4 ms·

That free will is basically the series of singular inevitable outputs of a computation (the "me-the-person-in-the-universe" computation) that are not compressib

by danbruc 10y ago

That free will is basically the series of singular inevitable outputs of a computation (the "me-the-person-in-the-universe" computation) that are not compressible/reducible (they have to be run to come to the output). That seems a bit like goalpost shifting to me. What is the common usage of the term free will? I argue it is sitting in a restaurant and being able to order either steak or fish and that this decisions in neither deterministic, i.e. the choice is not a function of the state of the universe prior to the decision, nor random, i.e. the choice is not independent of the state of the universe prior to the decision. I also argue that there is no third option and one could just define the second option as the negation of the first. This obviously renders this definition of free will inconsistent and leaves us with the choice between determinism and randomness as defined above. Of course only unless someone can point out why this definition does not capture the common usage of the term free will or that there is an error in the definition of or the relation between the two options. Note that this way of phrasing it avoids the problem of talking about a probability distribution which might be problematic because we might be unable to repeat the experiment or have to deal with other complicating factors like the probability distribution itself being a function of the state of the universe prior to the decision. What you are suggesting is obviously not how I think the term free will is ordinarily used and how it should therefore be defined. Your definition would clearly fall into my definition of no free will and only additionally demand that there is no efficient procedure to evaluate the function determining the decision so that we are unable to predict decisions at least in practice. This is certainly not an unacceptable definition and I can not tell whether I would say there is free will or not under that definition. How hard would evaluating the function have to be in order to call it free will? Just really impractical because it would require measuring the state of billions of billions of particles with very high accuracy? Or actually impossible due to something like the uncertainty principle or the no-cloning theorem? But anyway, I argue that this definition, even if it might be useful, does not match what the term free will is usually supposed to mean.

