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Note that this happens even when using a BlueCoat proxy in non-MITM mode. BlueCoat tries to "analyze" TLS connections, and rejects anything it doesn't understa
by JoshTriplett 10y ago
Note that this happens even when using a BlueCoat proxy in non-MITM mode. BlueCoat tries to "analyze" TLS connections, and rejects anything it doesn't understand. This exact issue occurred with TLS 1.2 back when BlueCoat only understood 1.1/1.0.
In this case, it doesn't sound like they're reverting it because of overall breakage, but rather because it breaks the tool that would otherwise be used to control TLS 1.3 trials and other configuration. Firefox had a similar issue, where they temporarily used more conservative settings for their updater than for the browser itself, to ensure that people could always obtain updates that might improve the situation.
- coderobe 10y agoRejecting anything it doesn't understand sounds like a bug to me. If it sees that it's TLS, it should attempt a protocol downgrade. There's absolutely no reason for this to break, as TLS 1.3 exists alongside TLS 1.2 (For now).
- ehsankia 10y agoThe surprising part (or maybe not) is that BlueCoat had been made aware of this change months ago and never got around properly testing it. This one of the softwares main purpose, and the fact that they didn't even make sure it works on the newest Chrome, leading to such a mess, is pretty sad.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- nikanj 10y agoThe way this is going to be spinned, I promise you, is: Google released a new version of Chrome, and support for that upgrade is in BlueCoat v.next. Here's an invoice for the new license+consulting services for the upgrade. In corporate environments, the last thing that changes is the thing that gets blamed. BlueCoat was not upgraded, Chrome was, and now things are broken? Not their fault.
- 234dd57d2c8dba 10y agoIt's a security feature, often malware will send encrypted traffic over 443 in an attempt to bypass firewalls. If BlueCoat can't understand the traffic, it drops it as it assumes it's malicious.
- theamk 10y agoBut the traffic is totally understandable -- the right action does not require knowing what TLS 1.3 is. The way it is supposed to work is as following: there is a protocol negotiation when the connection is established (which is obviously unencrypted), which contains TLS version supported. If MITM proxy does not understand the version, it can just change these bytes to force hosts to negotiate at a lower version. So the only reason BlueCoat fails is because the authors failed to implement force version downgrade.
- jarym 10y agoThe Bluecoat sales people did a number on you huh? Sounds really good until you ask 'why doesn't Bluecoat understand this traffic' - because it really should.
- icebraining 10y agoTLS 1.3 is still quite new, doesn't seem outrageous that they take a bit to implement it.
- deathanatos 10y agoThis is a failure to implement any version of TLS correctly, not just v1.3. (TLS has support for version negotiation including receiving a hello from a client with a future version, such as v1.3.)
- userbinator 10y agoRejecting anything it doesn't understand sounds like a bug to me. It sounds like a perfectly reasonable behaviour if the goal is to "fail closed", to provide more security in a fashion similar to a whitelist. If it sees that it's TLS, it should attempt a protocol downgrade. I don't remember the exact details but I recall reading that TLS has a mechanism to prevent version downgrades, precisely to defend against such "attacks", so the connection would not succeed in that case either.
- coderobe 10y agoClient and Server exchange a list of capabilities at the beginning of a TLS connection, if the proxy just filters out the protocols/versions it doesn't understand, server/client will agree on a different version (like 1.2).
- ademarre 10y ago> It sounds like a perfectly reasonable behaviour if the goal is to "fail closed", to provide more security in a fashion similar to a whitelist. This reminds me of firewalls that weaken security by filtering unrecognized HTTP headers: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12655180 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12655180
- tbrowbdidnso 10y agoThe TLS negotiation is mutual. Both endpoints tell each other what they support and they agree on a protocol that's mutually supported. If merely advertising 1.3 while still advertising older versions causes blue coat to break, it has a bug in TLS version negotiation. There is no downgrade or whitelist or failing closed. Each end says what they support and BlueCoat blows up the connection if it sees that the other end supports a newer version. It should say "oh we both support 1.2 let's use that" And apparently it's done this before so there's even less an excuse for it.
