4 ms·
Lol, Google just purged that search. EDIT: but there's still plenty of fish: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:lw4K9G2F1WgJ:lightnetwork.ph/
by toyg 10y ago
Lol, Google just purged that search.
EDIT: but there's still plenty of fish: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:lw4K9G2F1WgJ:lightnetwork.ph/ofw-family-day-december-1/&num=1&hl=en&gl=uk&strip=0&vwsrc=1 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:lw4K9G2...
This will take weeks to clean, and that's just for Google.
EDIT2: found other oauth tokens, lots of fitbit calls... And this just by searching for typical CF internal headers on Google and Bing. There is no way to know what else is out there. What a mess.
- danielweber 10y agoGood. They're trying to clean up all the private data leaked everywhere. I tempted to say "why couldn't they figure out this google dork themselves" but they've probably been slammed for the past 7 days cleaning up a bunch of stuff anyway.
- taviso 10y agoYou have no idea.
- danielweber 10y agoYour hard work is appreciated.
- mintplant 10y agoFYI, I'm seeing some more of these results show up (with active caches) for the following searches: "CF-RAY" "CF-Force-Miss-TS" "X-SSL-Server-Name" "Internal Upstream Server Certificate0"
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- clowd 10y agoThe effort you're putting into cleaning up someone else's mess cannot be understated, nor can it be sufficiently appreciated. Thanks!
- pseudopseudonym 10y agoThank you for all your hard work.
- ec109685 10y agoAny chance you can describe why these cached pages missed the purge that cloudflare initiated? Seems like cloudflare should have brought an outside expert to try to exploit this issue before the disclosure was made.
- tptacek 10y agoFor vulnerabilities with immediate exploit exposure, where people are currently being victimized by the flaw, Project Zero has a 7-day embargo. The short waiting period balances the vendor's interest in coordinating the smoothest fix to the problem with the public's interest in knowing its exposure and maximizing it's options for reacting to the exposure. The fixed waiting period keeps the process sane. Every vendor you'll ever disclose a serious vulnerability to will try to delay disclosure, usually repeatedly. If you set a precedent of making arbitrary exceptions, you'll never be able to stare anyone down. Again: as the reporters, you're trying to balance the vendor's interests with those of the public. Your credibility in these situations is pretty important, not just for this vulnerability, but for the next ones. With P0, we all know there will be a long series of "next ones" to be concerned about.
- meowface 10y agoI definitely understand the embargo, but this is one of those situations where the vuln was already fixed and it's likely very few malicious actors (possibly 0, but of course who knows) were aware of its existence. I feel like adding even just another day or two would've allowed them to purge more of these search results. I think that would greatly outweigh the increased risk of letting it remain undisclosed for slightly longer.
- ec109685 10y agoThank you for your thoughtful reply and realize the difficult situation you are in.
- tptacek 10y agoHah, no, my situation is super easy; it is "partisan bystander." I don't work for Google.
- i336_ 10y agoNot sure if you'll see this, but I've noticed that the cache links have been removed on literally all hits for these queries. And yet, I occasionally see working cache links on relevant unaffected pages. Really, really awesome to see this kind of response. It's an obvious course of action (also considering corporate liability that you're publicly holding/offering this data) but it's really cool to see everyone work to fix this en masse so quickly. I think a lot of people would enjoy hearing campfire battle stories of the past ~week once this is all over.
- photon-torpedo 10y ago> This will take weeks to clean, and that's just for Google. Couldn't Google just purge all cached documents which match any Cloudflare header? This will probably purge a lot of false positives, but it's just cached data, so would that loss really matter? My guess is that this approach should not take more than a few hours on Google's infrastructure. Of course, this leaves the problem of all the other non-Google caches out there.
- camus2 10y agoOuch, you really see everything : > authorization: OAuth oauth_consumer_key ... what a shit show. I'm sorry but at that point there must be consequences for incompetence. Some might argue "But nobody can't do anything" ... I'm sorry, CF has the money to to ditch C entirely and rewrite everything from the ground up with a safer language, I don't care what it is, Go,Rust whatever. At that point people using C directly are playing with fire. C isn't a language for highly distributed applications, it will only distribute memory leaks ... With all the wealth there is in the whole Silicon Valley, trillions of dollars, there is absolutely 0 effort to come up with an acceptable solution? all these startups can't come together and say: "Ok,we're going to design or choose a real safe language and stick to that"? where does all that money goes then? Because this bug is going to cost A LOT OF MONEY to A LOT OF PEOPLE.
- dunham 10y agoThese guys were probably saved by using OAuth - there is a consumer secret (which the "_key" is just an identifier for) and an access token secret, both of which are not sent over the wire. Just a signature based on them. (The timestamp and nonce prevent replay attacks.) OAuth2 "simplified" things and just sends the secret over the wire, trusting SSL to keep things safe.
- EGreg 10y agoDoes this have anything to do with CloudFlare's ambitious attempt to be the first service to proxy your https traffic to your users? Perhaps the largest MITM ever eh?
- lexicality 10y agoThis actually happened because they started to rewrite it all, according to their blog post.
- IceyEC 10y agoStarted to re-write it...in C
- dunham 10y agoOAuth1 doesn't send the secrets with the requests, just a key to identify the secret and a signature made with the secret. OAuth2 does send the secret, typically in an "Authorization: Bearer ..." header. The uber stuff that somebody else linked to looks like a home-grown auth scheme and it appears that "x-uber-token" is a secret, but hard to know for sure.
- ifdefdebug 10y agoSo while people are having fun here with search queries, how many scripts are already up and running in the wild, scraping every caching service they can think of in creative ways for useful data... This is an ongoing disaster, wasn't this disclosed too soon?