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> On the other hand, eliminativism manages to take an even whackier view of things than dualism. Whereas dualism has painted itself into a corner by refusing to
by naasking 10y ago
> On the other hand, eliminativism manages to take an even whackier view of things than dualism. Whereas dualism has painted itself into a corner by refusing to reexamine its suppositions, eliminativism "resolves" the problem by shutting its eyes, that is, by denying the existence of those things it must explain. As a result, it is an incoherent position.
Not even remotely. I'm not even sure how you could possibly form such a conclusion, except by some deep misunderstanding of all of the various materialist arguments that discuss qualia. Dennett is himself a materialist by the way.
Materialism can classify qualia as an illusion while still recognizing that some reduction of qualia to physical laws is needed. This reduction would be left to the domain of science though, because that's where it would belong.
- psyc 10y agoI've read a few Dennett books and watched many of his talks, and imo the main problem with him is his and his fans' motte & bailey style of arguing. He spends inordinate amounts of time heavily suggesting that consciousness is an ephemeral nothing that we're not just ignorant about, but mistaken about. But when pressed enough, then he retreats to a just barely reasonable stance that's closer to Chalmers than the stances he spends most of his time communicating. So I can't quite disagree with him, because after 20 years I still don't exactly know what he thinks.
- naasking 10y ago> He spends inordinate amounts of time heavily suggesting that consciousness is an ephemeral nothing that we're not just ignorant about, but mistaken about. That's right, it's an illusion, in the sense that we perceive ourselves to have some irreducible subjectivity, but we actually don't. > But when pressed enough, then he retreats to a just barely reasonable stance that's closer to Chalmers than the stances he spends most of his time communicating. I'd like to see a citation for that, because as far as I've seen, Dennett hasn't changed his stance on this subject in over 20 years, and he's been very straightforward about his position in every interview I've watched or read. And what he thinks is quite clear: he's a straight up materialist. Qualia don't actually exist as some irreducible phenomenon and consciousness is an illusion. He's published multiple books on the subject arguing for this position quite forcefully.
- Qcombinator 10y ago>Materialism can classify qualia as an illusion But can it? To say something is an illusion is to say that is really an experience of something else. And qualia are qualitative experiences, so the claim is that certain experiences are not experiences… which is problematic. Of course, a proper argument needs to be fleshed out more than that, but eliminativists face a real difficulty, unless they broaden the definition of materialism (which would take us closer to Aristotle).
- naasking 10y ago> But can it? To say something is an illusion is to say that is really an experience of something else. Your definition for "illusion" begs the question by simply assuming a subject is needed, ie. an "I" must experience an illusion. Rather, an illusion is simply describing the relation between perception and truth. If a perception, taken at face value, entails a false conclusion, then it's an illusion. Even the basic dictionary definitions of illusion make no reference to a subject. They're all of the form of "a false idea or belief", or "a deceptive appearance or impression". Beliefs and appearances are attributes we can ascribe to mechanistic systems too, like computers, which can have sensors plugged into Bayesian inference engines that can infer false "beliefs". So requiring a subject is a property that you have imposed on the meaning of illusion, it's not intrinsic to it.
- Qcombinator 10y agoI made no reference to a subject either. For "my" experiences to be not really "anybody's" experiences is a somewhat separate problem. As is a belief that I don't really have any beliefs, and so on. Any attempt to eliminate qualia or self or intentionality, etc. as being fundamental realities runs into the problem that all these things are more fundamental to my understanding than any proposed alternative.
- naasking 10y agoYour definition of illusion still begs the question, either by assuming a subject or assuming a reduction to further experience is needed. Like I said, illusion only requires that perception differ from truth. > Any attempt to eliminate qualia or self or intentionality, etc. as being fundamental realities runs into the problem that all these things are more fundamental to my understanding than any proposed alternative. 1. Perception is fundamental to understanding. Whether experience is fundamental is very questionable. 2. Being fundamental doesn't entail something is irreducible. Being in a car is fundamental to driving on a road, that doesn't entail cars are irreducible.