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Mmm? Secure enclave is present on most Android devices and is mandatory since Android 6.0. (It's just called something else.) Historically Android has been la
by izacus 10y ago
Mmm? Secure enclave is present on most Android devices and is mandatory since Android 6.0.
(It's just called something else.)
Historically Android has been lagging behind a bit from iOS devices when it comes to security, but Pixels and their software have a very similar security model and design (with some exceptions - less granularity with file-based encryption and some other mostly minor details).
Non Google devices however are usually significantly less secure - not so much due to Android design, as due to manufacturers deliberately disabling Android's security featuers (e.g. only Pixel actually uses dm-verity at this moment if I remember correctly), refusing to update them, building devices with bad trustzone drivers... etc.
If you keep to the 1st party (Google-branded) devices like in iOS world, you're mostly ok.
- CalChris 10y agoYes, they're using the ARM Trusted Execution Environment rather than a separate Enclave chip with its separate OS (L4). Apple is an ARM architecture licensee, designing their own compatible chips. So the TEE would have been an available path (compatibility is still required, no?) but they instead went the extra yard with a separate Enclave chip. As their white paper details, they also go to insane levels with that chip and moreover with its communications rather than just trust the TEE within an ARM chip and call it a day.
- izacus 10y agoYes, indeed they went above and beyond - probably because they also need to defend not only against external threats, but against the user of the device himself to keep the walled garden intact.
- CalChris 10y agoYes (dunno why all the downvotes) but Apple went even further than the walled garden would require. They could have easily left an Apple backdoor. But they encrypt the protocol going over wires to/from the Enclave. They go insanely far rather than sufficiently far. Yeah, nation state level attacks will still work, especially if they have the phone. But with Android it's not nation state level. It's corporate level and maybe less if they have the phone.
- Cyph0n 10y agoI felt that Apple's description of the initial key setup between the enclave and the main processor was hand-wavy at best. I know of another similar implementation that's used by Microsemi for their FPGA-based secure boot process[1]. They claim to protect the initial AES key transmission using an "obfuscated" crypto library that is sent to the processor over SPI on boot[2]. Also, I wonder if Apple exchanges a nonce during the setup to prevent replay attacks? [1]: https://www.microsemi.com/products/fpga-soc/security/secure-boot https://www.microsemi.com/products/fpga-soc/security/secure-... [2]: It's a C/C++ library called WhiteboxCRYPTO. There is a whitepaper (http://soc.microsemi.com/interact/default.aspx?p=E464 http://soc.microsemi.com/interact/default.aspx?p=E464), but AFAIK the gist of their argument is that the code and keys are sufficiently obfuscated to prevent reverse engineering (typical marketing-speak).
- CalChris 10y agoRead the Apple patent I cited above. Apple isn't exporting an API so don't expect much in the docs. But they do have to teach in the patent.
- emsy 10y agoThere was an article about iOS security where someone argued that Apple controls the enclave for security reasons, to which I answered that this is basically security by obscurity. You can see I was downvoted for this: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13676135 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13676135 I still downvoted izacus because it was an uncharitable fanboy rambling. The charitable interpretation would be that the walled garden (in regards to the enclave) is a side effect of their implementation, and not the intention.
- Cyph0n 10y agoMore recent ARM chips (A9+) come bundled with ARM TrustZone[1]. In a nutshell, the processor has two (hardware) isolated execution environments each running a different OS and different software. By default, the secure environment of TrustZone runs an L4 kernel (edit: this is incorrect, see reply below). Could it be the case that Apple is leveraging TrustZone but with a customized L4 kernel? Or is it confirmed that the Secure Enclave is a custom IC designed by Apple? I wouldn't be surprised if it's the former as it becomes much cheaper to implement the required security features. Edit: Check out this previous discussion on this exact topic: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8410700 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8410700 [1]: https://www.arm.com/products/security-on-arm/trustzone https://www.arm.com/products/security-on-arm/trustzone
- CalChris 10y agoTrustZone was announced 2012 (?). The Security Enclave is a separate very Apple designed chip. They've patented aspects of it, dated also 2012: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Mandt-Demystifying-The-Secure-Enclave-Processor.pdf https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Mandt-De... https://www.google.com/patents/US8832465 https://www.google.com/patents/US8832465
- bryanbuckley 10y ago> TrustZone was announced 2012 No, 2012 was when Trustonic was formed from competing TEE vendors: ARM, Gemalto, and Giesecke & Devrient. TrustZone has been around since before that. TI OMAP were front-runners of using it.
- bryanbuckley 10y ago> By default, the secure environment of TrustZone runs an L4 kernel. By default no SW runs on HW. "Mobicore" (now called "Kinibi" from Trustonic) is based on L4.
- Cyph0n 10y agoI know that mate, no need to get snarky. What I meant is that it was bundled with the core by default, but thanks for the correction. I thought I read it somewhere, but judging by a quick search, it seems I'm mistaken.
- Nullabillity 10y agoMy OnePlus 3T uses dm-verity as well, sadly. Displaying an "unlocked" badge during boot is acceptable. Actually pausing boot for 10 seconds every time is not by a long shot.
- izacus 10y agoThat's good to know when recommending devices.
- cschmittiey 10y agoNexus 5x and 6p have dm-verity as well.