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Harvey Friedman bringing incompleteness and infinity out of quarantine
- Mathnerd314 10y agoHis recent posts on equivalence theory: http://www.cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2017-February/020299.html http://www.cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2017-February/020299.htm... http://www.cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2017-February/020300.html http://www.cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2017-February/020300.htm... http://www.cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2017-February/020301.html http://www.cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2017-February/020301.htm... They still don't strike me as particularly natural or simple, particularly when compared to my favorite example of incompleteness, the surreal numbers. The surreal numbers are defined via transfinite induction and can grow as large as whatever cardinal you choose, and there are good reasons to pick large cardinals (closure under various operations), with the associated complications. > “The idea that there’s absolute solidity, a right and wrong, in mathematics—that mathematics has no real conceptual philosophical issues that have to be dealt with … I’m interested in completely blowing that up.” First-order logic is sound and complete; it's only second-order and higher logic that supports Godel's incompleteness theorem. Since most math is done in first-order logic (plain ZF, not even C; I think this is what the 85% figure in the article is referring to) I'm pretty sure this is not going to happen.
- cousin_it 10y agoZF is subject to the incompleteness theorems, it can't prove Con(ZF). Even much simpler systems, like Peano arithmetic, are subject to them.
- Mathnerd314 10y agoIt's consistent/complete in first-order logic, because Con(ZF) is a higher-order statement and thus can't even be formulated. First-order logic has a lot of nice properties, e.g. "if a result is finitary in the sense that it can be phrased as a first-order statement in Peano Arithmetic, and it can be proven using the axiom of choice (or more precisely in ZFC set theory), then it can also be proven without the axiom of choice (i.e. in ZF set theory)." (c.f. https://terrytao.wordpress.com/2013/12/07/ultraproducts-as-a-bridge-between-discrete-and-continuous-analysis/ https://terrytao.wordpress.com/2013/12/07/ultraproducts-as-a...)
- cousin_it 10y agoCon(ZF) is a sentence in ZF.
- JumpCrisscross 10y ago> Given any class of mutually exclusive classes, of which none is null, there is at least one class which has exactly one term in common with each of the given classes... If anyone else's train of thought got wrecked by the proposition of mutually-exclusive classes sharing terms, here you go: http://www.encyclopedia.com/people/science-and-technology/mathematics-biographies/bertrand-arthur-william-russell http://www.encyclopedia.com/people/science-and-technology/ma....
- Mathnerd314 10y agoYeah. Typically you don't even use Choice though, instead it's Zorn's Lemma: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zorn's_lemma https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zorn's_lemma. Zorn's Lemma has interesting weakenings, like https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boolean_prime_ideal_theorem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boolean_prime_ideal_theorem (they all amount to statements about particular types of ultrafilters: https://terrytao.wordpress.com/2007/06/25/ultrafilters-nonstandard-analysis-and-epsilon-management/ https://terrytao.wordpress.com/2007/06/25/ultrafilters-nonst...).
- rntz 10y agoThe "there is at least one class which.." doesn't mean "there is at least one class in that class of mutually exclusive classes which..."; it means "there exists at least one class at all which...". This is one way of phrasing the axiom of choice (although Russell uses "class" instead of "set"; in modern-day usage, we distinguish classes from sets, and AC applies to sets only).
- JumpCrisscross 10y agoIt made sense once I mentally substituted "there exists at least one class" for "there is at least one class".
- d3ckard 10y agoIt's especially interesting given that P vs NP is suspected to be unprovable in ZFC. Waiting for further development!
- IngoBlechschmid 10y agoI hugely enjoyed a survey article by Scott Aaronson on P ≟ NP. Section 3.1 contains a discussion on the possibility of the question being independent from ZFC. (He doesn't believe this possibility to be likely.) http://www.scottaaronson.com/papers/pnp.pdf http://www.scottaaronson.com/papers/pnp.pdf
- logicallee 10y agoI'm curious why you say "P vs NP is suspected to be unprovable in ZFC". What would make mathematicians suspect that (if you know)? I mean ZFC is not a toy system, it is obviously used in complex and deep ways to prove or resolve long-standing questions in ways that build on tons of deep results that themselves took tons of research. (By the way for anyone else reading, just so you don't get the wrong idea: ZFC is actually the standard set of axioms mathematicians work with every day. It's the normal way to do math.) What would make someone suspect this one is impossible to prove/decide under ZFC? (Or what would make someone think it is independent under ZFC?) "A lot of people have tried to prove it" doesn't seem a convincing argument. (Consider advances toward the twin prime conjecture, or the now-proven Fermat's last theorem, etc.) There must be something more that makes you say that. Thank you for any answer.
