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There's a new Name Constraints TLS extension to implement it: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4

by dchest 10y ago

There's a new Name Constraints TLS extension to implement it: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10 See also https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:NameConstraints https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:NameConstraints

majewsky 10y ago
This would be awesome for my company (SAP), since it could get its internal root CA into the standard set of root CAs, with the name constraint on the "sap" TLD. (Yes, that TLD is a thing.)
- tialaramex 10y ago
  People looking after the Web PKI aren't interested in adding trust for such a root which doesn't deliver any new value to their ordinary users. The US Federal Government is about to try this too, and I predict they'll struggle to jump all the hurdles (this isn't the FPKI, that's separate). You can get an existing CA (or more than one if you're paranoid) to write you a name-constrained subCA certificate today instead. This will cost a lot of money, but if they're pointlessly running a TLD then SAP is already burning money, presumably they can just fork a few million extra onto the bonfire.
tialaramex 10y ago
(Edited to explain about v509v3 name constraints) That's not a TLS extension, it's two separate things you've linked The first thing is a standard feature of X509v3, which doesn't help you at the root because although root keys are distributed in the form of x509v3 certificates for convenience, they aren't really treated as certificates, after all you're trusting them, if you can't trust the root then Game Over. We use these name constraints all the time, they often protect a corporate subCA. The second thing is a proposal to Mozilla policy from 2015, ie, if it was implemented, this would be a change to the behaviour of Mozilla's TLS client, most specifically Firefox. It isn't currently being discussed by m.d.s.policy, the group which decides Mozilla policy. If you care about Web PKI policy m.d.s.policy is basically the only place you can influence it, everybody else of any significance makes these decisions in private (e.g. Microsoft, Apple, Oracle) or takes their cue from m.d.s.policy (most Free Unices, more obscure browsers).

by dchest 10y ago

majewsky 10y ago

This would be awesome for my company (SAP), since it could get its internal root CA into the standard set of root CAs, with the name constraint on the "sap" TLD. (Yes, that TLD is a thing.)

tialaramex 10y ago
People looking after the Web PKI aren't interested in adding trust for such a root which doesn't deliver any new value to their ordinary users. The US Federal Government is about to try this too, and I predict they'll struggle to jump all the hurdles (this isn't the FPKI, that's separate). You can get an existing CA (or more than one if you're paranoid) to write you a name-constrained subCA certificate today instead. This will cost a lot of money, but if they're pointlessly running a TLD then SAP is already burning money, presumably they can just fork a few million extra onto the bonfire.

tialaramex 10y ago

(Edited to explain about v509v3 name constraints) That's not a TLS extension, it's two separate things you've linked The first thing is a standard feature of X509v3, which doesn't help you at the root because although root keys are distributed in the form of x509v3 certificates for convenience, they aren't really treated as certificates, after all you're trusting them, if you can't trust the root then Game Over. We use these name constraints all the time, they often protect a corporate subCA. The second thing is a proposal to Mozilla policy from 2015, ie, if it was implemented, this would be a change to the behaviour of Mozilla's TLS client, most specifically Firefox. It isn't currently being discussed by m.d.s.policy, the group which decides Mozilla policy. If you care about Web PKI policy m.d.s.policy is basically the only place you can influence it, everybody else of any significance makes these decisions in private (e.g. Microsoft, Apple, Oracle) or takes their cue from m.d.s.policy (most Free Unices, more obscure browsers).