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> I would argue that's it is irresponsible not to Please do so. Please present a compelling argument for why, in the general case, it is irresponsible not to s
by jstanley 10y ago
> I would argue that's it is irresponsible not to
Please do so. Please present a compelling argument for why, in the general case, it is irresponsible not to spy on your employees.
- pilif 10y agoWhile there's the potential of spying, there's also the much more common use-case of AV scanning the whole stream but otherwise not looking at it and not archiving it anywhere. Now we can all debate the value of AV scanning in general (I'm on the probably-not-worth-it-and-way-too-risky side), but if we attribute any kind of value to AV scanning (it might help with wide-spread attacks at the cost of facilitating targeted attacks), then being able to peek into SSL tunnels is a requirement for it to provide any kind of its proposed value. Depending on your users level of knowledge and your updating procedure, not running AV might indeed be considered irresponsible. If your systems are somewhat unpatched and your users oblivious to threats, then you're much more likely to be owned by and wide-spread malvertising and email spam attack (both of which AV actually protect against) than you're likely to be the victim of a targeted attack (which AV actually makes easier to pull off) just by virtue of the former being much more common than the latter.
- jcrawfordor 10y agoIn real corporate environments (where, keep in mind, most users are very non-sophisticated), this kind of inline scanning is extremely valuable. TLS intercepted data is also invaluable for post-incident investigation, for example, to determine whether or not a host A/V detection is likely valid without having to go through a costly and disruptive host forensics process (typically by grabbing the file out of retained data, or just by determining where the file actually came from). In fact, without TLS interception, post-incident investigation based on network artifacts is becoming more and more impractical as malicious actors are taking advantage of LetsEncrypt and CloudFlare to HTTPS protect their delivery and C2.
- anoother 10y agoI think they did: > How can you claim to protect customer data or respect customer privacy without looking at the data flowing out the front door?
- cmdrfred 10y agoWhy can your employees access resources that aren't approved in the first place? Considering their machine contains such sensitive information, that seems irresponsible.
- eropple 10y agoBecause some of those employees are database administrators and business analysts. Because others are customer service reps. Because how do you do a job without the data required to do a job?
- jerf 10y agoWho said they're not approved? People get approval to access all sorts of things that they aren't supposed to let out of the company. Or may be obligated to take certain steps to ensure that it's not just on the good graces of the employees to ensure doesn't get out. There's no squaring the circle here. You can not lay obligations on corporations to secure their stuff, but not permit them to have any tools that allow them to actually implement that security, and expect security to be the result. You can't assume that all employees of all companies everywhere that deal with sensitive information are solely staffed by angels, especially in light of the fact that the very fact that they deal with sensitive information can attract people who deceptively pose as employees long enough to get their hands on this information.
- 3pt14159 10y agoI agree with jerf here. In many cases I think the answer should be to create certain systems that are almost always offline (say after installation). We shouldn't be connecting the same computers that hold health records to the network that the doctor is checking Ask MD in the back office.