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1. UK is not in EU. The argument is that such arrangements are commonplace and I am sure one can find other such examples of data sharing in UK. 2. LOL yeah yo
by aub3bhat 10y ago
1. UK is not in EU. The argument is that such arrangements are commonplace and I am sure one can find other such examples of data sharing in UK.
2. LOL yeah you are so damn clueless that I wont even bother replying. Lets just say there is reading some popular press article about privacy and annonymity. And then there is knowing intricate details of how business/research is conducted.
- JorgeGT 10y agoUK is in the EU until 2 years after Article 50 gets invoked, and EU data protection rules fully apply. This is a fact. The rude insult to another user, I won't even address.
- aub3bhat 10y agoIf EU data protection rules apply then why aren't the authors marching to doors of EU Privacy Commisioner demnding to prosecute Google? The reality is that what is Deep Mind did is routine and commonplave, and that's why no one other than clickbait driven press is interested in it.
- Silhouette 10y agoThe ICO (the UK data protection authority) has an ongoing investigation into the deal. This is even mentioned in the original report.
- throwaway729 10y ago> is routine and commonplave Then go ahead and try to get access to a similar data set. Unaudited access to fully identified and full medical records going back a half decade for 1.6 million people, without obtaining individual permission or providing any individual notice. For nothing other than the promise of some diagnostic assistance software. As a for-profit company. Good luck greasing those wheels ;-)
- Silhouette 10y agoFrom your comments here, it appears that you're doing PhD research dealing with large sets of healthcare data. It also appears that you are casually dismissive of concerns about the risks of that data being de-anonymised. Your best rebuttal seems to be some vague allusion that the parent poster, who was essentially correct, didn't know what they were talking about. (This is something of a digression anyway, because in the actual case we're talking about, as the report notes, the data supplied was already identifiable anyway.) You have accused the authors of the report of going on a witch-hunt, but again you have offered little real argument except that such things are going on in other places, as if that makes those practices above criticism or automatically acceptable. Do you realise that you are providing a near perfect, real-time example of the need for stricter controls on medical data and who is allowed to access it?
- aub3bhat 10y agoConcerns about de-anonymization are NOT AT ALL relevant in cases where patient level data is shared. Since its common knowledge that this data is ripe for misuse and abuse. As a result government agencies have developed a set of legal requirements and contracts to be used when sharing such data. Talking about differential-privacy and de-identification-is-not-de-anonymization is meaningless in this context since all parties are acutely aware of the potential for misuse of this data. And regarding your concern about me, if anything I should be the one engaging in this ridiculous witch hunt against Deep Mind since I have during my PhD developed an Open Source transparent analytics platform for data on millions of patients. But unlike the authors I want real debate and real systems that can be used, not faux outrage over another click bait article. http://www.computationalhealthcare.com http://www.computationalhealthcare.com
- Silhouette 10y agoAs a result government agencies have developed a set of legal requirements and contracts to be used when sharing such data. That still doesn't matter. If Royal Free shared personal health data with Deep Mind without the data subjects' explicit consent, and if the arrangement doesn't fall under other permitted conditions for processing sensitive personal data under the DPA, then someone is breaking the law. If there were not at least some legitimate grounds for concern about whether that is the case, it is unlikely that the ICO would have opened a formal investigation into the deal. Again, nothing written in any contract between the organisations involved supersedes our primary data protection legislation. As for standard processes for handling such situations developed by government agencies, another substantial part of the report was about how the various regulatory bodies do not seem to have been consulted in ways that would normally have been expected before starting a project of this nature. There is nothing routine, in the UK environment, about transferring complete, multi-year medical records for large numbers of identifiable individuals to external organisations not run by medical professionals for such open-ended purposes as those described in the agreement here. This is not a small thing.