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> Despite your link, there is a lot of solid psych research. Yes, solid, but lacking the dimension of falsifiable theories about the mind. Tax accounting is al

• mattkrause 10y ago
  Really? Psychophysics and perception research is widely considered to be part of psychology, and has strong, falsifiable theories about how sensory stimuli are encoded and processed. Using purely behavioural methods, psychophysicists figured out that there were three color-sensitive "sensors" and pinned down their properties. I'm not sure it suddenly becomes biology because someone later found the cellular substrate, nor did it become chemistry when someone figured out the structure of opsin. Likewise, I'd argue that a lot of the learning stuff (e.g., reinforcement learning) also describes the mind's operation in testable and falsifiable ways.
  • lutusp 10y ago
    > Psychophysics and perception research is widely considered to be part of psychology ... Not according to the APA, nor how psychology is formally defined. http://www.apa.org/support/about-apa.aspx?item=7 http://www.apa.org/support/about-apa.aspx?item=7 Quote: "Psychology is the study of the mind and behavior." > and has strong, falsifiable theories about how sensory stimuli are encoded and processed. Studies that aren't based on empirical evidence, that aren't based on theories about nature, cannot be falsified. We know a lot about behavior, but we have no empirical theories about it -- for that, we have to wait for neuroscience. > I'm not sure it suddenly becomes biology because someone later found the cellular substrate, nor did it become chemistry when someone figured out the structure of opsin. Of course it becomes biology/chemistry. But the connection between someone's ideas about the mind and biology can only be conjecture until neuroscience produces a physical theory that makes such a connection -- and at that point, mind studies will be abandoned. > ... also describes the mind's operation in testable and falsifiable ways. The mind is not a physical thing, consequently it cannot produce empirical evidence or falsifiability, two of science's fundamental requirements. If one psychological experiment asserts that X is so, and another asserts that X is not so, that's not a falsification, it's a contradiction. The difference? A contradiction can itself be contradicted in another experiment (something often seen in psychology), but a scientific falsification is conclusive. All this talk about empirical evidence, theories and falsifiability may seem overly philosophical until one realizes this is how we keep religion out of science classrooms.
    • mattkrause 10y ago
      Let me give you an example, from visual perception. The "Feature Integration Theory" suggests that low-level image features are processed in parallel: you extract information about the color, orientation, and movement in parallel across the entire visual field. However, these representations are separate, and a second, serial process is needed to combine information across the two areas. This makes a specific, testable predictions. Suppose you're searching for a red triangle. If this shape is embedded in a sea of green triangles, your reaction time shouldn't vary as a function of the green triangles. The same thing should happen if the red triangle is surrounded by red circles--reaction times should be relatively constant regardless of the number of red circles. However, if you need to find a red triangle embedded in a mix of red circles and green triangles, you should a) be slower and b) your reaction time should be a function of the total number of shapes. I'd argue that this theory is empirical (run the experiment, record reaction times) and about as falsifiable as it gets (it's easy to test the difference in RT. vs. item # slopes). I'd also argue that this is a computational theory describing how visual search works, without worrying about the underlying implementation of that process. Clearly, it would be interesting to know that too, but it's certainly not necessary. David Marr proposed that cognitive processes could be studied on three levels: computational (what's the problem), algorithmic (what's a way to solve the problem), and implementation (what do the neurons do to run that algorithm), and each level was largely independent of the ones below.
      • lutusp 10y ago
        You seem to be missing the point that, no matter how many hypotheses we make about the inner workings of the brain, we cannot turn them into science without either confirming or refuting them by direct examination of the brain itself. As long as we're hypothesizing about mechanisms that remain beyond direct observation, it's speculation. One cannot falsify a speculation. Psychology doesn't study the brain, it studies the mind. > I'd argue that this theory is empirical ... The observation is empirical but the theory isn't. It cannot become science without validation by way of empirical evidence. https://youtu.be/LIxvQMhttq4?t=32 https://youtu.be/LIxvQMhttq4?t=32 > I'd also argue that this is a computational theory describing how visual search works, without worrying about the underlying implementation of that process. Yes -- and because we cannot directly observe the processes we're hypothesizing about, we cannot make them a matter of empirical evidence, therefore we have no basis for falsification. https://www.britannica.com/topic/criterion-of-falsifiability https://www.britannica.com/topic/criterion-of-falsifiability Quote: "Criterion of falsifiability, in the philosophy of science, a standard of evaluation of putatively scientific theories, according to which a theory is genuinely scientific only if it is possible in principle to establish that it is false." > Clearly, it would be interesting to know that too, but it's certainly not necessary. Only necessary for science, otherwise not important.