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Well, for your exact GOOGLE.IO example, it's very likely the answer is nobody will issue but I suspect you misapprehend why. Let's Encrypt absolutely would be
by tialaramex 10y ago
Well, for your exact GOOGLE.IO example, it's very likely the answer is nobody will issue but I suspect you misapprehend why.
Let's Encrypt absolutely would be happy to issue you a certificate for my web site if you can use DNS to convince them you control it.
Why not for GOOGLE.IO? Well Google is very famous, and CAs are obliged to have a "High risk" policy that identifies some names as "High risk" and requires human oversight for those names. Google is probably on every high risk list ever formulated. For Let's Encrypt since they have zero humans in their validation process, the "High risk" list is a blacklist, you just get an error "Policy forbids issuing" instead of your certificate.
But "High risk" doesn't scale. It protects Google, Microsoft, HSBC, Amazon, but it's not going to protect me or most other people.
CAA protects more broadly, but it doesn't protect you against somebody with control over DNS, because it needs DNS records to work, so they could just remove or alter the records. Also CAA is only just recently becoming mandatory, it can't save you if it's ignored by the CA.
- amluto 10y agotptacek is also arguing against a straw-man. DANE with TLSA usages 0, 1, and 2 just supplies additional constraints on top of existing PKIX validation. It's only TLSA usage 3 that has this issue at all. It would be entirely reasonable for browsers to get started with support for usages 0-2 but not 3. I suspect the real issue is that the DNS protocol makes it extremely awkward for client machines to do full DNSSEC validation -- the normal approach is to see the AD bit and to blindly trust the upstream resolver, and this is obviously a complete non-starter for DANE.
- tptacek 10y agoFirst off, TLSA Certificate Usage 2 also effectively turns the DNS into a CA, so you're just factually off here. Second, why is this a compelling argument? The first 2 TLSA usages are essentially what we already have: HPKP, bootstrapped from the DNS. HPKP's competition, TACK, worked the same way and didn't require DNSSEC at all. Further: all the problems people have with pinning (certificate suicide) remain in place with TLSA 0 and 1. So basically this argument is: "that's a straw man because there's a way to deploy DANE where it doesn't accomplish anything and that's probably the only way DANE will ever be deployed so none of this matters". I am willing to stipulate that's the case.
- amluto 10y ago> First off, TLSA Certificate Usage 2 also effectively turns the DNS into a CA, so you're just factually off here. Whoops. Usages 0 and 1, then. > Second, why is this a compelling argument? The first 2 TLSA usages are essentially what we already have: HPKP, bootstrapped from the DNS. TLSA usages 1 and 2 bootstrap off something that still works even if you've never visited the site before (or if you're in private browsing mode, etc). HPKP can't do that unless you preload. > Further: all the problems people have with pinning (certificate suicide) remain in place with TLSA 0 and 1. That's just not true. You can set a reasonable TTL and rescue yourself in a timely manner from a lost certificate without significantly impacting security. With HPKP, if you set a very short expiration, you lost almost all of your security.