If you tweak Bostrom's argument, it can sort of make sense. For example, if you believe a simulated human mind is "just as good" as a real mind, then it might m

If you tweak Bostrom's argument, it can sort of make sense. For example, if you believe a simulated human mind is "just as good" as a real mind, then it might make sense to colonize uninhabitable planets by building simulations there. It might even be easiest to colonize all planets this way. And if you suppose a future with lots of successful planet colonization, then there could easily be a lot more simulated minds in the history of the universe than real ones. However, I think the main problem with Bostrom's argument is an epistemological one: It supposes an entire outer world, about which we have no evidence and know nothing. It's like opening Sagan's garage[1], but instead of asserting an invisible dragon, you're asserting an entire universe. It is the least parsimonious hypothesis you could make, because it doubles the complexity of the universe! [1] http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/The_Dragon_in_My_Garage http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/The_Dragon_in_My_Garage