> Besides even without that, his showing that what's natural could be seen in another different way is enough to deprive the stoics of their claim to naturalnes

> Besides even without that, his showing that what's natural could be seen in another different way is enough to deprive the stoics of their claim to naturalness. It is not naturalness the preach, he points, it's "how nature should be according to stoics". Why bother depriving the stoics of their claim to naturalness if the claim to naturalness has no value? And why should we care about depriving the stoics of their claim to naturalness when no one is claiming naturalness in the contemporary conversation? > But the even more important insight is this: "And granted that your imperative, "living according to Nature," means actually the same as "living according to life"--how could you do DIFFERENTLY? Why should you make a principle out of what you yourselves are, and must be?" Granted that "living according to nature" means whatever Nietzche wants it to mean, Nietzche can argue anything, but even a cursory reading of the stoics shows that the stoics weren't speaking tautologically when they said "life according to nature". "Life according to nature" in stoic terms is more like "life that acknowledges the limitations placed on one by reality". Stated in English as quoted, Nietzche's argument sounds like Nietzche didn't even read the stoics. However, I suspect that Nietzche's intent may have been lost in translation, as such semantic arguments translate poorly.