- rocqua 10y ago> ZFC is actually the standard set of axioms mathematicians work with every day I'd dispute that mathematicians work with ZFC every day. Most pure but not foundational mathematics basically works with intuitionist set theory. By keeping the size and nesting of sets small enough, we never need to worry about ZFC. Zorn's lemma comes up occasionally, but that is all.
- logicallee 10y ago
- jesuslop 10y agoIf you want to hear of Friedman in real debate there is great discussion in the foundations of mathematics mailing list archives that are public. There there is real lively yet high-standards scholar figth of first rate experts from all viewpoints. I liked for instance the 'myth of second order logic' theme initiated by S. Simpson. It seems to me that the article is wrong when it says that the spheres recompounded bigger are a problem of large cardinal axioms. I think it derives from Choice, the C in ZFC instead.
- golergka 10y ago> I liked for instance the 'myth of second order logic' theme initiated by S. Simpson. Can you link to the thread? The archives seem gigantic
- wfn 10y agoPossibly http://www.personal.psu.edu/t20/fom/postings/9903/msg00069.html http://www.personal.psu.edu/t20/fom/postings/9903/msg00069.h... (and Simpson's replies downthread, e.g. http://www.personal.psu.edu/t20/fom/postings/9903/msg00151.html http://www.personal.psu.edu/t20/fom/postings/9903/msg00151.h...)
- jesuslop 10y agoI made this version for me of the relevant posts, too big for pastebin, hope permissions are ok: https://app.box.com/s/l36rfge3stx6go34or6l64m2eexijd26 https://app.box.com/s/l36rfge3stx6go34or6l64m2eexijd26 Some initial posts are warmup.
- Chinjut 10y agoI find Harvey Friedman has made the FOM mailing list completely unreadable. AND incredibly hostile to anyone with any sympathy to category theory, type theory, or the like. See https://plus.google.com/+CodyRoux/posts/6TiKLxjSCnu https://plus.google.com/+CodyRoux/posts/6TiKLxjSCnu (not by me, but expressing many of the same thoughts I've had; I particularly agree with many of the comments made by John Baez).
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- fmap 10y agoThere is a lot of ordinary mathematics that is outside of ZFC, which Friedman is well aware of but the writer of this article may not be. Grothendieck was not interested in abstract set theory when he introduced what are now called "Grothendieck Universes". He merely wanted to do algebraic geometry at a high level of abstraction. Similarly, Conway was apparently a bit dismayed when the formalization of his simple idea of "surreal numbers" required deeply unnatural encodings in ZFC... My opinion is still that ZFC itself is unnatural as a foundation for mathematics, precisely because we have to do so much encoding to get anything useful out of it. And whenever you iterate "large" encodings you leave the universe of "ordinary ZFC". Conway suggested - and this is realized in modern type theory - that we should instead allow arbitrary "free" constructions, such as his surreal numbers, to extend the basic universe of mathematics. To some extend this can be encoded in set theory, but only with ridiculously large (Mahlo) cardinals. This is not a direction that Friedman considers worthwhile, because he thinks that first-order logic and ZFC are inevitable. It's a shame that so many people on the FOM mailing list share the same view. There are good reasons why you don't find a lot of category theorists on that list anymore...
- auggierose 10y agoYou can combine ZFC and simple type theory to give you something in which you can comfortably do surreal numbers. This is done by embedding ZFC as a simple type. For example, here this is done for Partizan Games (which contain the surreal numbers): http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11921240_19 http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11921240_19
- sanduu 10y agoDo you use a pay~pal ? because if you do you can include an extra 300 a week to your earnings only working on the internet for 5 hours per day, check this site... http://bit.ly/2atnA1a http://bit.ly/2atnA1a
- pron 10y ago> a lot of ordinary mathematics that is outside of ZFC A lot of ordinary math? I think there's one if not two exaggerations in there. > My opinion is still that ZFC itself is unnatural as a foundation for mathematics, precisely because we have to do so much encoding to get anything useful out of it. One of the things Friedman likes to emphasize about the foundation of math is that there is very little you actually need to do with it. A good foundation is one that you don't even need to know is there. Most mathematicians don't work in any formalism, so a foundation doesn't need to be useful. It's not as if anyone actually needs to do all those tedious set encodings. Except that many of those who call for new foundations are really interested in mechanical proof checkers, and those do have to be useful. In order to make these arguments less religious, I think it would be worthwhile to adopt Turing's mathematical philosophy, which called for adopting mathematical foundations on an ad-hoc basis (or even no foundation at all). In other words, choose whatever foundation (if any) for the task at hand. This would make it easier to argue that, say, type theory is a more convenient core for proof checkers. > This is not a direction that Friedman considers worthwhile, because he thinks that first-order logic and ZFC are inevitable. That's not how I read him. He thinks that FOL and ZFC are good enough, and as foundations don't matter in practice (a good foundation is one you can ignore; I think that's a quote by him), it would take some achievement to justify seriously considering alternatives. He even says what it would take: easier teaching and/or easier proofs. So far no alternative foundation has been able to improve either one.
