8 ms·
Linus has toned down a lot from a decade ago. > You are _literally_ arguing for the equivalent of "what if a meteorite hit my plane while it was in flight - ma
by paulddraper 10y ago
Linus has toned down a lot from a decade ago.
> You are _literally_ arguing for the equivalent of "what if a meteorite hit
my plane while it was in flight - maybe I should add three inches of
high-tension armored steel around the plane, so that my passengers would
be protected".
> That's not engineering. That's five-year-olds discussing building their
imaginary forts ("I want gun-turrets and a mechanical horse one mile high,
and my command center is 5 miles under-ground and totally encased in 5
meters of lead").
> If we want to have any kind of confidence that the hash is reall
yunbreakable, we should make it not just longer than 160 bits, we should
make sure that it's two or more hashes, and that they are based on totally
different principles.
>
And we should all digitally sign every single object too, and we should
use 4096-bit PGP keys and unguessable passphrases that are at least 20
words in length. And we should then build a bunker 5 miles underground,
encased in lead, so that somebody cannot flip a few bits with a ray-gun,
and make us believe that the sha1's match when they don't. Oh, and we need
to all wear aluminum propeller beanies to make sure that they don't use
that ray-gun to make us do the modification _outselves_.
> So please stop with the theoretical sha1 attacks. It is simply NOT TRUE
that you can generate an object that looks halfway sane and still gets you
the sha1 you want. Even the "breakage" doesn't actually do that. And if
it ever _does_ become true, it will quite possibly be thanks to some
technology that breaks other hashes too.
> I worry about accidental hashes, and in 160
bits of good hashing, that just isn't an issue.
http://www.gelato.unsw.edu.au/archives/git/0504/0885.html http://www.gelato.unsw.edu.au/archives/git/0504/0885.html
- cbhl 10y agoIt's worth noting that selecting SHA-1 ten years ago is probably akin to selecting SHA-512 today -- a collision on MD5 was first announced in 2004, and computers and GPUs were a lot slower ten years ago.
- petertodd 10y agoFWIW, the first warnings that SHA-1 was insecure and "It's time for us all to migrate away from SHA-1." were published prior to git's initial 2005 release: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/cryptanalysis_o.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/cryptanalysis...
- vacri 10y agoBecause as we know, the security industry isn't a firehose of fear about everything that isn't airgapped (and then airgapping itself). Security recommendations come so thick and fast that even security researchers themselves don't bother following them. Even the bloke in your link explicitly apologises for using Word for some things, and he's considered a saint in the industry. What all the commenters here doing a hatchet-job on Torvalds are missing is that he's saying "show me the money"/"perfect is the enemy of good". The hatchet-jobbers are too busy doing the usual tittering over his language to actually absorb the point.
- loup-vaillant 10y agoClearly, Linus didn't know at the time. If he'd know, he would have chosen another hash in 3 seconds —no additional complexity, no additional effort involved in not choosing a hash the security community starts to have doubts about.
- dingo_bat 10y agoDon't forget the extra computation cost with a more complex hash.
- KingMob 10y agoWhich is largely irrelevant on desktops. Nobody's using git on embedded devices, so hash computational cost shouldn't be the deciding factor. Maybe people storing BLOBs will notice.
- reacweb 10y agoThere are blobs in the kernel and speed was a very important motivation when kernel switched to git.
- loup-vaillant 10y ago
- schoen 10y agoI don't think that comparison is quite right: ten years ago we already had two of Xiaoyun Wang's attacks which significantly reduced the work factor to break SHA-1. They were already cited at the time as reasons to move away from the algorithm (and I doubt we'd be able to do the 2⁸⁰ work needed to get a collision without cryptanalytic research! — notably the successful Stevens attack today reported performing a total of 2⁶³ hash operations while claiming to be "one of the largest computations ever completed"). There's also important concern about SHA-512 (which has led to SHA-3 and other options), but I'm not sure it can be put in the same category; at least all of the best attacks today are significantly reduced-round. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-2#Cryptanalysis_and_validation https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-2#Cryptanalysis_and_valida... By contrast, Wang's original attack (which we had more than 10 years ago) achieved a 2¹¹ speedup for collisions against full SHA-1 and her second attack later the same year achieved 2¹⁷ speedup. Evidently the speedup for the final version of Stevens's attack (which worked) was also around 2¹⁷. By contrast, a Moore's law improvement over 10 years would only be expected to make computers around 2⁶ times faster! (At the risk of mixed or mangled metaphors, we might say that mathematical insight during the time period you mention has been about 2¹¹ times more useful for attacking SHA-1 than computer power increases.) Edit: someone else linked to Valerie Aurora's chart, which I'd forgotten about, which gives a synopsis of the historical status of the most popular hashes. On that chart, SHA-1 from 2005 was one category worse ("Weakened") than SHA-512 is today ("Minor weakness"). http://valerieaurora.org/hash.html http://valerieaurora.org/hash.html
- flamedoge 10y agoSomething that bothers me is, why don't there exist dynamic encryption that scales with the current computing power? Then we might have less of a migration mess. Hope is that encryption breakers have to win by algorithmic strength rather than brute force "add more cores".
