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Paul Kedrosky picks him apart here: http://paul.kedrosky.com/archives/2010/05/david_brooks_go.html http://paul.kedrosky.com/archives/2010/05/david_brooks_go.ht

Paul Kedrosky picks him apart here: http://paul.kedrosky.com/archives/2010/05/david_brooks_go.html http://paul.kedrosky.com/archives/2010/05/david_brooks_go.ht...

mindcrime 16y ago
That's hardly a "picking apart." He basically says "Yeah, your one example, which was basically a metaphor anyway, well, it's actually true, but well, it's not as neat as you think it is." Ok, and?
- klochner 16y ago
  Fair enough - I was being a little sensationalist in expressing "relevant article", but . . . Brooks uses it as an example, but I'm not seeing the metaphor. He uses the crosswalk as an example of how people put too much faith in safety systems. The example is flawed because crosswalks are not (well-designed) safety systems given that drivers can't see them. "The world is a crosswalk . . . ?"
hga 16y ago
Not that I don't mind giving Brooks a good lashing, for I too "Now and then I don’t mind David Brooks’ columns at the NYT" (heck, he wrote one in the last month that was better than OK :-), but isn't this sort of the reverse pattern of posting, in that the essay on how people who don't have a clue about complexity ritually invoke it as a "thumb-sucking, multisyllabic way of saying something is hard" as Kedrosky puts it? I'd go further, pointing out e.g.: The success of D-Day/Operation Overlord and a lot of other complex stuff that no one person could understand. We have proven techniques for dealing with these sorts of things. Would that our ruling class of social engineers that includes him be a fraction as good at dealing with their complex problems. Tree Mile Island is a poor example as he uses it: "In the first place, people have trouble imagining how small failings can combine to lead to catastrophic disasters. At the Three Mile Island nuclear facility, a series of small systems happened to fail at the same time." Well, I'm sure this is true, but the people who count in this, the designers of the reactor, imagined it and e.g. included a conic spreader at the bottom of the reactor vessel to allow for a serious core melt-down. Which is the worst case that indeed happened and that the system they designed contained, as they planned. No China Syndrome in the real world (in the US, at least). I continued to analyze this essay, but it's, say, 80% bogus and not worth the trouble of debunking in detail. Let's just say that when he closes by saying we live in an "imponderably complex technical society", he's mostly revealing that Sons of Mary like him can't ponder it. Sons of Martha like us can make a lot of sense of it and we will continue to do so.
tbrownaw 16y ago
How does "the reason that more people die in crosswalks is really that the cars can't see the crosswalks" count as "picking apart" an argument that familiarity and perceived safety lead to complacence? If anything it would seem to corroborate it (the cars see no difference, so it must all be due to pedestrian carelessness).
- hga 16y ago
  Because that wasn't the context in which Brooks was using the example. He started that paragraph by noting the "people have a tendency to place elaborate faith in backup systems and safety devices." In response Kedrosky pointed out that "This isn’t like a functioning safety system in an oil rig, which is what Brooks is arguing, but more like a dummy dial unconnected to anything." It does support Brooks' overall theme (most especially his previous points about Feynman's observations on NASA's safety culture (or rather lack thereof)), just not as he used it.
  - tbrownaw 16y ago
    It doesn't matter at all if the safety system has any effect. The point is entirely that safety systems (functional or not) apparently make people more reckless. Examples of this are crosswalks (not effective), and the oil rig safety thing (which in this case was also not effective). <<That’s because they have a false sense of security in crosswalks and are less likely to look both ways. >> <<Transocean official apparently tried to close off a safety debate by reminding everybody the blowout preventer would save them if something went wrong. The illusion of the safety system encouraged the crew to behave in more reckless ways. >>
    - hga 16y ago
      Ah; I think I discounted the last item you quote since as far as I know it's wrong: instead, that was an cynical aside made by a Transocean "official" after the meeting in which the BP "official" in command made a/the bad decision. As quoted by another Transocean guy, "Well, I guess that's what we have those pinchers for", apparently referring to the BOP.