coldtea 10y ago
>That seems a bit like goalpost shifting to me. What is the common usage of the term free will? I argue it is sitting in a restaurant and being able to order either steak or fish and that this decisions in neither deterministic, i.e. the choice is not a function of the state of the universe prior to the decision, nor random, i.e. the choice is not independent of the state of the universe prior to the decision. I'd say that's a false approach, as it doesn't capture the actual thing we mean by "free will" -- even if it seems it does initially. Neither dependent on the state of the universe nor random basically implies a soul. That is, an agent outside of the universe (that can still know part of the universe's history as it pertains to them and consider it when they take their decision but is not influenced by it directly to the decision). In the end, that could just be a random choice. Now, the essential when we say free will is that the agent that decides a course is "me". In other words, the ability to take different choices when repeating the experiment with the exact same parameters (state of the universe) is not important to free will. Neither is the ability to not be influenced by the state of the universe important. The only important aspect is "will" -- so it's not free as "whatever goes", but free as in "mine". And it wouldn't be mine if, given my timespace-history as a person, I would take entirely different decisions given the same exact initial conditions. I'm me precisely because I take specifically a certain decision -- mine decision. Using the term "free will" casually some might think that this means we can decide arbitrarily (e.g. if we could repeat the experiment with all other conditions absolutely the same, we could possibly see a different decision), but I think that's a wrong extension of the basic requirement: that the decision comes from the agent. And the way that this is ensured in my version (and in line with both determinism and randomness in the universe) is that the agent IS the decision (the sum of their decisions) embodied. Which is also symmetrical: given the same circumstances exactly (to the last particle being the same etc) we would make the same decision -- but on the same time, it's our history of passing through those exact circumstances and making those decisions that defines us (our "I"). What those going for the "arbitrary free choice" (possibility of different choice on same experiment) do is that they define the agent as someone outside the universe, e.g. dualism. But we are "me" and "you" inside the universe, and only to the extend that we have our exact personal histories.
- danbruc 10y ago
  I'd say that a false approach, and that it doesn't capture the actual thing we mean by "free will" even if it seems it does. I obviously have to disagree and I want to stress again that I am talking about the way the term free will is commonly used, not about the way it should be used. Go and ask people. I argue that most people will say that they could have made either choice in the sense that repeated trials would yield differing choices and that making the choice is not merely an act of flipping a coin. This of course turns out to be an impossibility under close inspection, as I argued before, and it therefore follows that free will in the common usage of the term does not exist. But I am pretty sure most people will nonetheless object if you argue that they could not possibly have made any other choice than the one they made besides maybe by flipping a coin. Neither dependent on the state of the universe nor random basically implies a soul. That is, an agent outside of the universe (that can still know part of the universe's history as it pertains to them and consider it when they take their decision but is not influenced by it directly to the decision). In the end, that could just be a random choice. Such a kind of soul would be part of the universe as far as I am concerned. It is something that can be acted upon by the normal universe to record facts and it can act on the normal universe by influencing decisions. I am unable to see how such a kind of soul would be significantly different from a halo of weakly interacting dark matter surrounding every body, gravity aside. There are weak bidirectional interaction between the normal matter of your body and the dark matter of your halo, and they are so weak that they escape our current detection capabilities. We also do not currently understand and are unable to observe the internal dynamics of dark matter halos. Is there any aspect to souls that this analogy does not capture? Well, souls could possibly exist outside of space and maybe even time, but that seems to be nothing more than a minor technical detail, at least in the context of free will. So I argue that souls of the kind you described are not adding anything to the picture, they are mostly equivalent to some kind of yet undiscovered physics. The essential when we say free will is that it's "me" the agent that decides. It is undoubtedly true, that it is an important part of free will, that the decision originates from the agent. This aspect is, I argue, captured in the term will, the desires of an agent. Some might think that this means we can decide arbitrarily (e.g. if we could repeat the experiment with all other conditions absolutely the same, we could possibly see a different decision), but I think that's a wrong extension of the basic requirement: that the decision is uniquely on the agent. This is, I argue, the question of what the term free means. As argued before, I think most people actually understand it in the sense that you consider a wrong extension. I also think that in your point of view free would be mostly redundant, just affirming what will essentially already conveys, that the decision originates from the agent, that the decision is free from external influences. And the way that this is ensured (and in line with both determinism and randomness in the universe) is that the agent is the decision (the sum of their decisions) embodied. Which is also kind of obvious: given the same circumstances exactly (to the last particle being the same etc) we would make the same decision. But it's also our history of passing through those exact circumstances and taking those decisions we took that makes us "I". Here I just want to note that this interpretation might have its very own problems, especially what constitutes external influence? What if steak is out? Or if the restaurant is on fire? What if I force you at gunpoint to order fish? What if I kidnapped you twenty years ago and only gave you fish for four years so that you hate fish today? What if you are under the influence of drugs? It might turn out to be quite tricky to find the boundary between agent and external influences in space and time and I would not be to surprised if, upon close inspection and careful definition, it turns out that the agent is identical with the past light cone of the decision.

by danbruc 10y ago

coldtea 10y ago

>That seems a bit like goalpost shifting to me. What is the common usage of the term free will? I argue it is sitting in a restaurant and being able to order either steak or fish and that this decisions in neither deterministic, i.e. the choice is not a function of the state of the universe prior to the decision, nor random, i.e. the choice is not independent of the state of the universe prior to the decision. I'd say that's a false approach, as it doesn't capture the actual thing we mean by "free will" -- even if it seems it does initially. Neither dependent on the state of the universe nor random basically implies a soul. That is, an agent outside of the universe (that can still know part of the universe's history as it pertains to them and consider it when they take their decision but is not influenced by it directly to the decision). In the end, that could just be a random choice. Now, the essential when we say free will is that the agent that decides a course is "me". In other words, the ability to take different choices when repeating the experiment with the exact same parameters (state of the universe) is not important to free will. Neither is the ability to not be influenced by the state of the universe important. The only important aspect is "will" -- so it's not free as "whatever goes", but free as in "mine". And it wouldn't be mine if, given my timespace-history as a person, I would take entirely different decisions given the same exact initial conditions. I'm me precisely because I take specifically a certain decision -- mine decision. Using the term "free will" casually some might think that this means we can decide arbitrarily (e.g. if we could repeat the experiment with all other conditions absolutely the same, we could possibly see a different decision), but I think that's a wrong extension of the basic requirement: that the decision comes from the agent. And the way that this is ensured in my version (and in line with both determinism and randomness in the universe) is that the agent IS the decision (the sum of their decisions) embodied. Which is also symmetrical: given the same circumstances exactly (to the last particle being the same etc) we would make the same decision -- but on the same time, it's our history of passing through those exact circumstances and making those decisions that defines us (our "I"). What those going for the "arbitrary free choice" (possibility of different choice on same experiment) do is that they define the agent as someone outside the universe, e.g. dualism. But we are "me" and "you" inside the universe, and only to the extend that we have our exact personal histories.