- lmm 10y ago> Showing it’s not provable, on the other hand, is more difficult. He did this with a proof by contradiction: He began with the assumption that he could prove his theorem in ZFC, and then constructed from it a system of objects in which ZFC holds. Which means that if his theorem holds true, then ZFC is consistent—and, transitively, that ZFC has proven its own consistency. But by Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, that cannot possibly be the case. And so, the theorem cannot be proven in ZFC. He’s working to extend the theory to other types of symmetries, other definitions of “maximal,” and other types of objects. So he encoded some statements about ZFC into these statements about sets of rationals. Wasn't Gödel was able to do better already, encoding statements about ZFC into basic arithmetic/number theory? I guess I just don't understand what the big breakthrough is supposed to be, even though I'm interested in alternate axiom systems (e.g. the whole homotopy type theory / univalent foundations business). Is the idea that he's come up with some new natural statements about symmetries of sets that turn out to demonstrate incompleteness? That would be an innovation, but the above description makes it sounds like it's more about finding symmetry statements that correspond to ZFC.
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- arketyp 10y agoHow does this relate to automata theory and Wolfram's principle of computational equivalence (spare me any lectures about his self-promotion) and the conjecture that universal Turing machines are virtually ubiquitous and arise from the simplest of rules?
- orbifold 10y agoI think homotopy type theory has a better shot at providing a good foundation for math as opposed to some revision of set theory.
- AnimalMuppet 10y agoI don't understand HoTT. But every time I try to learn a bit about it, I go to the Wikipedia article (hey, everybody's got to start somewhere). And something always bugs me: They're trying to build a foundation for all of mathematics. But their starting point requires weak omega groupoids. But weak omega groupoids are not exactly a fundamental object; you kind of need a foundation of something else before you ever get anywhere near weak omega groupoids. Their foundation, then, seems to me to be inevitably recursive. Now, I get that the people involved in this are much smarter than me, and know far more mathematics. So, if you can, ELI5: Why isn't HoTT a recursive house of cards?
- Chinjut 10y agoHomotopy Type Theory axiomatizes weak omega groupoids; it gives you formal rules you can manipulate to reason about weak omega groupoids. This is exactly the same way, say, ZFC axiomatizes sets of sets of sets… "You're allowed to shuffle symbols in these ways, and the results of doing so we shall call theorems". There's not an intrinsic sense in which sets are "foundational objects" and groupoids aren't; yes, you can encode groupoids as set structures with certain properties, but in just the same way, you can encode sets as groupoid structures with certain properties. Or, for example, you can encode points and lines using coordinates and Dedekind cuts of rational numbers or what have you, but you can also do Euclidean geometry without first developing some theory of real number arithmetic in that fashion, just directly axiomatizing the relevant properties of points and lines. Any formal system gives you some basic rules to work with; as long as you can communicate and understand the rules, you're good to go. You don't need any other prerequisites.
- AnimalMuppet 10y agoWell, it's pretty easy to say that math started with the counting numbers. It's not much more of a reach to say that when we were counting some collection of things, we were counting the elements of a set. So saying that sets are the foundation of mathematics is, historically, quite natural. Weak omega groupoids? Not so much. [Edit: Excellent ELI5, though. Thanks.]
- BostX 10y agoTL;DR
- ibgib 10y agoInteresting article. I can relate to his dictionary investigations when I was confronted with being taught about "circular definitions". I couldn't get around (no pun intended) the fact that all definitions were circular. This is what has led me to developing ibGib, which as I stated here elsewhere (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13632500 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13632500) that ibGib is heavily influenced by Goedel in that it uses a SHA-256 hash of an immutable datum to effectively be the Goedelian number of that datum. So there are four fields: ib, gib, data, rel8ns. The gib is the hash of the other three fields, which allows for integrity of the data, as well as allowing it to be content addressable since the ib^gib is the address. So it's a monotonically increasing data store that focuses on the process of defining. So instead of "proofs" that imply an ontological/objective "truth", ibGib focuses on "the meta proof" that is the prov-ing process by assigning any "proving mechanism" a number (just as it assigns anything a number). This way, you are approaching paradoxes and the like as a process of economics and evolution of proving systems. This is like the "proof" that contains the peer review process that is doing the proving.