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That is certainly a point of view I would agree with, but that is not what I meant. I did not mean how the structure forms but how the structure becomes conscio

by danbruc 10y ago

That is certainly a point of view I would agree with, but that is not what I meant. I did not mean how the structure forms but how the structure becomes conscious and self-aware. Let me try to explain with a though experiment, assuming humans are purely physical. You build a human-like robot with cameras, and microphones and actuators. You also build a gigantic mechanical computer out of gears and hook up the sensors and actuators of the robot to the mechanical computer. Finally you run a quantum mechanical simulation of a human brain and nerve system on the mechanical computer. Shouldn't the whole thing now be equivalent to a human? Shouldn't it be conscious and self-aware? This then raises the question, when and how did the gears stop to just turn according to simple rules and became a mind capable of exploring and thinking about the world? There seems to be some kind of large jump between mindless rotating gears and becoming aware of you own existence. I have a hard time making really precise what I mean, but I hope you get the idea.

rocqua 10y ago
I'd say that such a 'philosophical' zombie would indeed be conscious. In fact, I'd call it human. As for how it arose, I'd posit a theory: As an animal starts modeling others, at some point it's model includes the others are also modeling others. Now, combine this with that animal (and the others) also modeling themselves. At some point, probably during collaboration, it starts becoming useful to start reconciling these models with each other by communicating about them. Now, reconciling models about a third party is already a big step, but essentially speculation. At some point though, someone might want to reconcile their model of you with your own model of yourself. After all, your model is probably a better source of truth. This requires phrases like: "I think that", "I wanted", perhaps even "I wondered". Interestingly, this account of consciousness is rooted very deeply in the 'second-person'. It is very much a social construct. I'd also like to point out this is naught but a hypothesis.
- danbruc 10y ago
  There is probably some truth in the mind being a result of social interaction. If you read about feral children, a common theme seems to be that those children end up somewhat like animals lacking essential human characteristics. I'd say that such a 'philosophical' zombie would indeed be conscious. In fact, I'd call it human. I don't think those two are compatible. A philosophical zombie lacks consciousness, sentience, and qualia, a human does not. And I don't see why this collection of gears should lack any of them, why it should be a philosophical zombie. Those gear should feel pain, and not in the sense that the positions of some of those gears indicate that there is pain, like a bit in a computer memory, but just like you and me experience pain. And that seems, at least to me, a gigantic leap. I can perfectly understand how you could evaluate different sensor inputs, calculate a pain level, and store it somewhere in memory. And then you could easily create reactions, try to get away from whatever causes you pain, you could make the robot scream. But that seems nothing like how I experience pain, I really feel it. Humans don't even need external sources of pain, we can experience pain from memories and thoughts alone. Admittedly that may be an artificial distinction, one could certainly imagine a kind of internal sensor input that does not sense external stimuli but the state of other parts of your brain. But all that doesn't help, at least me, at all understanding why I can feel pain and what it means to feel pain in the first place. I can not make the jump from a physical and inanimate picture of a human made out of particles to how it feels to be a human. I can not understand how a collection of gears could possibly feel pain. And when I say not understand I mean it in the most powerful way. It's not that I can not understand the details, it's not that I don't understand anything about it but know how I could learn about it, it's much worse, I can not even imagine how I could possibly try to understand it.

by danbruc 10y ago

rocqua 10y ago

I'd say that such a 'philosophical' zombie would indeed be conscious. In fact, I'd call it human. As for how it arose, I'd posit a theory: As an animal starts modeling others, at some point it's model includes the others are also modeling others. Now, combine this with that animal (and the others) also modeling themselves. At some point, probably during collaboration, it starts becoming useful to start reconciling these models with each other by communicating about them. Now, reconciling models about a third party is already a big step, but essentially speculation. At some point though, someone might want to reconcile their model of you with your own model of yourself. After all, your model is probably a better source of truth. This requires phrases like: "I think that", "I wanted", perhaps even "I wondered". Interestingly, this account of consciousness is rooted very deeply in the 'second-person'. It is very much a social construct. I'd also like to point out this is naught but a hypothesis.

danbruc 10y ago
There is probably some truth in the mind being a result of social interaction. If you read about feral children, a common theme seems to be that those children end up somewhat like animals lacking essential human characteristics. I'd say that such a 'philosophical' zombie would indeed be conscious. In fact, I'd call it human. I don't think those two are compatible. A philosophical zombie lacks consciousness, sentience, and qualia, a human does not. And I don't see why this collection of gears should lack any of them, why it should be a philosophical zombie. Those gear should feel pain, and not in the sense that the positions of some of those gears indicate that there is pain, like a bit in a computer memory, but just like you and me experience pain. And that seems, at least to me, a gigantic leap. I can perfectly understand how you could evaluate different sensor inputs, calculate a pain level, and store it somewhere in memory. And then you could easily create reactions, try to get away from whatever causes you pain, you could make the robot scream. But that seems nothing like how I experience pain, I really feel it. Humans don't even need external sources of pain, we can experience pain from memories and thoughts alone. Admittedly that may be an artificial distinction, one could certainly imagine a kind of internal sensor input that does not sense external stimuli but the state of other parts of your brain. But all that doesn't help, at least me, at all understanding why I can feel pain and what it means to feel pain in the first place. I can not make the jump from a physical and inanimate picture of a human made out of particles to how it feels to be a human. I can not understand how a collection of gears could possibly feel pain. And when I say not understand I mean it in the most powerful way. It's not that I can not understand the details, it's not that I don't understand anything about it but know how I could learn about it, it's much worse, I can not even imagine how I could possibly try to understand it.