4 ms·
Small correction: the CA industry doesn't self-regulate. Both browsers and CAs participate in the CA/Browser Forum and my (admittedly outsider) impression is th
by ivanr 10y ago
Small correction: the CA industry doesn't self-regulate. Both browsers and CAs participate in the CA/Browser Forum and my (admittedly outsider) impression is that browsers almost always have the upper hand.
- gsnedders 10y agoThings that go to vote in the CAB Forum are often split pretty exactly down CA v. browser lines, and the CA outnumber the browsers and hence typically win. That said, the power of the browser vendors as those who maintain the trust stores is obviously there.
- agwa 10y agoThis is not accurate. To pass, a ballot must receive a 2/3 majority from CAs AND a 1/2 majority from browsers. While there have been some contentious votes along CA-browser lines, you can see from the ballot history that most ballots have passed and thus had support from both browsers and CAs: https://cabforum.org/ballots/ https://cabforum.org/ballots/
- shthed 10y agoOh let me guess how this goes: > Ballot 161 – Notification of incorrect issuance > In the event that a CA issues a certificate in violation of these requirements, the CA SHALL publicly disclose a report within one week of becoming aware of the violation. A link to the report SHALL simultaneously be sent to incidents@cabforum.org. > From the CAs, there were 0 YES votes, 14 NO votes and 5 Abstentions > From the Browsers, there were 3 YES votes, 0 NO votes and 0 Abstentions. sigh
- TheGreatAmus 10y agoThe ballot was a bit more nuanced than it seems. 1) Browsers already require reporting of mis-issuance directly to them. Mozilla requires a public bug list and 2) There was insufficient clarity in the ballot about "mis-issuance". Plus with crt.sh, this information is already available in one general location, which made the reporting requirement of everything seem a bit redundant.
- tialaramex 10y agoIf they can't get their way, the browser vendors can just shrug and make their own rules, that's what happened for Ballot 169 for example. Ballot 169 says to validate DNS names in a certificate you can't just make up any old "validation method" and say you think it's adequate, you must use at least one of these specific enumerated methods. The Ballot passed, but then a bunch of CAs declared that they had patented some of the methods on the list. So effectively even though it passed Ballot 169 was unwound while they negotiated patent licensing agreements. But Mozilla meanwhile went "everybody must obey Ballot 169 or get kicked out of Mozilla's trust store", so that raised the bar anyway. The happy news is that a mix of Mozilla saying "comply or feel free to go out of business, we don't care" and people like me pointing at the crappy patents and laughing at their weak excuse for "innovation" appears to have had the desired effect, and a new Ballot will reinstate the stuff from Ballot 169 later this year.
- annnnd 10y agoBut if I understand correctly, this decision was Google's entirely? If that is the case then it doesn't matter much what forum thinks about Symantec. Buying a certificate which is not supported by a major browser vendor would be... eccentric, so my guess is this will be a major blow for Symantec certificate business.
- tialaramex 10y agoCA/B is neither a regulator nor, formally, a Standards Development Organisation although if you can squint it can look a little like either. CA/B produces the Baseline Requirements and also a set of EV Guidelines, for how a CA should behave. The browser vendors (actually mostly OS vendors in their guise as browser vendors, Mozilla effectively stands in for all the Free Unix type operating systems) operate trust roots, and each of them decides their own criteria for things to appear in those roots. BUT there was concern as the root store programmes began to tighten up their criteria that they might step on each others' toes, CA/B is a forum to share common principles. For example, rather than Mozilla tell CAs to stop issuing certificates that last more than 2 years plus a few days, and Google tell them not to issue ones that last more than 25 months, and then Microsoft say they want a rule forbidding new certificates that last more than 750 days, everybody got together at CA/B and passed a Baseline Requirements change setting the limit at 825 days from next year. CA/B looks a lot like a cartel (all the companies in an industry meeting up to agree things) so it has a bunch of things it mustn't do to ensure it doesn't break anti-cartel legislation and get anybody sent to jail [The world's most famous cartel, OPEC, doesn't fear the law because OPEC is run by governments and governments have sovereign immunity]. For example it can't talk about prices, or future products. Another result of not being a cartel is that CA/B doesn't bind either CAs or Browsers. The CAs can break CA/B rules without being kicked out of CA/B and the Browsers can and do require things beyond the Baseline Requirements, for example Microsoft requires every CA in its programme to revoke any certificate it tells them to, on demand. Initially CA/B was all about smoke-filled rooms (maybe not literally) but Mozilla and Google have pressured them to gradually act more in the open, so you can actually follow along most of their decision making in real time via their mailing lists.