4 ms·
In theory, a reasonable hash or CRC _inside_ the OTP stream would prevent tampering. TEMPEST and DPA are other things I didn't consider in our thought experime
by 1001101 10y ago
In theory, a reasonable hash or CRC _inside_ the OTP stream would prevent tampering.
TEMPEST and DPA are other things I didn't consider in our thought experiment, but if I really wanted to be thorough, I would have. (I suspect there's very little signal for either in the OTP scheme).
I think the key exchange (sneakernet) is what makes the OTP approach unwieldy. If the source of randomness is good, and keys are not reused, in theory, it's the highest quality system out there.
- andai 10y agoI am thinking about a system for transmitting keys through the mail. A microSD card is small enough to conceal inside of something else. I'm thinking of some kind of packaging where you could easily tell if it has been opened, and it would be impossible to re-seal perfectly. It does not matter if the key is intercepted, as long as the recipient knows this, and does not use the key. -- As far as TEMPEST goes, I think at the point the adversary is physically near you, you've got bigger things than encryption to worry about. You could wrap the raspberry pi's case in aluminium foil. I'm not sure if the usb power cable leaks any signals: wrap it too for good measure ;)