4 ms·
> If anything, if we want to take computation more seriously, we should adopt a foundation that accounts for non-terminating computation natively... Of course,
by pron 10y ago
> If anything, if we want to take computation more seriously, we should adopt a foundation that accounts for non-terminating computation natively... Of course, ZFC is even worse in this regard.
I really don't understand this line of argument, regardless of the conclusion. Does the application of math to physics suggest that we should adopt a logical foundation of mathematics that does not allow expressing speed quantities greater than the speed of light? This notion may not be as far-fetched as it may seem, because the sole justification for defining problems that take an infinite number of steps to compute as "non-computable" in the first place was physical, as was Brouwer's justification for intuitionistic mathematics. Moreover, Turing quickly realized that computability (or its converse, non-termination) are crude approximations for feasibility (or tractability), that was more fully developed later. And we could continue this argument further to any degree, so why stop at computability?
- catnaroek 10y agoWith all due respect to physicists and their work, physics doesn't belong in the foundation of mathematics. If our understanding of physics changed drastically tomorrow (an admittedly very improbable event), all mathematics not directly related to physics should remain unaffected. On the other hand, computation does belong in the foundations: constructing and verifying proofs (even informal ones) is computing, and it is the role of foundations to tell us how those computations can be carried out in a pleasant way. Any change in our understanding of computation should lead us to revise how we construct and verify proofs.
- pron 10y agoBut the definition of computation is physical. The Church-Turing thesis is a physical hypothesis. It is conceivable that a new physical discovery will contradict the Church-Turing thesis, and with it the definition of what is computable (and in particular how we construct and verify proofs, which is but a small part of computation).
- catnaroek 10y ago> But the definition of computation is physical. A lot of mathematics is inspired by physical considerations, but mathematical concepts are themselves not physical. In particular, computation is just having state transitions, not necessarily in a physical system. (Just like recursion is any form of self-reference in any definition, not necessarily procedure definitions.) > The Church-Turing thesis is a physical hypothesis. Then let's not mention it, and stick to what can be dealt with mathematically.
- pron 10y ago> A lot of mathematics is inspired by physical considerations, but mathematical concepts are themselves not physical. I'm not sure I understand your point. It is true that any computation can be modeled mathematically, but so can any other physical process. Also, computation does not require a specific physical implementation and is an abstract concept, but so what? Gödel, Turing and von Neumann were very well aware that computation is a physical/philosophical concept described mathematically, not a purely mathematical one. > Then let's not mention it, and stick to what can be dealt with mathematically. But the definition of what is computable and what isn't depends on the Church-Turing thesis.
- eastWestMath 10y agoComputation is an entirely abstract thing. Nowhere does the definition of Turing machines or the lambda calculus makes any reference to actual physical things.
- pron 10y agoChurch doesn't really define computation[1], and Turing most certainly bases his entire definition (the first ever definition of computation) on multiple references to physical things (finite "states of mind", limits of what can be read or manipulated at any one time etc.). Brouwer also bases intuitionism on the physical, when he appeals to the limited capability of a finite (idealized) mind. Computation carried out with an infinitely fast (in terms of physical time) and/or infinitely large computer is not Turing computation. [1]: He conjectures that LC coincides with what he calls a "a vague intuitive notion" of an algorithm, and when he tries to make a rigorous argument he finds that he needs to rely on circularity, and writes this: "if this [circular] interpretation or some similar one is not allowed, it is difficult to see how the notion of an algorithm can be given any exact meaning at all."
- AnimalMuppet 10y ago> constructing and verifying proofs (even informal ones) is computing I'd like to see your proof for that assertion...