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Currently the DNS roots are already effectively in charge. If an entity, government or otherwise, controls .LY, they can trivially get a trusted X.509 cert for
by amluto 10y ago
Currently the DNS roots are already effectively in charge. If an entity, government or otherwise, controls .LY, they can trivially get a trusted X.509 cert for .LY. DANE just makes it much harder for other attackers to do the same.
Having a CT-like feature for DNSSEC would be nice, though.
- tptacek 10y agoThat's clearly not true. Try this thought experiment: you're GCHQ, the owner of .IO. You want a certificate issued for GOOGLE.IO. You control the TLD and thus the GOOGLE.IO zone. What CA will issue you GOOGLE.IO on a DV basis, and what will happen if they do? Obviously, there's a reason nobody is issuing Google certificates, despite the insecure DNS that appears to be the only obstacle to that happening. Flesh out why, and try to be specific. The point isn't really about Google, but about the fact that the Web PKI is more complicated than the CA BRs suggest, and has safeguards at multiple levels. I am not arguing that the CA PKI is a good system. It is not. It's a wretched system. It's only my contention that DNSSEC is worse.
- kodablah 10y agoI suppose the OP is assuming the government has a trusted root that they can create certs from at will. I would be curious to know, were a government able to DNS spoof or cert spoof to MITM traffic, which would they choose? Which would be more detectable? I assume Google is basically off limits without local machine access due to pinning and other checks built in to Chrome.
- tptacek 10y agoEveryone assumes that each of the Five Eyes governments can, in a pinch, get any certificate they need issued. What people overlook is that on the modern Internet, browsers themselves form an ad hoc certificate surveillance network. If you get a certificate issued for a site that pins, or create a CT discrepancy, there is a very good chance Google and Mozilla are going to discover the CA responsible. And, as you can see, even if you operate the largest, most important CA on the Internet, Google will, if that happens, fuck your shit up. If you want one (of many) dispositive arguments against DNSSEC, just consider that Google and Apple and Mozilla are not in fact in a position to fuck shit up for .COM. You can't revoke or distrust a TLD: the use of those TLDs is encoded into the brains of hundreds of millions of users. Not so a CA!
- tialaramex 10y agoWell, for your exact GOOGLE.IO example, it's very likely the answer is nobody will issue but I suspect you misapprehend why. Let's Encrypt absolutely would be happy to issue you a certificate for my web site if you can use DNS to convince them you control it. Why not for GOOGLE.IO? Well Google is very famous, and CAs are obliged to have a "High risk" policy that identifies some names as "High risk" and requires human oversight for those names. Google is probably on every high risk list ever formulated. For Let's Encrypt since they have zero humans in their validation process, the "High risk" list is a blacklist, you just get an error "Policy forbids issuing" instead of your certificate. But "High risk" doesn't scale. It protects Google, Microsoft, HSBC, Amazon, but it's not going to protect me or most other people. CAA protects more broadly, but it doesn't protect you against somebody with control over DNS, because it needs DNS records to work, so they could just remove or alter the records. Also CAA is only just recently becoming mandatory, it can't save you if it's ignored by the CA.
- amluto 10y agotptacek is also arguing against a straw-man. DANE with TLSA usages 0, 1, and 2 just supplies additional constraints on top of existing PKIX validation. It's only TLSA usage 3 that has this issue at all. It would be entirely reasonable for browsers to get started with support for usages 0-2 but not 3. I suspect the real issue is that the DNS protocol makes it extremely awkward for client machines to do full DNSSEC validation -- the normal approach is to see the AD bit and to blindly trust the upstream resolver, and this is obviously a complete non-starter for DANE.
- tptacek 10y agoFirst off, TLSA Certificate Usage 2 also effectively turns the DNS into a CA, so you're just factually off here. Second, why is this a compelling argument? The first 2 TLSA usages are essentially what we already have: HPKP, bootstrapped from the DNS. HPKP's competition, TACK, worked the same way and didn't require DNSSEC at all. Further: all the problems people have with pinning (certificate suicide) remain in place with TLSA 0 and 1. So basically this argument is: "that's a straw man because there's a way to deploy DANE where it doesn't accomplish anything and that's probably the only way DANE will ever be deployed so none of this matters". I am willing to stipulate that's the case.