danbruc 10y ago
I'd say that a false approach, and that it doesn't capture the actual thing we mean by "free will" even if it seems it does. I obviously have to disagree and I want to stress again that I am talking about the way the term free will is commonly used, not about the way it should be used. Go and ask people. I argue that most people will say that they could have made either choice in the sense that repeated trials would yield differing choices and that making the choice is not merely an act of flipping a coin. This of course turns out to be an impossibility under close inspection, as I argued before, and it therefore follows that free will in the common usage of the term does not exist. But I am pretty sure most people will nonetheless object if you argue that they could not possibly have made any other choice than the one they made besides maybe by flipping a coin. Neither dependent on the state of the universe nor random basically implies a soul. That is, an agent outside of the universe (that can still know part of the universe's history as it pertains to them and consider it when they take their decision but is not influenced by it directly to the decision). In the end, that could just be a random choice. Such a kind of soul would be part of the universe as far as I am concerned. It is something that can be acted upon by the normal universe to record facts and it can act on the normal universe by influencing decisions. I am unable to see how such a kind of soul would be significantly different from a halo of weakly interacting dark matter surrounding every body, gravity aside. There are weak bidirectional interaction between the normal matter of your body and the dark matter of your halo, and they are so weak that they escape our current detection capabilities. We also do not currently understand and are unable to observe the internal dynamics of dark matter halos. Is there any aspect to souls that this analogy does not capture? Well, souls could possibly exist outside of space and maybe even time, but that seems to be nothing more than a minor technical detail, at least in the context of free will. So I argue that souls of the kind you described are not adding anything to the picture, they are mostly equivalent to some kind of yet undiscovered physics. The essential when we say free will is that it's "me" the agent that decides. It is undoubtedly true, that it is an important part of free will, that the decision originates from the agent. This aspect is, I argue, captured in the term will, the desires of an agent. Some might think that this means we can decide arbitrarily (e.g. if we could repeat the experiment with all other conditions absolutely the same, we could possibly see a different decision), but I think that's a wrong extension of the basic requirement: that the decision is uniquely on the agent. This is, I argue, the question of what the term free means. As argued before, I think most people actually understand it in the sense that you consider a wrong extension. I also think that in your point of view free would be mostly redundant, just affirming what will essentially already conveys, that the decision originates from the agent, that the decision is free from external influences. And the way that this is ensured (and in line with both determinism and randomness in the universe) is that the agent is the decision (the sum of their decisions) embodied. Which is also kind of obvious: given the same circumstances exactly (to the last particle being the same etc) we would make the same decision. But it's also our history of passing through those exact circumstances and taking those decisions we took that makes us "I". Here I just want to note that this interpretation might have its very own problems, especially what constitutes external influence? What if steak is out? Or if the restaurant is on fire? What if I force you at gunpoint to order fish? What if I kidnapped you twenty years ago and only gave you fish for four years so that you hate fish today? What if you are under the influence of drugs? It might turn out to be quite tricky to find the boundary between agent and external influences in space and time and I would not be to surprised if, upon close inspection and careful definition, it turns out that the agent is identical with the past light cone of the decision.