>News stories that used that phrasing were being inaccurate; the collection was of plaintext traffic between international Google datacenters. A US intelligenc

>News stories that used that phrasing were being inaccurate; the collection was of plaintext traffic between international Google datacenters. A US intelligence agency targeting a portion of a US company's infrastructure that just happens to be international still constitutes a breach of trust. Whether that means they'd go as far as compromising an office network located in the United States is another matter, but I seem to recall a talk given by a security chief at Google discussing their use of custom RISC-V silicon for security due to their threat model including nation-state actors, with explicit mention of Western intelligence agencies. I wish I could find the link. >The point I'm making is that it's rational for people not well-versed in the minutiae of foreign intelligence regulations to think that intelligence agencies can and do intrude however they please on private companies. The mental gymnastics[0] that the NSA already uses to legally justify domestic collection on US citizens doesn't really inspire confidence that the IC wouldn't stoop to similar antics when it came to private companies. >Having an inside man wouldn't be particularly advantageous since the company lawyers must get involved ... Must they? My point was that legally compelling an insider who's already on your side might serve as an interesting loophole. Especially if they're not required to inform counsel and have no intention of doing so. Like I said though, IANAL. >... (the U.S. hasn't yet prohibited a person's legal representative from viewing writs). It's worth noting that in the early days that wasn't so clear: "CONAN: And they are roughly equivalent to subpoenas. Mr. LICHTBLAU: Yes and no. There are differences - one of the key differences is that for a long time the recipient was not even allowed to tell you when they received such a letter. CONAN: Even their own lawyer. Mr. LICHTBLAU: There was debate about whether or not you could even get a lawyer." [1] >I do wish that the credibility of U.S. companies was taken into account more often when espionage decisions are made. The terrible optics behind PRISM made it look like companies were volunteering information, when the government was coercing them through the NSL program. Agreed. [0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10605489 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10605489 [1] http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=6885103 http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?story...