I think the main problem with the article is that it's conclusions are covered by signalling theory [1][2] but the author seems blissfully unaware that this fie

I think the main problem with the article is that it's conclusions are covered by signalling theory [1][2] but the author seems blissfully unaware that this field exists. A signal of quality is likely to be reliable if it's inherently expensive to produce and is correlated to the desired metric. A big peacock tail is a reliable indicator of the peacock's health, because to falsely grow a bigger tail than it should support would end up being detrimental for the peacock. Same with lion manes, college degrees, etc. The author points out that there are metrics and signals that can be overvalued, and that's true, but the hospital example is a terrible one because fellow physicians have access to the true quality of a doctor. A surgeon with a good degree, expensive watch, and nice clothing will not fool his or her fellow doctors because they actually see how they operate in the theatre. If a doctor X tells me that surgeon Y is good (and I trust doctor X), then that's sufficient evidence because doctor X almost certainly knows better than me, and I can entirely skip the process of evaluating surgeon Y's sartorial choices myself. Where the author's point makes more sense is addressing pop-culture indications of quality, which are more likely to be incorrect because the general public (or the media industry specifically) is not an expert in any given field. You probably shouldn't hire an engineer simply based on ideas of what hackers look and talk like gleaned from Mr. Robot, but I think most people already knew that? [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signalling_(economics) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signalling_(economics) [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signalling_theory https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signalling_theory