3 ms·

Of course not. But if (as in this case) we're trying to mitigate, broadly, against a threat with the resources[1] of the CIA, SHA1 should be considered complet

by pryce 10y ago

Of course not. But if (as in this case) we're trying to mitigate, broadly, against a threat with the resources[1] of the CIA, SHA1 should be considered completely inappropriate now, even though the recent SHA1 announcement was with respect to collisions rather than a preimage attack. Surely requesting they post SHA256 hashes is the appropriate step? [1] obviously after the leaks this specific attack is more likely to be coopted by many additional actors, but I don't think that's enough to explode my point.

tripzilch 10y ago
> but I don't think that's enough to explode my point No, however the part where they produced a collision and not a pre-image attack, is :) We should be moving away from SHA1, but it's unlikely that they're hoarding a pre-image attack on SHA1 and have spent the (probably rather large) amount of resources to produce one for this DLL in particular.