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How does "the reason that more people die in crosswalks is really that the cars can't see the crosswalks" count as "picking apart" an argument that familiarity

How does "the reason that more people die in crosswalks is really that the cars can't see the crosswalks" count as "picking apart" an argument that familiarity and perceived safety lead to complacence? If anything it would seem to corroborate it (the cars see no difference, so it must all be due to pedestrian carelessness).

hga 16y ago
Because that wasn't the context in which Brooks was using the example. He started that paragraph by noting the "people have a tendency to place elaborate faith in backup systems and safety devices." In response Kedrosky pointed out that "This isn’t like a functioning safety system in an oil rig, which is what Brooks is arguing, but more like a dummy dial unconnected to anything." It does support Brooks' overall theme (most especially his previous points about Feynman's observations on NASA's safety culture (or rather lack thereof)), just not as he used it.
- tbrownaw 16y ago
  It doesn't matter at all if the safety system has any effect. The point is entirely that safety systems (functional or not) apparently make people more reckless. Examples of this are crosswalks (not effective), and the oil rig safety thing (which in this case was also not effective). <<That’s because they have a false sense of security in crosswalks and are less likely to look both ways. >> <<Transocean official apparently tried to close off a safety debate by reminding everybody the blowout preventer would save them if something went wrong. The illusion of the safety system encouraged the crew to behave in more reckless ways. >>
  - hga 16y ago
    Ah; I think I discounted the last item you quote since as far as I know it's wrong: instead, that was an cynical aside made by a Transocean "official" after the meeting in which the BP "official" in command made a/the bad decision. As quoted by another Transocean guy, "Well, I guess that's what we have those pinchers for", apparently referring to the BOP.

hga 16y ago

Because that wasn't the context in which Brooks was using the example. He started that paragraph by noting the "people have a tendency to place elaborate faith in backup systems and safety devices." In response Kedrosky pointed out that "This isn’t like a functioning safety system in an oil rig, which is what Brooks is arguing, but more like a dummy dial unconnected to anything." It does support Brooks' overall theme (most especially his previous points about Feynman's observations on NASA's safety culture (or rather lack thereof)), just not as he used it.

tbrownaw 16y ago
It doesn't matter at all if the safety system has any effect. The point is entirely that safety systems (functional or not) apparently make people more reckless. Examples of this are crosswalks (not effective), and the oil rig safety thing (which in this case was also not effective). <<That’s because they have a false sense of security in crosswalks and are less likely to look both ways. >> <<Transocean official apparently tried to close off a safety debate by reminding everybody the blowout preventer would save them if something went wrong. The illusion of the safety system encouraged the crew to behave in more reckless ways. >>
- hga 16y ago
  Ah; I think I discounted the last item you quote since as far as I know it's wrong: instead, that was an cynical aside made by a Transocean "official" after the meeting in which the BP "official" in command made a/the bad decision. As quoted by another Transocean guy, "Well, I guess that's what we have those pinchers for", apparently referring to the BOP.