2 ms·
> Bell's inequalities, Gleason's Theorem, Kochen-Specher Theorem, the two-color theorem: and four years ago Aspect concluded some experiments in Paris, which se
by naasking 10y ago
> Bell's inequalities, Gleason's Theorem, Kochen-Specher Theorem, the two-color theorem: and four years ago Aspect concluded some experiments in Paris, which seemed to rule out any prospect of a hidden variable theory. So it seems to me that Professor Margenau was quite right to see quantum mechanics as bearing on the freewill problem, not as proving that it exists but as, in Plantinga's terminology, defeating a defeater.
It seems he was ignorant of Bohmian mechanics then, because deterministic QM is still alive and well.
> 3. If a human m is a sufficiently skilful mathematical logician (equipped with a sufficiently powerful computer if necessary) then if m is given L(m), he or she can construct T(L(m)) and Determine that they are true—which L(m) cannot do.
This step is dubious:
1. It's not at all clear that m could prove the truth of T(L(m)) even in these circumstances. I would need to see these steps to be convinced.
2. Humans are finite automotons (see the Bekenstein Bound), and the addition of a "sufficiently powerful computer" drastically increases the computational power available to m beyond what m is capable of alone. So L(m) would have to be a logical system that encompasses this unbounded power, and so T(L(m)) would still have true but unprovable statements, even with the computer due to Goedel.
This argument basically tries to prove that a Turing machine + Oracle can solve the Halting problem for Turing machines, but cannot solve the Halting problem for Turing machines+Oracles. However, it neglects to acknowledge that L is predicated on the Oracle, so we're not solving the Halting problem for Turing machines, we're solving the Halting problem for Turing machines+Oracles given only an Oracle, which is impossible.
As for the argument itself, it's a clever attempt, but still predicated on the assumption that determinism is inconsistent with free will. This has yet to be demonstrated, and in fact, all such arguments to date have been refuted (although clearly not to everyone's satisfaction).