5 ms·
It was my understanding that people were finding numerous examples of leaked data that included Authorization headers, which don't always leak passwords but whi
by saurik 10y ago
It was my understanding that people were finding numerous examples of leaked data that included Authorization headers, which don't always leak passwords but which still leak session keys. Maybe if espadrine from this linked comment reads this, he could explain more?
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13719455 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13719455
FWIW, as an example, Grindr uses CloudFlare: do a Google search for "authorization: grindr3" and you will find a URL which (no longer cached but you can still get snippets) contained an authenticated grindr request, which would be enough to have had temporary access to that person's account.
https://costumla.com/wild-west-costumes-for-men.html https://costumla.com/wild-west-costumes-for-men.html
"... U Edge Certificate Authority1 0 U San Francisco1 0 U California�1p ���U� N��U � � �f"�0! %���U@ @GET /v3/profiles/[REDACTED] HTTP/1.1 CF-RAY: 33282514b8d957d7 FL-Server: 15f76 Host: grindr.mobi X-Real-IP: [REDACTED] Accept-Encoding: gzip Client-Accept-Encoding: gzip X-Forwarded-Proto: https Connect-Via-Https : on Connect-Via-Port: 443 Connect-Via-IP: 104.16.85.62 Connect-Via-Host: grindr.mobi CF-Visitor: {"scheme":"https"} CF-Host-Origin-IP: [REDACTED] Zone-ID: 22252132 Owner-ID: 2607399 CF-Int-Brand-ID: 100 Zone-Name: grindr.mobi Connection: Keep-Alive X-SSL-Protocol: TLSv1.2 X-SSL-Cipher: ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 X-SSL-Server-Name: grindr.mobi X-SSL-Session-Reused: . SSL-Server-IP: 104.16.85.62 X-SSL-Connection-ID: 15d1b8de6025864d-DFW X-SPDY-Protocol: 3.1 authorization: Grindr3 ... accept: application/json user-agent: grindr3/3.0.13.16790;16790;Free;Android 6.0 CF-Use-OB: 0 Set-Expires-TTL: 14400 CF-Cache-Max-File-Size: 512m Set-SSL-Name: grindr.mobi CF-Cache-Level: byc CF-Unbuffered-Upload: 0 Set-SSL-Client-Cert: 0 Set-Limit-Conn-Cache-Host: 50000 CF-WAN-RG5: 0 CF-Brand-Name: cloudflare CF-Age-Header-Enabled: 0 CF-Respect-Strong-Etag: 0 Set-Proxy-Read-Timeout: 100 Set-Proxy-Send-Timeout: 30 CF-Connecting-IP: [REDACTED] Set-Proxy-Connect-Timeout: 90 Set-Cache-Bypass: 0 Set-SSL-Verify: 0 CF-Force-Miss-TS: 0 Set-Buffering: 0 CF-Pref-OB: 1 Set-Keepalive: 1 CF-Pref-Geoloc: 1 CF-Use-BYC: 0 CF-IPCountry: [REDACTED] CF-IPType ..."
edit: I have spent the last fifteen minutes pulling the search snippet (edit: and now an hour; but all on my phone, so this is harder than it should be, and I also am distracted by other stuff). The way you do this is by walking through the parts you can see to get nearby context. (I do this a lot to pull content purged from or inaccessible to or simply updated in Google's cache.)
In so doing, while I haven't been able to still have access to the session key (likely too long and unique for a snippet), I have pulled the X-Real-IP address field of this Grindr user and a profile identifier they were checking out (both of which I redacted above, but you could trivially get yourself now using that context).
CloudFlare: if you think there isn't private data that was leaked, OR EVEN PRIVATE DATA STILL ACCESSIBLE, you are a bunch of fucking idiots. 1) Clearing the cache isn't sufficient, as for anything built from short plain text words we can pull the snippet. 2) IP addresses and session keys count as "private data". 3) GET requests actually are often sensitive information :/.
- PuffinBlue 10y agoI am the second responder in that thread. I personally saw an oAuth bearer token for a user of Fitbit. It was there clear as day. Maybe I saw the only one that leaked, but that seems...unlikely.
- dunham 10y agoOAuth2 does indeed send a secret bearer as an "Authorization: Bearer" header, but OAuth1 does not. The FitBit stuff I recall seeing other day was OAuth1. It would look like oauth_token=XXX and oauth_consumer_key=YYY, along with oauth_signature=ZZZ. If that's what you're seeing, it's not a bearer token and that data isn't secret. Those values are essentially record locators. OAuth1 has an undisclosed "consumer secret" (embedded in the app) and "token secret" (acquired at login) that are used to sign the request. So these requests don't leak any usable tokens. If you also see oauth_nonce and oauth_timestamp values, then the signature is also protected from a replay attack. The response body of the request that originally acquired the token/secret would leak these secrets. I'm sure there are bearer tokens out there for other services, but if fitbit is using OAuth1, you'd have to snag that original token acquisition to call the api as that user. Edit - I hope this doesn't come off as argumentative. I just want to point out the good design choices made by the guys that weren't actually compromised by this. OAuth2 is really easy to implement, but it kinda feels like a step backwards security-wise.
- PuffinBlue 10y ago> The FitBit stuff I recall seeing other day was OAuth1. Fitbit uses oAuth 2 https://dev.fitbit.com/docs/oauth2/ https://dev.fitbit.com/docs/oauth2/
- lightedman 10y ago"OAuth2 is really easy to implement, but it kinda feels like a step backwards security-wise." No, no it isn't. There are about three proper ways to implement it. Almost nobody whose site I've come across that uses OAuth2 has it properly implemented. Token revocation and authentication is hard, folks.
- 10y ago