6 ms·

I did not deeply read the whole article because it's pretty wordy and a lot of air, but there is a point where it discusses Leibniz "solution", which was "there

by tbabb 10y ago

I did not deeply read the whole article because it's pretty wordy and a lot of air, but there is a point where it discusses Leibniz "solution", which was "therefore God". Basically the well-discredited "unmoved mover" argument in a slightly different cloak. He goes on to try and prove that there cannot be two identical things in the universe, which I guess he must have done before anyone knew about fundamental particles. In reality, it seems to me that if you want to develop a system of understanding you have to develop a set of axioms and accept them. And by Goedel's incompleteness theorem, your system cannot be a complete or exhaustive description of what is true.

deleted 10y ago
[deleted]
jawns 10y ago
> well-discredited "unmoved mover" argument If you mean that there are arguments against the Aristotelean concept of an unmoved mover, that is certainly so. But typically the term "discredited" implies a broad public consensus, whereas many people accept some form of the cosmological argument, which is related to the concept of an unmoved mover. To use your version of "discredited," we might say that both theism and atheism are discredited, merely because there are arguments against each.
- jpttsn 10y ago
  1: there exists argument against X 2: lots of humans don't believe X Maybe there is a third kind of "discredited."
  - foldr 10y ago
    To say that an argument is discredited usually implies that there's a clear balance of expert opinion against it. That's not really the case with the cosmological argument, or with the (similar but not identical) argument given by Aristotle for an unmoved mover.
    - eclat 10y ago
      I'd wager there is a clear consensus amongst philosophers against the cosmological argument, considering 73% of them are atheists. http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=13371 http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=13371
      - foldr 10y ago
        1) You can be an atheist and still think that the cosmological argument is a good argument. In other words, you can think that the premises are plausibly true, and that the conclusion is significantly more likely to be true given the truth of the premises than it is otherwise. Being an atheist only prevents you from thinking that the cosmological argument is strong enough to outweigh all arguments against the existence of God. 2) Few philosophers are experts in the cosmological argument anyway, so it doesn't matter what most philosophers think of it.
- dragonwriter 10y ago
  Aristotle's unmoved mover argument (and it's slight variation in Aquinas' cosmological argument, and the whole class of arguments for the existence of God of similar general form) are discredited in the sense that they either (1) rely on equivocation, or (2) are internally inconsistent, or (3) simply introduce an additional unproven entity without explaining anything, or (4) even if one assumes it's completely true, it doesn't prove the existence of anything like the usual conception of a personal God anyhow. (The options aren't mutually exclusive, though usually onky one of the first two applies, depending on exact definitions of terms—though often those definitions are unclear enough to be uncertain which of the two applies to a particular argument.) If "everything in existence depends on something else" is a valid generalization, introducing an entity with out such dependencies is a cobtradiction. OTOH, if it's not a valid generalization, any number of things in existence could lack such a dependency, and there is no need to assume a unique and special unobserved entity with no dependencies. An independent common first cause or unmoved mover is, perhaps, an aesthetically pleasing (for some) solution to the apparent problem that things generally seem to have causes but infinite regress is an unappealing belief. But it is neither logically necessary, nor does any first cause necessary resemble God (the Big Bang works fine as an uncaused cause on which all other events in the universe depends, and isn't anything like any traditional concept of God, as, more generally, does any initial state inferred from modern observations of physics.)
  - foldr 10y ago
    >If "everything in existence depends on something else" is a valid generalization, introducing an entity with out such dependencies is a cobtradiction. Sure, but Aristotle, Aquinas and Leibniz did not this that this was a valid generalization. >the Big Bang works fine as an uncaused cause on which all other events in the universe depends It would not work fine as an uncaused cause, since it is not purely actual. Also, it's worth noting that the unmoved mover argument doesn't actually make any reference to the universe as such. It starts with any given instance of motion and then argues that this motion must ultimately have originated from an unmoved mover. Neither the universe nor its beginning in time is ever mentioned. (And in fact Aristotle thought that the universe was past eternal, and Aquinas was neutral on that issue.)
coldtea 10y ago
>He goes on to try and prove that there cannot be two identical things in the universe, which I guess he must have done before anyone knew about fundamental particles. Well, that's still right, whether there are same-ish fundamental particles or not. Just a pair of particles being the same in all their aspects doesn't make them identical. For example they don't occupy the same place in space.
- igravious 10y ago
  I don't know why you're being downvoted. By the very definition of the term identical if any two things are identical they must be the same in all respects including spatial and temporal location. So fundamental particles are very much not identical in this sense. Of course there are not two identical things in the universe. Because being identical they're the same thing, aren't they? It's called the identity of indiscernibles. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_of_indiscernibles https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_of_indiscernibles And one may disagree with the "unmoved mover" (let's call it an) axiom but if one takes that as given then it is plain to see that Leibniz's argument holds. And say you actually do disagree with it as an axiom then you have a bigger problem, what Umberto Eco called the most intractable problem of all, the problem that generates all other problems, namely, "Why is there something rather than nothing?"
  - obstinate 10y ago
    I don't agree that is the definition of the word identical. I think the common understanding of the word is irrespective of position in space time. If that weren't it's meaning, it would be a pretty useless word.
    - coldtea 10y ago
      >I think the common understanding of the word is irrespective of position in space time. Logic, science and philosophy (and Leibniz did all three) doesn't concern itself with the "common understandings of the world". In the Leibniz's example, he wanted to set first principles -- that go deeper than the "common understanding".