- wapz 10y agoWow you could have copy pasted that whole response. Every single sentence was fairly aggressive.
- DINKDINK 10y agoClassic availability bias and round trip bias "I have no evidence of SHA-1 being broken which is evidence that SHA-1 can't be broken"
- zkms 10y ago> "what if a meteorite hit my plane while it was in flight - maybe I should add three inches of high-tension armored steel around the plane, so that my passengers would be protected" I think this is a shockingly good example of how smart people get security questions utterly wrong. The right analogy when it comes to security has to involve some type of adversary, not just random, unmotivated natural phenomena -- as long as we're using aircraft analogies, it's not so much "a meteorite might randomly hit my plane in flight" as "there's angry and armed people shooting at my plane with armour-piercing ammunition". Indeed, in the real world, putting hundreds of kilograms of armour on aircraft isn't the absurd/childish idea Linus seems to think it is: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairchild_Republic_A-10_Thunderbolt_II#Durability https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairchild_Republic_A-10_Thunde...
- DiabloD3 10y agoThe A-10 isn't a plane, it's a gun with a plane wrapped around it. And it hunts tanks.
- jessaustin 10y agoWe took a couple of minutes off this afternoon to watch some Warthogs pulling some tight maneuvers... to think, USAF wants to sell them all to Poland...
- protomyth 10y agoI am told the gun is also quite good at shooting ground troops. A relative of mine had an A-10 stay with his group most of the night. Every time the enemy decided to go after them the A-10 came back and made them rethink their actions.
- astrodust 10y agoThat zipper noise: To think that those are 30mm rounds being fired at that speed is just plain scary. http://www.xdtalk.com/attachments/img_7014-jpg.34438/ http://www.xdtalk.com/attachments/img_7014-jpg.34438/ If one of those is lingering, I wouldn't even fight if I was the enemy. It might not be able to kill a modern main battle tank, but I bet spraying it with rounds like that would fuck it up pretty seriously.
- philsnow 10y ago> > If we want to have any kind of confidence that the hash is reall yunbreakable, we should make it not just longer than 160 bits, we should make sure that it's two or more hashes, and that they are based on totally different principles. Why is this quoted in support of an argument that Linus used to come across as a lunatic in online correspondence ? This seems to me like an entirely reasonable way to make it very, very difficult to ever attack, because an attacker would have to be able to generate collisions for both of your hash functions. (I'm not a crypto expert -- maybe you are, if so and my above comment is totally wrong, can you explain how it's wrong?)
- ckozlowski 10y agoI think Linus' point at the time was that the computational cost added to every transaction to protect against a (at the time) highly infeasible event of questionable impact was a poor cost vs. benefit argument. Adding complexity isn't free, and there needs to be a measurable benefit against a threat. But of course, now is not then. And I think zkms' metaphor "there's angry and armed people shooting at my plane with armour-piercing ammunition" is apt here. The threat is much more sizable now, and so the cost vs. benefit analysis has changed. Incidentally, one of the requirements of the SHA-3 competition was that it not be related to previous hashes. So while there are no demonstratable attacks against SHA-2, we nonetheless have "two ...hashes, and that they are based on totally different principles."
- loup-vaillant 10y agoWhile we're at it, every SHA-3 finalist were deemed "good enough", so we now have more than 2 such hashes. (I personally love Blake2b.)
- AlexandrB 10y agoI actually asked this exact question in the SHA-1 thread and got an informative response [1]. Apparently creating a collision in two hash functions is not much harder [2]. [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13715146 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13715146 [2] https://www.iacr.org/archive/crypto2004/31520306/multicollisions.pdf https://www.iacr.org/archive/crypto2004/31520306/multicollis...
- btym 10y ago> It is simply NOT TRUE that you can generate an object that looks halfway sane and still gets you the sha1 you want This was his point, and it's still true. Generating a specific SHA-1 hash is still not feasible.
- euyyn 10y agoIt's not so inconceivable, after seeing the PDF collision, to contribute to another project a commit whose hash has a collision with another malicious commit you keep up your sleeve. Not saying it's easy, but now it's on the horizon.
- otabdeveloper 10y ago> Not saying it's easy, but now it's on the horizon. Not really. It's not a preimage attack. They spent several hundred dollars to find two random byte strings with the same SHA1 hash. There's still no way to SHA1-collide a specific byte string instead of random junk.
- victorNicollet 10y agoThis is exactly what euyyn is saying: create two files with the same SHA1 (by adding bytes of gibberish to an unused section), commit one to the repository, and now you have an collision available.
- mi100hael 10y agoThat's not how git uses hashes. In that scenario, there would still be a diff and hence git would recognize the files were different.
- somerandser99 10y agoWhere are the technical arguments? Just false analogies and hyperboles. I wouldn't like to work with a person like this in my team.