Sure, the root keys of DNS are non-state operated, but they are used to sign the DNS-sec keys for the TLDs. These, in turn, are used to sign the keys for the na

Sure, the root keys of DNS are non-state operated, but they are used to sign the DNS-sec keys for the TLDs. These, in turn, are used to sign the keys for the nameserver responsible for serving the normal domain. For any country TLD domain (.us .uk .nl), those keys are held by a state actor. That TLD then gets to sign any lower level DNS servers. Say whomever controlled .com wanted to change the key for hackernews.com. They'd simply change the .NS record for hackernews.com to point to a different DNS box with different keys, that proxies DNS requests for the real server but re-signs them. It can then simply serve a new DANE record. (DANE records are the DNS-sec version of CAs). This is essentially the same procedure as a CA issuing a wrong certificate. The source of this problem is that you don't just need to trust the root DNS servers, but you also need to trust the TLD-servers that are signed by the root DNS servers. (And down recursively if there are more NS records in between)