4 ms·
Yeah, yeah, proliferation risk. If the stuff is that hard to contain then why all the waste sitting around? I think the concern about breeder reactors isn't
by wahern 10y ago
Yeah, yeah, proliferation risk. If the stuff is that hard to
contain then why all the waste sitting around?
I think the concern about breeder reactors isn't so much the proliferation risk of the fuel and waste itself, but that a commercial market in breeder reactor technology will proliferate the knowledge and equipment necessary such that state actors will find it easier to build breeder reactors quickly and secretly.
But maybe that's just a misperception on my part.
Before Beowulf clusters, building supercomputers required tremendous expertise. The U.S. thought it could keep China from building supercomputers by controlling the export of supercomputers and supercomputing-enabling technology. But once supercomputing moved to clusters of commodity hardware, most of those export controls became useless almost overnight. China didn't spontaneously develop an expertise in chip design and fabrication; rather, because of the technological shift in the West, supercomputing know-how and equipment simply became impossible to contain.
- TheSpiceIsLife 10y agoThe idea state actors could building anything quickly and secretly is a misconception.
- wahern 10y agoDepends on the complexity and on our intelligence assets. Because of our lack of intelligence assets, China and North Korean have done spectacularly well. Pakistan got away with selling nuclear plans for years without our knowledge. There's probably all manner of less complex projects underway that U.S. intelligence is oblivious to. Like China and North Korea, Iran is something of an outlier. Israel has long had strong intelligence assets in Iran, and in addition to benefiting from those, the U.S. seems to have been able to beef up SIGINT fairly quickly with arguably better than usually results. It's highly dependent on the technology and the country in question. Sure, at the end of the day it's impossible to keep the genie in the bottle. But the goal is never forever. A country's strategic interests always have an implicit time component. If you can suppress tech long enough for a "rogue" state to become a respectable player in the international system, then you've won. Long enough might be only a few years. Conversely, if you can develop tech faster than the U.S. can learn about _and_ act upon it, you've won. North Korea won that race, and might have been able to win it even without China protecting it. And how did North Korea win that race? Largely with exogenous skill, importing Soviet talent after the fall of the USSR. Also, need I remind anyone the intelligence disaster that was both 9/11 and the Iraq War? It's not so much that the intelligence community was wrong, but that there's rarely any certainty in their assessments. If you don't know for certain that something is true, how do you justify your policy decisions? It gets muddy very quickly.
- TheSpiceIsLife 10y ago> Because of our lack of intelligence assets, China and North Korean have done spectacularly well. I don't think that's fair. Maybe China and North Korea have done well because there are knowledgeable and determined who live and work in those countries. > Pakistan got away with selling nuclear plans for years without our knowledge. How do you know that?
- wahern 10y agoI don't think that's fair. Maybe China and North Korea have done well because there are knowledgeable and determined who live and work in those countries. No doubt that's true. There are many capable scientists in those countries. However, in the case of North Korea for example, from all available publicly known information North Korea had been trying to build both ballistic missiles and a nuclear program since the 1960s. But there appears to have been few significant advancements until the fall of the USSR and the immigration of some well-known Soviet scientists, after which their programs made significant advances over suspiciously short periods of time. How do you know that? I don't know, just like I don't know that Obama isn't a secret Muslim, that Trump isn't a Manchurian Candidate, or that you're not an extraterrestrial alien. However, for whatever reason the Illuminati saw fit to disclose that Pakistan sold nuclear secrets to North Korea; which apparently went on for over decade before the initial disclosure; that many high-level U.S. officials (politicians, appointees, and civil servants alike) went [apparently] apoplectic upon disclosure; and that the fall-out seemed to be widespread and persistent. We also "know" that South Africa had the bomb and Israel has the bomb. And despite official denials it seems clear that Israel, minimally, had the tacit approval of the U.S. if not outright assistance, and that South Africa's program was also under surveillance at the time. In other words, once details of these programs became publicly known it also became publicly known shortly afterward the extent to which the U.S. knew about those developments. In the case of the Pakistan sale of nuclear secrets, and in multiple situations wrt North Korea and China, by all public accounts the U.S. was and still is often readily taken by surprise. There are plenty other historical examples (including recent examples) of the U.S. being taken by surprise, although obviously not all were so strategically consequential.
- 100k 10y agoLike the Manhattan Project?
- TheSpiceIsLife 10y agoIt's a good point. If the best example is something that occurred ~70 years ago it's hard to know whether that means secrecy is working, or not.
- duncan_bayne 10y agohttps://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manhattan_Project https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manhattan_Project Rare, but it does happen.