- rocqua 10y agoThis is apparently a problem when bluecoat is used in non-mitm mode. That probably means bluecoat is merely inspecting the initial handshake, not modifying it. That would imply it can't actually modify the handshake. It then simply inspects a connection it doesn't understand and 'fails closed' by preventing that connection.
- jlgaddis 10y agoOn the other hand, allowing stuff that you don't understand gives us things like the CSRF vulnerabilities in MongoDB and such. In the case of a security appliance -- such as this -- it should, in my opinion, "fail closed".
- deathanatos 10y agoSorry, no. TLS is explicitly designed to allow smooth upgrading like this. This proxy is supposed to (in response to a client hello w/ TLSv1.3) respond with TLSv1.2 if that's what it supports. This is still a rigorous parsing of the input being given: nothing is "not understood": version negotiation is an inherent part of the protocol and is supposed to allow for painless upgrades to more secure protocols. The RFC (which if you're implementing TLS, you should have open at all times) explicitly calls out exactly this behavior: > Note: some server implementations are known to implement version negotiation incorrectly. For example, there are buggy TLS 1.0 servers that simply close the connection when the client offers a version newer than TLS 1.0. The quality of this vendor's implementation is extremely suspect.
- rocqua 10y agoThe issue only occurs in non-mitm mode, probably meaning the box doesn't actually do the TLS handsake, instead merely inspecting it.
- skywhopper 10y agoIt's in BlueCoat's political interests to make sure TLS 1.3 rolls out as slowly as possible since it actively works against their entire business model, so they have zero incentive to be proactive about this until the TLS 1.3 extensions are approved that make MITM possible again.
- quotemstr 10y agoRidiculously conservative middleboxes are why we can't have nice things and why we need to encrypt all new protocols, security properties aside.
- jlgaddis 10y ago[ off-topic comment deleted ]
- kbart 10y agoProbably you have already (mis)clicked (down)vote button on this comment before. It's easy to do accidentally, especially on touchscreen.
- jlgaddis 10y agoI was pretty sure that wasn't it. I noticed it as soon as I first saw the comment. That's the simplest explanation, though, so that's probably what happened. Oh well.
- DanielDent 10y agoThis is precisely the conclusion Google reached and has used as they work on QUIC. Even protocol state (equivalents of TCP FIN/SYN/etc) is encrypted, to ensure that middleboxes don't get ideas about what the protocol is 'supposed' to do - ideas which make it hard to change the protocol in the future.
- CapacitorSet 10y agoIt is really sad that one reason why QUIC encrypts protocol states is to prevent excessively eager middleboxes from meddling with the traffic.
- peterwwillis 10y agoActually, no, that would just make everything more difficult. Browsers need to start coming to terms with the fact that they do not get do dictate how www networking operates for every organization around the world. There are hundreds of thousands of organizations that need inspection and caching and proxying of internal www traffic. That all protocols should disallow or frustrate this disregards real needs of users and organizations. Further still, if protocols can't be designed to be implemented easily or to allow for implementation bugs or lack of features, it's a crap protocol or application. Middleware will always be necessary, and encryption really shouldn't change the requirements of how middleware needs to work with a protocol.
- mrmondo 10y agoBlueCoat are an incredibly evil company that are breaking the internet.
- rossy 10y agoBlueCoat makes me cry. We have an application running inside the firewall of one of our clients that communicates with a HTTPS REST API hosted by a server in our datacenter. The connection must be encrypted because it handles confidential information, but when it passes through BlueCoat's TLS proxy, the Authorization header gets mangled and it can't authenticate against our backend. Higher-ups decided that it would be better to try to convince the client to let our app bypass their proxy than to implement a custom workaround for BlueCoat users, but the client never let us through, so the only solution we could implement involved manually SCPing the required data between client and server.
