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Should your therapists secretary, who has access to your medical records and your therapists notes be able to pick up malware from some drive by page and be abl
by Spooky23 10y ago
Should your therapists secretary, who has access to your medical records and your therapists notes be able to pick up malware from some drive by page and be able to exfiltrate your data without any audit trail or inspection?
Should a administrative person at your local police department be able to take screenshots of a criminal complaint where someone wrongfully alleges that you have commited some horrific crime and post them to Facebook or save to their Dropbox?
You have a duty to protect your customers. In my career, I've had to testify as a witness when employees attempted to steal customer identities by various means. They were caught because our outbound DLP/proxy identified structured data that matched records commonly in use.
I don't claim that AV is special. I do claim that evaluating the quality of an HTTPS implementation inside of AV software is difficult, particularly for customers (typically SMB, schools, or municipal government) who are looking at client based solutions.
If you're in a position of leadership in a company that may be handling my data, please let me know so that I can do business elsewhere.
- fulafel 10y agoDo you realize what controls "Should person X be able to do Y" implies? We don't live in a surveillance state where we control people by all encompassing surveillance. This is the status quo, and there's a consensus to keep it that way. Even in the US where employer snooping is largely unregulated, people are still left with more than enough capability to exfiltrate information from their organisations. Changing that would imply twice-daily pat-downs / cavity searches, inability to exit the workplace for lunch, bans of personal smartphone etc devices, regular home searches, wiretapping of personal phone/im/email etc and it would still be leaky. I'm sure you can find instances of leaks where they happened through channels that your "DLP" product has caught, and I can see how that works as a marketing point for DLP. But in the big picture the problem isn't "TLS is secure" and outbound traffic snooping doesn't solve it.