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Ugh, another non-philosopher hacking at straw men with poorly defined terms. The equivalence of non-determinism and randomness is not at all necessary to dispel

Ugh, another non-philosopher hacking at straw men with poorly defined terms. The equivalence of non-determinism and randomness is not at all necessary to dispel the idea of free will; simply ask someone to define it, and it either a) turns into vapor or b) turns to abstraction that is equally meaningless, such as to knowledge. What is knowledge but state? It has nothing to do with free will, which cannot be differentiated from any other physical phenomenon. It's also a terribly boring problem. Regardless on you stance on what free will is, the answer does not mean you are removed from culpability; it rather means that you are not exempt from defense of your actions as a being with finite knowledge explaining your state to another being (presumably, a court) with finite knowledge. For all the philosophers asking this question, they fail to produce any instance where the answer is meaningful. Leopold and Loeb managed to persuade a gullible jury that they can excuse human interactions with philosophy; it is of interest to pop psychology and flaws in the american justice system, NOT to philosophy. The phenomena of consciousness are far more worthwhile concepts because they don't pigeonhole reality into a dry dichotomy.

RangerScience 10y ago
AFAICT, his terms are very well defined; he's using terms specifically from quantum computing, which combines terms from quantum phyics, classical computing theory, and adds a few of its own. He's also doing the thing where he's discussing the issue without a direct attempt to resolve it, which may be throwing off your comprehension.
- fdsfsafasfdas 10y ago
  "free will" is not a quantum computing term.
naasking 10y ago
> It's also a terribly boring problem. Regardless on you stance on what free will is, the answer does not mean you are removed from culpability If you acknowledge culpability in a given set of circumstances, then those culpable acted of their own free will. Choice from free will entails moral culpability, so you can only deny free will by also denying moral culpability. The fact that it's difficult to define the precise meaning of these terms doesn't make the problem meaningless.
- fdsfsafasfdas 10y ago
  Culpability is a happy illusion outside of a social context. Why are we trying to define this in quantum physics terms? It only makes sense in a Kantian universe, where there is an ideal of rationalism. Given how ambiguous human language (let alone human thought) is, do you seriously think that there is an objective culpability for arbitrary concepts when people won't even interpret the arbitrary concepts the same way? All of this smacks of scientists trying to weigh in on ontological problems. Science is only relevant so far as to show us the limits of what we can claim—in this case, science shows us free will doesn't map neatly into our known universe, hence the article above trying to argue for ways to preserve this abstract concept in a world that doesn't care. Look at: The Emperor's New Mind. It's the best attempt so far at actually fleshing out the problem, and it hinges entirely on the (fallacious) idea that because humans can innovate they aren't bound by turing completeness. Of course, this is hogwash, because what you'd have to demonstrate was that a single consciousness can prove everything given a finite set of axioms, which is of course an impossible proposition. Penrose sidesteps this by focusing on the magnification of quantum effects to human-level. I mean, come on—if that's your hope at understanding your own brain, just give up and imagine fairies in it. Is that really more comforting (...let alone rational) than accepting you're driven more by your circumstances than by some ineffable thing about yourself you can't even define? Might as well accept that you're inherently an observer to phenomena outside your immediate ability to understand completely—you know, the basis of the scientific theory. When people talk about free will in terms of quantum effects, all they reveal is how poorly read they are. It's a binary concept that doesn't map at all into a world where things-are—-—of-predictatable-but-you-can't-predict-the-unpredictable. It's nonsensical except at levels that are meaningless to human thought OR meaningless to physics.
  - naasking 10y ago
    > Culpability is a happy illusion outside of a social context I'm sure that's what you believe, but that doesn't make it true. > do you seriously think that there is an objective culpability for arbitrary concepts when people won't even interpret the arbitrary concepts the same way? The whole point of objectivity is that interpretation has no bearing on truth (or culpability in this case). > in this case, science shows us free will doesn't map neatly into our known universe Science shows no such thing. Assuming determinism of choice shoes only that philosophies of free will that claim free choice is incompatible with determinism are incompatible with evidence. Of course, we don't actually know that we are deterministic (evidence is not conclusive), and it does not in any way rule out free will that is compatible with determinism, which is the type most philosophers profess. This is an all too common mistake that scientists make: thinking that their definition of free will is obviously the one everyone is using.

RangerScience 10y ago

AFAICT, his terms are very well defined; he's using terms specifically from quantum computing, which combines terms from quantum phyics, classical computing theory, and adds a few of its own. He's also doing the thing where he's discussing the issue without a direct attempt to resolve it, which may be throwing off your comprehension.

fdsfsafasfdas 10y ago
"free will" is not a quantum computing term.

naasking 10y ago

> It's also a terribly boring problem. Regardless on you stance on what free will is, the answer does not mean you are removed from culpability If you acknowledge culpability in a given set of circumstances, then those culpable acted of their own free will. Choice from free will entails moral culpability, so you can only deny free will by also denying moral culpability. The fact that it's difficult to define the precise meaning of these terms doesn't make the problem meaningless.

fdsfsafasfdas 10y ago
Culpability is a happy illusion outside of a social context. Why are we trying to define this in quantum physics terms? It only makes sense in a Kantian universe, where there is an ideal of rationalism. Given how ambiguous human language (let alone human thought) is, do you seriously think that there is an objective culpability for arbitrary concepts when people won't even interpret the arbitrary concepts the same way? All of this smacks of scientists trying to weigh in on ontological problems. Science is only relevant so far as to show us the limits of what we can claim—in this case, science shows us free will doesn't map neatly into our known universe, hence the article above trying to argue for ways to preserve this abstract concept in a world that doesn't care. Look at: The Emperor's New Mind. It's the best attempt so far at actually fleshing out the problem, and it hinges entirely on the (fallacious) idea that because humans can innovate they aren't bound by turing completeness. Of course, this is hogwash, because what you'd have to demonstrate was that a single consciousness can prove everything given a finite set of axioms, which is of course an impossible proposition. Penrose sidesteps this by focusing on the magnification of quantum effects to human-level. I mean, come on—if that's your hope at understanding your own brain, just give up and imagine fairies in it. Is that really more comforting (...let alone rational) than accepting you're driven more by your circumstances than by some ineffable thing about yourself you can't even define? Might as well accept that you're inherently an observer to phenomena outside your immediate ability to understand completely—you know, the basis of the scientific theory. When people talk about free will in terms of quantum effects, all they reveal is how poorly read they are. It's a binary concept that doesn't map at all into a world where things-are—-—of-predictatable-but-you-can't-predict-the-unpredictable. It's nonsensical except at levels that are meaningless to human thought OR meaningless to physics.
- naasking 10y ago
  > Culpability is a happy illusion outside of a social context I'm sure that's what you believe, but that doesn't make it true. > do you seriously think that there is an objective culpability for arbitrary concepts when people won't even interpret the arbitrary concepts the same way? The whole point of objectivity is that interpretation has no bearing on truth (or culpability in this case). > in this case, science shows us free will doesn't map neatly into our known universe Science shows no such thing. Assuming determinism of choice shoes only that philosophies of free will that claim free choice is incompatible with determinism are incompatible with evidence. Of course, we don't actually know that we are deterministic (evidence is not conclusive), and it does not in any way rule out free will that is compatible with determinism, which is the type most philosophers profess. This is an all too common mistake that scientists make: thinking that their definition of free will is obviously the one everyone is using.