- reacweb 10y agoSsh is almost often available to connect through the firewall. Do IT people understand how easily you can work around proxy using ssh ? Just start a vm in the cloud (like a C1 at scaleway for 3.6€ per month), install squid (with default options). On your PC, run portable applications: putty connected to your vm with a forward of proxy port and portable firefox configured to use your forwarded proxy.
- jeroenhd 10y agoThere's not even a need for installing a proxy! SSH has native SOCKS proxy support, so all you need to do is set up an SSH connection and set the browser connection to a dynamic SSH port forward. This also prevents leaking DNS requests : with a standard proxy your computer might be trying to look up domains using the company DNS system. With a SOCKS proxy, you can forward all DNS traffic as well!
- avodonosov 10y agoHow do you "set the browser connection to a dynamic SSH port forward"?
- jessaustin 10y agoThis exact issue occurred with TLS 1.2 back when BlueCoat only understood 1.1/1.0. Good grief! From David Benjamin's final comment: Note these issues are always bugs in the middlebox products. TLS version negotiation is backwards compatible, so a correctly-implemented TLS-terminating proxy should not require changes to work in a TLS-1.3-capable ecosystem. It can simply speak TLS 1.2 at both client <-> proxy and proxy <-> server TLS connections. That these products broke is an indication of defects in their TLS implementations. It's understandable that I've never heard of BlueCoat: clearly this product's success is based more on selling to executives than on quality, and it has been some time since I worked in an organization that had executives to sell to.
- jacquesm 10y agoIt sounds like it might be a worthwhile effort to reverse engineer one of those.
- AlyssaRowan 10y agoReverse-engineer? A middlebox? Which holds trusted secret keys and which, in its normal unremarkable operation, intercepts, parses, reconstructs, decrypts, re-encrypts, forwards, and optionally logs both confidential and attacker-controlled traffic? And is also known to be used for nationwide bulk internet censorship by regimes often called 'oppressive'? Why, doesn't it just. Please consider, very carefully, the ethics and equities issues one might face with any interesting findings here.
- lmm 10y agoWhat's true is true - better to know it than stick our heads in the sand. If these boxes have vulnerabilities (who am I kidding, they do parsing, they're probably implemented in C "for performance", of course they have vulnerabilities), we are better off for knowing about them than not.
- AlyssaRowan 10y ago
- peterwwillis 10y agoThe fix should not have been reversion. The fix should have been a simple workaround that if the connection fails totally and no downgrade handshake attempt was made, make a new connection using 1.2 to start with, which would succeed and the connection opened. This would be equivalent to a downgrade handshake from 1.3 to 1.2 but without requiring all products support 1.3.
- dvorak42 10y agoThe problem with this fix is that then as long as you have the fallback, the user gains none of the security properties of TLS 1.3 (since the attacker can always force a downgrade by sending junk to the client during the handshake) and has the additional cost of a second TLS negotiation. While there was previously this "TLS fallback" implemented in Chrome to work around buggy endpoints, this was primarily due to buggy endpoints* which was a much larger issue and difficult to fix, while these middlebox issues affect a much smaller portion of users and we're hopeful that the middlebox vendors that have issues can fix their software in a more timely manner. * TLS 1.3 moves the version negotiation into an extension, which means that old buggy servers will only ever know about TLS 1.2 and below for negotiation purposes and won't break in a new matter with TLS 1.3.
- peterwwillis 10y agoAm I not correct that 1.3 got backed out of chrome for the current issue? So 1.3 isn't even there now... Which breaks anything that explicitly requires 1.3. My fix would support all cases and not break anything. Unless I missed something?
- cesarb 10y agoNothing can require 1.3, since 1.3 isn't finished yet. They were doing interoperability testing with a draft version of TLS 1.3, and nobody should require a draft version of TLS 1.3 without having a fallback to TLS 1.2.
- jandrese 10y agoSometimes it is even worse than that. Some of the middleware TLS proxies don't verify the certificate before they resign the data. They completely open up your enterprise to MITM attacks, and in fact hide the fact that you are being MITMed. This came to light way back during the Superfish debacle, and some vendors still have not fixed the problem.