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Why wouldn't power in the non-physics sense not have meaning? Why are you restricting meaning, and thus truth, to just physics? In order to even participate in
by barce 10y ago
Why wouldn't power in the non-physics sense not have meaning? Why are you restricting meaning, and thus truth, to just physics? In order to even participate in this forum doesn't meaning, and thus, truth, require a broader definition?
- lutusp 10y ago> Why wouldn't power in the non-physics sense not have meaning? Well, I didn't say that. I said it was an unfalsifiable topic. > Why are you restricting meaning, and thus truth, to just physics? Didn't say that either, and just as well, since there are no truths in physics. In science one can prove a theory false, but one cannot prove a theory true. All legitimate scientific theories remain open to falsification by new empirical evidence, in perpetuity. Not so for philosophy, which was my point.
- dang 10y agoPlease don't keep making the same point over and over. It gets boring after a while and then crosses into harangue, like someone at a dinner party with an idée fixe. If you want to make the point once and move on, that's fine, but then please let people who are interested in Foucault discuss Foucault.
- lutusp 10y ago> Please don't keep making the same point over and over. Sure, not problem. I'll stop pointing out that philosophy is a contentless debating society when the philosophers realize it, and when they stop treating it as though it constitutes an objective science (a point argued by others in this thread).
- swift 10y agoIs an idea like "in science one can prove a theory false, but one cannot prove a theory true" falsifiable? If yes, what kind of experiment could be designed to test it? If no, does that mean it's of no value?
- lutusp 10y ago> Is an idea like "in science one can prove a theory false, but one cannot prove a theory true" falsifiable? Yes, it is. And it passes that test.
- swift 10y agoIt's justified by logical argument, but not by empirical evidence. There is no empirical measurement we can take or experiment we can perform that would falsify it, because things like "theories" and "truth" are not physical. If your argument is that it's falsifiable because it follows logically from a set of premises that we've all agreed to accept, and we could show it to be false by showing a flaw in that logical reasoning, then I don't see how you can state that most philosophy is not falsifiable and remain consistent.
- lutusp 10y ago> It's justified by logical argument, but not by empirical evidence. On the contrary, falsifiability's merits can be tested and potentially falsified. Science produces more useful results -- a better depiction of reality -- than other pursuits that don't require falsifiability. That is a merit-test (a falsifiable one) for falsifiability. The issue is not whether falsifiability exists, the issue is whether it has greater merit than other ways of evaluating ideas. > ... because things like "theories" and "truth" are not physical. Neither are ideas, but we grant ideas the status of tangible things, to the degree that we assign ownership to some of them (with mixed results). Scientific theories have validity solely to the degree to which we can correlate them with aspects of reality. This gives scientific theories a special status not shared by all ideas. > ... then I don't see how you can state that most philosophy is not falsifiable and remain consistent. It would be easy for a philosopher to refute such a claim -- by producing a philosophical theory that has the property of falsifiability by empirical evidence. But if that were done, the submitted theory would fail the litmus test of philosophical ideas in modern times (that they be ideas apart from empirically testable ones). This is the property that distinguishes philosophy from science. So it seems the distinction is to some extent self-referential.
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- throwawaycopy 10y agoSymbolic logic can help us build airplanes and bridges. It cannot help us explain art, politics, and the nature of existence. The world is a lot less computable than you seem to believe. But honestly I think you're just being silly and stubborn while arguing with strangers on a website.
- lutusp 10y ago> It cannot help us explain art, politics, and the nature of existence. Neither can philosophy. How you missed this obvious reply is beyond me. You need to learn the difference between describe and explain.
- Veen 10y agoWhere does the concept of "falsification" come from? Karl Popper was a philosopher. The concept you using to dismiss philosophy is a product of philosophy and wouldn't exist without philosophy. > In science one can prove a theory false, but one cannot prove a theory true. This statement concerns logic and epistemology, both branches of philosophy, not science. Falsification came about as a solution to the demarcation problem and the problem of induction (both products of philosophy, not science). You are right that most philosophical statements are not falsifiable, but that simply means they are not scientific according to a definition of science that assumes all scientific statements are falsifiable. In short, you haven't really said anything (our understanding of circular reasoning and begging the question also come from philosophy).
- lutusp 10y ago> Where does the concept of "falsification" come from? Karl Popper was a philosopher. Karl Popper didn't invent falsifiability, he discovered it. This could have happened to anyone -- Popper happens to have been that one. The influence of the falsifiability idea eclipses its source. If we lose Popper, if he turns out to have some glaring personal defect that would end the career of a politician, falsifiability remains. The reason? Falsifiability is an idea, and ideas don't have parents. Henry Ford invented efficient production-line methods. He was also a rabid anti-Semite. Does this character defect undermine the value of efficient production methods? Only if we try to associate ideas with their originators, or imagine some connection between the two. This is how it works in the realm of ideas -- ideas are the focus, not those who express them. In philosophy we talk about Popper or Foucault or Derrida. In science we talk about biology or evolution or physics. There are an infinity of primes -- easily proven. Who first had this idea? Not important -- the idea stands on its own. > You are right that most philosophical statements are not falsifiable, but that simply means they are not scientific according to a definition of science that assumes all scientific statements are falsifiable. Yes, and that's how science is defined. No falsifiability, no science. But this requires us to imagine a world in which ideas have a life of their own. > In short, you haven't really said anything ... A perfect philosophical rejoinder. All ideas are constructed on a foundation of sand and no particular idea has more persuasiveness than another. Falsifiability is an idea. Therefore ... Therefore why not take the next step and try to claim that all ideas are subjective, that we can't expect to meaningfully express and share ideas, or let reality-testing rank them in an objective way? In short, why not accept the postmodern thesis? The answer is that postmodernism contradicts the very idea of meaningful, productive conversation, conversation that might lead to a social good. To address the postmodern thesis is to fatally undermine the exchange in which it's introduced -- an exchange that requires the very thing postmodernism denies. Meanwhile, outside philosophy, we have the recourse of testing our ideas against reality and letting reality rank the ideas for us. According to reality, natural selection shapes the biological world, and the identity of the people who stumbled on this idea is irrelevant. According to reality, there is no ether carrying light waves -- in spacetime theory, no medium is required -- and this idea's originator doesn't matter. When you understand the equations of relativity theory, you have learned the topic, and Einstein's having abandoned his first child can't undermine the idea or degrade its value. But all that requires us to accept the idea that there is an objective, shared reality about which meaningful conversation is possible. As it happens, among philosophers this idea hasn't taken hold.