling argument? The first 2 TLSA usages are essentially what we already have: HPKP, bootstrapped from the DNS. TLSA usages 1 and 2 bootstrap off something that still works even if you've never visited the site before (or if you're in private browsing mode, etc). HPKP can't do that unless you preload. > Further: all the problems people have with pinning (certificate suicide) remain in place with TLSA 0 and 1. That's just not true. You can set a reasonable TTL and rescue yourself in a timely manner from a lost certificate without significantly impacting security. With HPKP, if you set a very short expiration, you lost almost all of your security.