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I think this is pretty easy. We as people have likes, dislikes (i.e. preferred states), desires, etc. We also identify with these preferred states and desires.

I think this is pretty easy. We as people have likes, dislikes (i.e. preferred states), desires, etc. We also identify with these preferred states and desires. Furthermore, we have the capacity to alter the world and our behavior to bring about these preferred states and desires. To put it another way, we can alter our behavior for the sake of achieving desired goals. This is a higher level of self control than a calculator in that it has no capacity to alter its behavior. If a calculator had preferred states, it has no capacity to alter its behavior to achieve those preferred states. Now, we still don't have the capacity to change our will and so we don't have "ultimate" (contra-causal) free will. But I think its pretty clear that we have more control than a calculator.

hyliandev 10y ago
I'd like to reword what I meant: we do technically have more control than a calculator. I guess what I mean is something more like: how are we any less deterministic than a calculator? I don't mean, harder to predict. I mean, are we not as deterministic as anything else?
- hackinthebochs 10y ago
  Sorry meant to reply to this sooner. Yeah, we're just as deterministic. The question then is, does determinism invalidate choice? What is it about choice that necessarily makes it contradict determinism? Is it the idea that the choice is predictable under determinism? Is it that there was ultimately only one option available for you and thus only the illusion of choice? If that's the case then we don't have that kind of choice. The way i see it is that choice/free will is just a useful concept at the level of description of people. The mistake is mixing the levels of description and expecting the resulting statements to be coherent. There's no point in a causal chain where a "choice" happens, yet at the level of description of people with behaviors, choice happens. If we don't expect some kind of metaphysical truth underlying the claim that we make choices, then there's no problem. If you want your choices to have some acausal sort of control, then you're out of luck.

hyliandev 10y ago

I'd like to reword what I meant: we do technically have more control than a calculator. I guess what I mean is something more like: how are we any less deterministic than a calculator? I don't mean, harder to predict. I mean, are we not as deterministic as anything else?

hackinthebochs 10y ago
Sorry meant to reply to this sooner. Yeah, we're just as deterministic. The question then is, does determinism invalidate choice? What is it about choice that necessarily makes it contradict determinism? Is it the idea that the choice is predictable under determinism? Is it that there was ultimately only one option available for you and thus only the illusion of choice? If that's the case then we don't have that kind of choice. The way i see it is that choice/free will is just a useful concept at the level of description of people. The mistake is mixing the levels of description and expecting the resulting statements to be coherent. There's no point in a causal chain where a "choice" happens, yet at the level of description of people with behaviors, choice happens. If we don't expect some kind of metaphysical truth underlying the claim that we make choices, then there's no problem. If you want your choices to have some acausal sort of control, then you're out of luck.