5 ms·
strong agreement on what we can do to improve it. uh, yes there is. Change the way your state votes away from FPTP to a preferential voting system. https://w
by nosuchthing 10y ago
strong agreement on what we can do to improve it.
uh, yes there is.
Change the way your state votes away from FPTP to a preferential voting system.
https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/ https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Comparison_of_Schulze_to_preferential_voting_systems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Comparison_of_Schulze...
https://www.boston.com/news/politics/2016/11/10/maine-became-the-first-state-in-the-country-to-pass-ranked-choice-voting https://www.boston.com/news/politics/2016/11/10/maine-became...
- dwaltrip 10y agoMy (limited) understanding is that preferential voting systems are not a silver bullet, but I'd love to see some evidence that they would significantly improve things. Of course, we may also need to consider the notion that the voting system is only a minor problem compared to other aspects of our governance model.
- thaumasiotes 10y agohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theore...
- nosuchthing 10y agoAbsurd. Ranked order voting grants every ability a vote has in FPTP, without the caveat of fear and coercion that forces voters into the 2 party system. FPTP is by far worse than any preferential vote count. FPTP will literally throw your vote away if you do not vote for one of the two perceived """"popular"""" parties.
- thaumasiotes 10y ago> FPTP will literally throw your vote away if you do not vote for one of the two perceived """"popular"""" parties. It will also "literally throw your vote away" if you do vote for one of the two perceived "popular" parties. This is an old observation. And yet, interest groups that vote continue to get better results than interest groups that don't.
- ABCLAW 10y agoArrow's impossibility theorem is often trotted out as an argument against ranked preference, but in federal elections non-dictatorship is an irrelevant consideration, as information-scarcity prevents a voter from leveraging his unique position as the deciding vote. It makes quite a lot of sense as a downside in limited, party based voting situations. IE, if you were an independent in a theoretical senate where 50 republicans, 50 democrats and you were to vote on a party-line proposition.
- thaumasiotes 10y ago> in federal elections non-dictatorship is an irrelevant consideration, as information-scarcity prevents a voter from leveraging his unique position as the deciding vote If non-dictatorship were being violated, you'd know. The non-dictatorship criterion states that the following situation is impossible: - Out of all the voters, there is one in particular, who we'll call K. - The election outcome is always identical to whatever K voted, no matter what anyone else voted. So, if it isn't possible that a single person ranked candidate A first, the rest of the country ranked candidate B first, and the election nevertheless ranked candidate A first, then the election system does not violate the non-dictatorship criterion. With that in mind, I am totally confused as to the point you're trying to make? The reason we don't worry about dictatorship is that we don't use systems that exhibit it, not that we have one but nobody knows who it is.
- ABCLAW 10y agoWe do use systems that exhibit it under certain constraints, as per my example. Additionally, these constraints are highly common in practice. The result is that Arrow's theorem itself isn't a rebuttal, as per my first point, and discussion should center around the other two elements of Arrow's theory. Specifically whether or not they are, in practice, worse than our current situation. Which they aren't. So why trot out Arrow's theorem for the 90th time?
- thaumasiotes 10y ago> We do use systems that exhibit it under certain constraints, as per my example. This is an error on your part. Your example does not violate non-dictatorship; the rules of the election permit anyone to vote against their party registration. Arrow's theorem is about the design of elections, not predictions about how people will vote in practice.
- cle 10y agoThere is no practical path towards these, though, given the political climate. People in general intertwine their political affiliation with their personal identity and self-worth--good luck trying to get them to abandon it. And there are no incentives for politicians either, they similarly benefit from the predictability and clear demarcation of polarization (vote predictability makes legislation easier to whip, gerrymandering is easier, etc.).
- bluejekyll 10y agoI wonder about that... If you look at each individual district, I'd agree with you. If you look at it more generally though, there would be a case for the Republicans wanting to push this in CA (where they are almost non-players at the state level at this point), and similarly the Democrats pushing for it in Texas. Given this, there is an argument for both parties wanting this so that they could potentially have more power in areas where they do not now...
- komali2 10y agoThis is politics. Nothing is "practical" except what you are willing to do. A man got on TV and said "I could shoot supporters in the street and still get votes," then was elected president. You can do literally anything. Saying "it's impractical" is just you getting in your own way.
- cle 10y agoThat's nonsense, he was elected President because enough of the right people voted for him. He could very easily have done things to piss them off and then would not have been elected President. Just because his election didn't fit in with your mental model of how politics works, doesn't mean that it didn't fit in to any model. It did, it just wasn't yours.
- notmarkus 10y agoIsn't the obvious conclusion that one could say the exact same thing to you? Just because it doesn't fit your model of practicality...