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I found J.R. Lucas' thoughts on the matter pretty thorough: http://www.leaderu.com/truth/2truth08.html http://www.leaderu.com/truth/2truth08.html >Unfortunatel
by hprotagonist 10y ago
I found J.R. Lucas' thoughts on the matter pretty thorough: http://www.leaderu.com/truth/2truth08.html http://www.leaderu.com/truth/2truth08.html
>Unfortunately, I was elected to a tutorial fellowship at Merton, my old college in Oxford, and was submerged in the pressures of Oxford tutorial life, so that my Freedom of the Will was not published until 1970. It is not very different from the original article, but does meet some of the criticisms first leveled against it, and sets the Godelian argument in a more general context. Perhaps two points I make in the book are worth reiterating. Professor Minsky spent some time yesterday criticizing Professor Margenau saying that he had misunderstood the import of quantum mechanics. I think actually the misunderstanding was on Professor Minsky's part and that he had failed to understand the structure of Professor Margenau's argument. Quantum mechanics is relevant to the problem of the will because it has replaced classical Newtonian physics which seemed to rule it out. It does not of itself prove free will - lots of quantum mechanical systems have no free will - but it disproves a disproof of it. In my book I referred to speculations on whether quantum mechanics might be replaced by a more determinist theory - a "Hidden Variable Theory" as it is called, and Von Neumann's argument against it. Since then the argument has progressed much further. Von Neumann's proof has been proved and criticized, and a whole series of results have been obtained - Bell's inequalities, Gleason's Theorem, Kochen-Specher Theorem, the two-color theorem: and four years ago Aspect concluded some experiments in Paris, which seemed to rule out any prospect of a hidden variable theory. So it seems to me that Professor Margenau was quite right to see quantum mechanics as bearing on the freewill problem, not as proving that it exists but as, in Plantinga's terminology, defeating a defeater.
further, Lucas proposed the following:
1. Determinism ↔ For any human h there exists at least one (deterministic) logical system L(h) which reliably predicts h's actions in all circumstances.
2. For any logical system L a sufficiently skilled mathematical logician (equipped with a sufficiently powerful computer if necessary) can construct some statements T(L) which are true but unprovable in L. (This follows from Gödel's first theorem.)
3. If a human m is a sufficiently skilful mathematical logician (equipped with a sufficiently powerful computer if necessary) then if m is given L(m), he or she can construct T(L(m)) and
Determine that they are true—which L(m) cannot do.
4. Hence L(m) does not reliably predict m's actions in all circumstances.
5. Hence m has free will.
6. It is implausible that the qualitative difference between mathematical logicians and the rest of the population is such that the former have free will and the latter do not.
- AnimalMuppet 10y agoIt seems to me that step 3 requires that the human m have a sufficiently accurate understanding of themselves. That step seems to me to be questionable.
- hprotagonist 10y agohe's arguing a proof of mere existence there. You don't need to propose an algorithm, or indeed have any idea how to go about it, you can just assert that it must exist and that's enough. it is a bit teeth-gnashing though.
- RangerScience 10y agoA physicist, an engineer, and a mathematician are in a hypothetical theater when the stage curtains catch fire. The physicist makes some measurements as to the volume of curtain, available air flow, chemical properties of the curtain, flow rate and thermal capacity of the water hose and water, formulating a precise equation for how much water is necessary to put the fire out when starting at a given time, and precisely puts the fire out. The engineer makes a few quick estimates as the the volume of fuel and air, uses that to estimate the amount of water needed, doubles it, and puts the fire out (with safety factor 2). The mathematician looks at the fire, looks at the fire hose, states: "The problem is solvable", and exits stage left.
- AnimalMuppet 10y agoAnd I'm arguing that his proof of mere existence has holes in it. At a minimum, step 3 is not a mechanistic step that can be simply asserted. Or, rather, I assert that step 3 posits a degree of self-knowledge that no human actually possesses. Now you have to choose which unproven assertion you're going to believe, his or mine, or else you have to find a way to prove one or the other.
- naasking 10y ago> Bell's inequalities, Gleason's Theorem, Kochen-Specher Theorem, the two-color theorem: and four years ago Aspect concluded some experiments in Paris, which seemed to rule out any prospect of a hidden variable theory. So it seems to me that Professor Margenau was quite right to see quantum mechanics as bearing on the freewill problem, not as proving that it exists but as, in Plantinga's terminology, defeating a defeater. It seems he was ignorant of Bohmian mechanics then, because deterministic QM is still alive and well. > 3. If a human m is a sufficiently skilful mathematical logician (equipped with a sufficiently powerful computer if necessary) then if m is given L(m), he or she can construct T(L(m)) and Determine that they are true—which L(m) cannot do. This step is dubious: 1. It's not at all clear that m could prove the truth of T(L(m)) even in these circumstances. I would need to see these steps to be convinced. 2. Humans are finite automotons (see the Bekenstein Bound), and the addition of a "sufficiently powerful computer" drastically increases the computational power available to m beyond what m is capable of alone. So L(m) would have to be a logical system that encompasses this unbounded power, and so T(L(m)) would still have true but unprovable statements, even with the computer due to Goedel. This argument basically tries to prove that a Turing machine + Oracle can solve the Halting problem for Turing machines, but cannot solve the Halting problem for Turing machines+Oracles. However, it neglects to acknowledge that L is predicated on the Oracle, so we're not solving the Halting problem for Turing machines, we're solving the Halting problem for Turing machines+Oracles given only an Oracle, which is impossible. As for the argument itself, it's a clever attempt, but still predicated on the assumption that determinism is inconsistent with free will. This has yet to be demonstrated, and in fact, all such arguments to date have been refuted (although clearly not to everyone's satisfaction).