4 ms·

It's not _that_ unexpected in this case. In short, SNAP's IPO was big enough that most of the banks which like the company participated in the IPO. Legally any

It's not _that_ unexpected in this case. In short, SNAP's IPO was big enough that most of the banks which like the company participated in the IPO. Legally anyone involved in the IPO can't publish an analysis for (IIRC) 10 days, which means that the banks which like them can't talk.

rhizome 10y ago
Interesting, does this create a perverse incentive for SNAP to get as many banks as possible onboard so that there's a bigger embargo on analyst commentary? Provided they can get enough banks, natch.
- foota 10y ago
  The issue is the backs they don't get are the ones that don't believe in their company, so any company that likes them can't talk.
- GCA10 10y ago
  Yes. Wall Street provides highly liquid markets to the rest of the world, but when it comes to the way the finance sector's own services are delivered, the pros excel at turning price-efficient markets into cozy cartels.
- lmm 10y ago
  Isn't that backwards? They'd like to have a friendly bank who didn't buy any of their stock who could just talk them up (though whether they'd like that more than money in their pockets is questionable); at the moment their friends are all embargoed and only their enemies are talking.
  - rhizome 10y ago
    Why wouldn't a friendly bank buy into them?
    - lmm 10y ago
      Exactly. It would be convenient for Snap if there was a friendly bank who hadn't bought into them, because then that friendly bank would not be embargoed. But there's no reason for a bank to do that.
      - rhizome 10y ago
        I guess I don't understand what you meant by "backwards," then.
        lmm 10y ago
        You said "does this create a perverse incentive for SNAP to get as many banks as possible onboard so that there's a bigger embargo on analyst commentary?" which to my mind is backwards: the embargo creates a perverse incentive for Snap to get as few banks as possible onboard so that there's a smaller embargo on analyst commentary.

rhizome 10y ago

Interesting, does this create a perverse incentive for SNAP to get as many banks as possible onboard so that there's a bigger embargo on analyst commentary? Provided they can get enough banks, natch.

foota 10y ago
The issue is the backs they don't get are the ones that don't believe in their company, so any company that likes them can't talk.
GCA10 10y ago
Yes. Wall Street provides highly liquid markets to the rest of the world, but when it comes to the way the finance sector's own services are delivered, the pros excel at turning price-efficient markets into cozy cartels.
lmm 10y ago
Isn't that backwards? They'd like to have a friendly bank who didn't buy any of their stock who could just talk them up (though whether they'd like that more than money in their pockets is questionable); at the moment their friends are all embargoed and only their enemies are talking.
- rhizome 10y ago
  Why wouldn't a friendly bank buy into them?
  - lmm 10y ago
    Exactly. It would be convenient for Snap if there was a friendly bank who hadn't bought into them, because then that friendly bank would not be embargoed. But there's no reason for a bank to do that.
    - rhizome 10y ago
      I guess I don't understand what you meant by "backwards," then.
      - lmm 10y ago
        You said "does this create a perverse incentive for SNAP to get as many banks as possible onboard so that there's a bigger embargo on analyst commentary?" which to my mind is backwards: the embargo creates a perverse incentive for Snap to get as few banks as possible onboard so that there's a smaller embargo on analyst commentary.