6 ms·
By extension from Rawlsian justice, not distinguishing one form of life from another by reference to anthropocentrism.
by barrkel 17y ago
By extension from Rawlsian justice, not distinguishing one form of life from another by reference to anthropocentrism.
- jerf 17y agoI'm not sure at all what you're trying to say. While I freely admit that my familiarity with Rawlsian justice now comes from about three minutes spent with Wikipedia, it seems an awful lot like his conception of justice foundationally depend on the involvement of "rational agents", which includes human-class intelligence as a core part of the definition of that term. It would seem to me that stripping away that aspect of the system leaves virtually nothing left, and certainly nothing that trivially obviously extends out to not-even-possibly-rational agents (or, arguably, non-agents according to the usual meanings of the term) with only 17 words of explanation. (Actually defining justice in a way that covers all life forms is also a rather interesting question to ponder for a while; given the diversity of "life", such as the classic "virus" conundrum, it becomes hard to avoid including non-life in the definition as well. And what do you do with an ethical system that has an opinion about a black hole destroying a star, whatever that opinion may be?) That said, fully expanding your point would probably blow out the HN comment limit; you could probably get a medium-large essay out of it. But I would be sort of curious if you could sketch out a bit more. I'm actually not interested in attacking it, because I'm not actually trying to push a viewpoint on the question today; the goal of my first paragraph is to more thoroughly explain my confusion about your statement than criticize something too short for me to even understand.
- barrkel 17y agoIf one were completely divorced from attachment to any one life form (i.e. behind a veil of ignorance), but considered the whole as a family (and all life on this planet, so far as we know, is related), couldn't we be proud of the accomplishments of one of our distant cousins, even if we don't "end up" as them (when the "veil" is lifted)? As to rational agents etc., let us say that we are rational when we are behind the veil, but we may end up as any kind of life form. Rawls' theory doesn't necessarily follow from his original position, IMO. Rawls seemed to prefer quite a conservative, fearful, optimizing for the worst kind of case, but I don't think that's the only way to look at it. I don't buy too deeply into the Second Principle in Theory of Justice. But the Original Position, as a thought experiment, has a lot to say for it, particularly because it resolves problems inherent in the golden rule (e.g. a masochist becomes a sadist). I do think though, that if you're to get to some concept of fairness as it relates to animals etc., that you have to get out of anthropocentrism.