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I wonder how helpful these sort of posts are for actual journalists or whistle blowers. It's one thing to tell a casual user to get an iphone as a reasonably se

I wonder how helpful these sort of posts are for actual journalists or whistle blowers. It's one thing to tell a casual user to get an iphone as a reasonably secure choice compared to Android's fragmented mess, but for someone whose job and/or life is on the line, you need a more thorough coverage. You may even need like a mini course of sorts that covers basics of CS and infosec. Short of that, such cavalier advice can be misleading.

pvg 10y ago
This was written as a response to a question from an actual journalist. It's quoted right at the top. What do you find 'cavalier' about it?
- bubblethink 10y ago
  Because it fails to mention any downsides of running an ios based phone, and I'm sure that a balanced discussion would find many. Security is complex, and paraphrasing it this way may be fine as casual advice, but when you add "journalists" in the title of your post, it falls short.
  - pvg 10y ago
    It outlines many of the limits of the advice, describes a specific case in which an activist was targeted by multiple iOS zero days, etc. What are the downsides you think it omits and in what ways does Matthew Green misunderstand the complexities of security?
    - bubblethink 10y ago
      Not so much about misunderstanding as it is about omitting other details. For one, IOS is a completely closed box whereas AOSP is completely open. You can argue for or against security by obscurity v/s security in open software, but at the very least it needs a mention in any fair comparison. Secondly, most of the blog focuses on average case behaviour. In Apple's case the average, best and worst case are all the same since they make only one device and one OS. In contrast, android is a vast spectrum. Now if you were to give out advice to people with sensitive data, you should compare the best case for both of them, which he briefly does, but not quite as detailed as it warrants. For instance, is iphone necessarily better than a Pixel running AOSP or something like CopperheadOS ? I'm not so sure. IOS's centralized behaviour also makes it an easier target in some ways. Want to attack all browsers on an iphone ? Attack webkit. There are other security fails such as relying on either itunes or icloud for getting data in and out of the phone. Much fuss was made over Cloudfare's lack of a bug bounty program. Apple didn't have one either until quite recently either.
      - pvg 10y ago
        I'll just take the bit with the highest inaccuracy density: IOS is a completely closed box whereas AOSP is completely open. You can argue for or against security by obscurity v/s security in open software, but at the very least it needs a mention in any fair comparison. This gets addressed by people working in security on every single HN thread, including this one. Assessments of the security of iOS are not dependent on its 'openness'. There is also nobody seriously arguing 'security by obscurity' vs 'open software'. That's not what 'security by obscurity' means nor does the security of iOS depend on 'obscurity'. None of this needs a mention in a 'fair comparison' because it's simply wrong.

pvg 10y ago

This was written as a response to a question from an actual journalist. It's quoted right at the top. What do you find 'cavalier' about it?

bubblethink 10y ago
Because it fails to mention any downsides of running an ios based phone, and I'm sure that a balanced discussion would find many. Security is complex, and paraphrasing it this way may be fine as casual advice, but when you add "journalists" in the title of your post, it falls short.
- pvg 10y ago
  It outlines many of the limits of the advice, describes a specific case in which an activist was targeted by multiple iOS zero days, etc. What are the downsides you think it omits and in what ways does Matthew Green misunderstand the complexities of security?
  - bubblethink 10y ago
    Not so much about misunderstanding as it is about omitting other details. For one, IOS is a completely closed box whereas AOSP is completely open. You can argue for or against security by obscurity v/s security in open software, but at the very least it needs a mention in any fair comparison. Secondly, most of the blog focuses on average case behaviour. In Apple's case the average, best and worst case are all the same since they make only one device and one OS. In contrast, android is a vast spectrum. Now if you were to give out advice to people with sensitive data, you should compare the best case for both of them, which he briefly does, but not quite as detailed as it warrants. For instance, is iphone necessarily better than a Pixel running AOSP or something like CopperheadOS ? I'm not so sure. IOS's centralized behaviour also makes it an easier target in some ways. Want to attack all browsers on an iphone ? Attack webkit. There are other security fails such as relying on either itunes or icloud for getting data in and out of the phone. Much fuss was made over Cloudfare's lack of a bug bounty program. Apple didn't have one either until quite recently either.
    - pvg 10y ago
      I'll just take the bit with the highest inaccuracy density: IOS is a completely closed box whereas AOSP is completely open. You can argue for or against security by obscurity v/s security in open software, but at the very least it needs a mention in any fair comparison. This gets addressed by people working in security on every single HN thread, including this one. Assessments of the security of iOS are not dependent on its 'openness'. There is also nobody seriously arguing 'security by obscurity' vs 'open software'. That's not what 'security by obscurity' means nor does the security of iOS depend on 'obscurity'. None of this needs a mention in a 'fair comparison' because it's simply wrong.