Paul Kedrosky picks him apart here: http://paul.kedrosky.com/archives/2010/05/david_brooks_go.html http://paul.kedrosky.com/archives/2010/05/david_brooks_go.ht...

mindcrime 16y ago

That's hardly a "picking apart." He basically says "Yeah, your one example, which was basically a metaphor anyway, well, it's actually true, but well, it's not as neat as you think it is." Ok, and?

klochner 16y ago
Fair enough - I was being a little sensationalist in expressing "relevant article", but . . . Brooks uses it as an example, but I'm not seeing the metaphor. He uses the crosswalk as an example of how people put too much faith in safety systems. The example is flawed because crosswalks are not (well-designed) safety systems given that drivers can't see them. "The world is a crosswalk . . . ?"

hga 16y ago

Not that I don't mind giving Brooks a good lashing, for I too "Now and then I don’t mind David Brooks’ columns at the NYT" (heck, he wrote one in the last month that was better than OK :-), but isn't this sort of the reverse pattern of posting, in that the essay on how people who don't have a clue about complexity ritually invoke it as a "thumb-sucking, multisyllabic way of saying something is hard" as Kedrosky puts it? I'd go further, pointing out e.g.: The success of D-Day/Operation Overlord and a lot of other complex stuff that no one person could understand. We have proven techniques for dealing with these sorts of things. Would that our ruling class of social engineers that includes him be a fraction as good at dealing with their complex problems. Tree Mile Island is a poor example as he uses it: "In the first place, people have trouble imagining how small failings can combine to lead to catastrophic disasters. At the Three Mile Island nuclear facility, a series of small systems happened to fail at the same time." Well, I'm sure this is true, but the people who count in this, the designers of the reactor, imagined it and e.g. included a conic spreader at the bottom of the reactor vessel to allow for a serious core melt-down. Which is the worst case that indeed happened and that the system they designed contained, as they planned. No China Syndrome in the real world (in the US, at least). I continued to analyze this essay, but it's, say, 80% bogus and not worth the trouble of debunking in detail. Let's just say that when he closes by saying we live in an "imponderably complex technical society", he's mostly revealing that Sons of Mary like him can't ponder it. Sons of Martha like us can make a lot of sense of it and we will continue to do so.

tbrownaw 16y ago

How does "the reason that more people die in crosswalks is really that the cars can't see the crosswalks" count as "picking apart" an argument that familiarity and perceived safety lead to complacence? If anything it would seem to corroborate it (the cars see no difference, so it must all be due to pedestrian carelessness).

hga 16y ago
Because that wasn't the context in which Brooks was using the example. He started that paragraph by noting the "people have a tendency to place elaborate faith in backup systems and safety devices." In response Kedrosky pointed out that "This isn’t like a functioning safety system in an oil rig, which is what Brooks is arguing, but more like a dummy dial unconnected to anything." It does support Brooks' overall theme (most especially his previous points about Feynman's observations on NASA's safety culture (or rather lack thereof)), just not as he used it.
- tbrownaw 16y ago
  It doesn't matter at all if the safety system has any effect. The point is entirely that safety systems (functional or not) apparently make people more reckless. Examples of this are crosswalks (not effective), and the oil rig safety thing (which in this case was also not effective). <<That’s because they have a false sense of security in crosswalks and are less likely to look both ways. >> <<Transocean official apparently tried to close off a safety debate by reminding everybody the blowout preventer would save them if something went wrong. The illusion of the safety system encouraged the crew to behave in more reckless ways. >>
  - hga 16y ago
    Ah; I think I discounted the last item you quote since as far as I know it's wrong: instead, that was an cynical aside made by a Transocean "official" after the meeting in which the BP "official" in command made a/the bad decision. As quoted by another Transocean guy, "Well, I guess that's what we have those pinchers for", apparently referring to the BOP.