If a simulation contains minds is it not equivalent Dennet's "Brain in a vat" [1] model of consciousness ? In "Consciousness Explained" Dennet postulates that

If a simulation contains minds is it not equivalent Dennet's "Brain in a vat" [1] model of consciousness ? In "Consciousness Explained" Dennet postulates that a conscious mind perceiving a thing-in-the-world need not have perfect rich input data but merely a neuron that responds yes to the question: Am I seeing that thing ? [1] Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennet, page 8, [ Prelude, Hard Hallucination Problem ]: "...intervene somewhere along the chain (anywhere on the optic nerve, ...between the eyeball and consciousness), tugging just right on the nerves would produce exactly the chain of events that would be caused by a normal veridical perception of something, ...producing, at the receiving end in the mind, exactly the effect of such a conscious perception."