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There's a second hypothesis that explains why (second) preimage attacks are not commonly published: after a hash collision is produced, the crypto community has
by jepler 10y ago
There's a second hypothesis that explains why (second) preimage attacks are not commonly published: after a hash collision is produced, the crypto community has no further interest. How much was ever published about, say, MD4 after the 1995 document that this article cites, showing a practical piece of software for generating collisions? I haven't tried to answer that question, but I suspect the answer is "not much".
- jepler 10y agoI could be wrong about this. For instance, http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2148250.2148477 http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2148250.2148477 https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/868b/443aec1e87951c8a896b1298c1fa9cdd1e1e.pdf https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/868b/443aec1e87951c8a896b12... "Improved preimage attack on one-block MD4" is a 2012 publication improving the preimage attack on MD4 from 2^107 to 2^95. So 17 years after a practical collision attack on MD4, academics ARE still working on it as a cryptographic primitive, but despite that they have NOT found a practical preimage attack on it.