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Most important note to policy makers: encryption is a reality we can't limit or forbid. It's maths. Deliberately weakened encryption, special "master keys" or
by alkonaut 10y ago
Most important note to policy makers: encryption is a reality we can't limit or forbid. It's maths.
Deliberately weakened encryption, special "master keys" or legal restrictions on the use of powerful encryption are not even remotely feasible.
The bottom line is: everyone, especially those we wouldn't prefer did, can communicate securely when they want.
A policymaker who still thinks that there is some kind of "pragmatic middle way" where the intelligence community can listen to potential terrorists while the rest of us can still do secure online banking, is delusional and needs to be told as much.
- adrianN 10y agoIf you ban encryption, only criminals will be able to use encryption. That is very convenient, since it's easy to detect when people are communicating on a secure channel. The same argument applies of course if you only allow encryption that has a master key that allows LEA to eavesdrop. That is probably safe enough for online banking (it's the system we currently have with https), so from a policymaker's point of view this is an okay solution.
- EthanHeilman 10y ago>That is very convenient, since it's easy to detect when people are communicating on a secure channel. This is a fairly complicated question. Disk/file encryption is not easy to detect without access to the disk , however I won't discuss that here because you only addressed communication. Generally when policy people talk about encryption they mean technologies which protect confidentiality, but not technologies which protect authentication e.g. signature algorithms, MACs, etc. Authentication technologies often contain random fields such as nonces this provides a very obvious location to store encrypted data in a message. Given that ciphertexts should be indistinguishable from randomness, an attacker should not be able to tell that a random field is not random without the key. There are already tools which hide ciphertexts in nonce fields. Compression also provides a useful place to hide ciphertexts since it looks random as well. Most criminals will not go to the lengths above. Most people including most criminals prefer convenience over security. That being said, if communication security is important to a crime (and it usually isn't), and the criminals are competent at INFOSEC (they usually aren't) they can and will use encryption which is not easily detectable (spies can and will use hard to detect encryption even if encryption is illegal). We are moving toward a society in which almost anything done in public is recorded and analyzed via video, RFID/cell tower access patterns/social media/license plate readers. Police have never had more tools to investigate crime and never had more evidence to convict people. If LEOs so wished and had the resources to handle the caseload and arrests they could get ~90% clearance for jaywalking.
- jrcii 10y agoJust to clarify, I've seen an argument repeatedly that secure backdoors for law enforcement are foolish because they're a mathematical impossibility. So that we're not discrediting our (anti backdoor) position by guilt of exaggeration, we can safely admit that's false. https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/97690/MIT-CSAIL-TR-2015-026.pdf https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/97690/MIT-CSA... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_escrow https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_escrow https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_sharing https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_sharing The problem isn't with mathematical impossibilities but the practical realities of implementing these techniques and the inherent, insurmountable side channel attacks.