by tbabb 10y ago

deleted 10y ago

[deleted]

jawns 10y ago

> well-discredited "unmoved mover" argument If you mean that there are arguments against the Aristotelean concept of an unmoved mover, that is certainly so. But typically the term "discredited" implies a broad public consensus, whereas many people accept some form of the cosmological argument, which is related to the concept of an unmoved mover. To use your version of "discredited," we might say that both theism and atheism are discredited, merely because there are arguments against each.

jpttsn 10y ago
1: there exists argument against X 2: lots of humans don't believe X Maybe there is a third kind of "discredited."
- foldr 10y ago
  To say that an argument is discredited usually implies that there's a clear balance of expert opinion against it. That's not really the case with the cosmological argument, or with the (similar but not identical) argument given by Aristotle for an unmoved mover.
  - eclat 10y ago
    I'd wager there is a clear consensus amongst philosophers against the cosmological argument, considering 73% of them are atheists. http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=13371 http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=13371
    - foldr 10y ago
      1) You can be an atheist and still think that the cosmological argument is a good argument. In other words, you can think that the premises are plausibly true, and that the conclusion is significantly more likely to be true given the truth of the premises than it is otherwise. Being an atheist only prevents you from thinking that the cosmological argument is strong enough to outweigh all arguments against the existence of God. 2) Few philosophers are experts in the cosmological argument anyway, so it doesn't matter what most philosophers think of it.
dragonwriter 10y ago
Aristotle's unmoved mover argument (and it's slight variation in Aquinas' cosmological argument, and the whole class of arguments for the existence of God of similar general form) are discredited in the sense that they either (1) rely on equivocation, or (2) are internally inconsistent, or (3) simply introduce an additional unproven entity without explaining anything, or (4) even if one assumes it's completely true, it doesn't prove the existence of anything like the usual conception of a personal God anyhow. (The options aren't mutually exclusive, though usually onky one of the first two applies, depending on exact definitions of terms—though often those definitions are unclear enough to be uncertain which of the two applies to a particular argument.) If "everything in existence depends on something else" is a valid generalization, introducing an entity with out such dependencies is a cobtradiction. OTOH, if it's not a valid generalization, any number of things in existence could lack such a dependency, and there is no need to assume a unique and special unobserved entity with no dependencies. An independent common first cause or unmoved mover is, perhaps, an aesthetically pleasing (for some) solution to the apparent problem that things generally seem to have causes but infinite regress is an unappealing belief. But it is neither logically necessary, nor does any first cause necessary resemble God (the Big Bang works fine as an uncaused cause on which all other events in the universe depends, and isn't anything like any traditional concept of God, as, more generally, does any initial state inferred from modern observations of physics.)
- foldr 10y ago
  >If "everything in existence depends on something else" is a valid generalization, introducing an entity with out such dependencies is a cobtradiction. Sure, but Aristotle, Aquinas and Leibniz did not this that this was a valid generalization. >the Big Bang works fine as an uncaused cause on which all other events in the universe depends It would not work fine as an uncaused cause, since it is not purely actual. Also, it's worth noting that the unmoved mover argument doesn't actually make any reference to the universe as such. It starts with any given instance of motion and then argues that this motion must ultimately have originated from an unmoved mover. Neither the universe nor its beginning in time is ever mentioned. (And in fact Aristotle thought that the universe was past eternal, and Aquinas was neutral on that issue.)

coldtea 10y ago

>He goes on to try and prove that there cannot be two identical things in the universe, which I guess he must have done before anyone knew about fundamental particles. Well, that's still right, whether there are same-ish fundamental particles or not. Just a pair of particles being the same in all their aspects doesn't make them identical. For example they don't occupy the same place in space.

igravious 10y ago
I don't know why you're being downvoted. By the very definition of the term identical if any two things are identical they must be the same in all respects including spatial and temporal location. So fundamental particles are very much not identical in this sense. Of course there are not two identical things in the universe. Because being identical they're the same thing, aren't they? It's called the identity of indiscernibles. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_of_indiscernibles https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_of_indiscernibles And one may disagree with the "unmoved mover" (let's call it an) axiom but if one takes that as given then it is plain to see that Leibniz's argument holds. And say you actually do disagree with it as an axiom then you have a bigger problem, what Umberto Eco called the most intractable problem of all, the problem that generates all other problems, namely, "Why is there something rather than nothing?"
- obstinate 10y ago
  I don't agree that is the definition of the word identical. I think the common understanding of the word is irrespective of position in space time. If that weren't it's meaning, it would be a pretty useless word.
  - coldtea 10y ago
    >I think the common understanding of the word is irrespective of position in space time. Logic, science and philosophy (and Leibniz did all three) doesn't concern itself with the "common understandings of the world". In the Leibniz's example, he wanted to set first principles -- that go deeper than the "common understanding".